

Review of Bertrand Russell, *My Philosophical Development* (1959, Routledge Classics Edition 2023)

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Read-through quotes and notes

Quotations from *My Philosophical Development* (MPD) are delimited using < >, while quotations from elsewhere are delimited using ‘ ’ or “ ”.

pp.ix-xvi, <Foreword to the Routledge Classics Edition> by Nicholas Griffin, comprising: an overview of MPD, which to me is no improvement on Russell’s own <Introductory Outline>; and a catalogue of its specific errors, none of which strike me as ‘fatal’.

p.xvii, <Prefatory Note>: Here Russell advises readers to review Alan Wood’s barely-commenced <Russell’s Philosophy: A Study of its Development>, included as pp.227-249. Having done so, I don’t agree with Russell that Wood <admirably clarifies various things that might otherwise cause misunderstanding>. Instead, once again I prefer Russell’s own <Introductory Outline>.

pp.1-4, <1 | Introductory Outline>: <At Cambridge I was indoctrinated with the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, but G. E. Moore and I together came to reject both these philosophies. ... When, however, after 1910, I had done all I intended to do as regards pure mathematics, I began to think about the physical world and, largely under Whitehead’s influence, I was led to new applications of Occam’s razor, to which I had become devoted by its usefulness in the philosophy of arithmetic. ... Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, I have sought solutions of philosophical problems by means of analysis; and I remain firmly persuaded, in spite of some modern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analysing is progress possible.> It’s clear that Russell assumes that his philosophical development is the result of <analysis>, rather than ‘iterative development’ and/or ‘the toolkit approach’, which I maintain are the key components of ‘scientific method’, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf. This is consistent with Russell’s assumptions and methods as deployed in *History of Western Philosophy* (HWP); see HWPNotes.pdf pp.70-72 for my views on that.

pp.5-15, <2 | My Present View of the World>: Whilst this commences with a ‘materialist’ premise which is similar to that in MyPhilosophy03.pdf – compare <the great processes of nebular and stellar evolution proceed according to laws in which mind plays no part> with “every material entity in this universe came into existence through the automatic operation of many competing physical processes” – our paths diverge thereafter. I have several problems with Russell’s perspective, as follows.

- This <View of the World> is predicated on an interpretation of physics which is completely in thrall to Einstein’s general theory of relativity. But in my view this is just as mistaken as a philosophy framed wholly by Newtonian mechanics. Since each of these theories is applicable only within its own finite domain,* it’s incorrect to see either of them as ‘true’ or ‘false’ in any absolute sense. It follows that Russell’s inferences from this viewpoint don’t survive my critique of HWP p.633, see HWPNotes.pdf p.58. (*See ideas5.doc 2/6/23 for the five qualities of a well-defined {Perspective, Tool, Model, Theory, Philosophy}.)
- As for Russell’s inferences from the <irreversibility of physical processes>, in my view these are largely mistaken, because “for open and dynamic environments ... it seems that complexity only ever gives rise to yet more complexity”, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf. Granted, it’s not obvious how this seemingly innocuous observation is a counter-argument to Russell’s grand scheme. Nevertheless, for me it’s a succinct and compelling summary of a lifelong interest in and study of (i) the Second Law of Thermodynamics, see for example my

comments on *Unended Quest* p.183 and pp.189-194 in UQNotes.pdf, and (ii) nonlinear dynamics, see for example *How to Make a Mind* (HMM) pp.114-115.

- As well as making the contributions to academic philosophy summarised in MPD, in his lifetime Russell exerted a powerful influence on social values and opinions, notably through his pacifism during the First World War and his campaigning for nuclear disarmament during the Cold War. In my view the ideas that led to these actions are just as essential to Russell's overall philosophical development as his work on mathematical logic (for example).

Therefore I judge this <View of the World> to be incomplete, or incoherent, or both.

I consider the potency of these objections to be sufficient to justify my continued preference for *my* present view of the world over that of Russell *circa* 1959.

pp.16-25, <3 | First Efforts>: <I began thinking about philosophical questions at the age of fifteen. ... Just before and just after my sixteenth birthday, I wrote down my beliefs and unbeliefs, using Greek letters and phonetic spelling for purposes of concealment.> To me this early compulsion to express private thoughts *in writing* is the key to Russell's genius. It's one of the reasons why I identify with him so strongly: when I was eighteen I bought "a medium-sized lockable metal box" in order to "hide from prying eyes whatever thoughts and emotions I felt worthy of committing to paper", thereby chancing upon the priceless discovery that "by hiding secrets in a lockable metal box I could, in due course, unlock the shackles of my mind", see HMM pp.22-23.

<On the whole I am inclined to pursue truth, though truth of the kind in this book (if that indeed be truth) I have no desire to spread, but rather to prevent from spreading.> Russell was just sixteen when he wrote this, and clearly already on the way to becoming a great philosopher.

<It was not only as to theology that I had doubts, but also as to mathematics. ... However, I found so much pleasure in the acquisition of technical skill that at most times I forgot my doubts. And, to some extent, they were laid to rest by a book which greatly delighted me: W. K. Clifford's *Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*.> This book (available online, see link below) is an introduction to pure and applied mathematics, covering roughly the same material as my A Level in the subject, 1978-1980. The author's mother was a Kingdon, see *The Kingdon Family* pp.167-168.

pp.26-41, <4 | Excursion into Idealism>: <James Ward, whom I had consulted as to what I should read ... drew the inference that I had better read no more philosophy till after my mathematical Tripos, with the result that I did not do so badly in it as had been feared when he gave his advice. ... When I had finished my Tripos, I sold all my mathematical books and made a vow that I would never look at a mathematical book again. And so, in my fourth year, I plunged with whole-hearted delight into the fantastic world of philosophy.> Similarly, in the final year of my physics degree I "became entirely pragmatic, put aside philosophical doubt, and just learned by rote what was required for the exams", after which, "Partly as a reaction to too many physics facts and equations and too few philosophical doubts, and partly in order to study in the same place as Geeta, I followed my three years at Imperial with one year at the London School of Economics (LSE), undertaking their MSc course in Logic and Scientific Method", see HMM p.24. (However, on finishing my degree I didn't sell my physics books, for the simple reason that I'd parted with them the year before, at a knock-down price to Geeta's sister Sunita.)

<On re-reading what I wrote about the philosophy of physics in the years 1896 to 1898, it seems to me complete nonsense, and I find it hard to imagine how I can ever have thought otherwise.>

From the extracts in this chapter I'm inclined to agree with Russell. And I feel much the same about my "childishly simplistic" MSc essays, see HMM p.25.

<Every science works with a certain limited number of fundamental ideas, which number is smaller than that of all the fundamental ideas. Now every science may be regarded as an attempt to construct a universe out of none but its own ideas. What we have to do, therefore, in a logic of the sciences, is to construct, with the appropriate set of ideas, a world containing no contradictions but those which unavoidably result from the incompleteness of these ideas.> In his earlier sentences Russell *nearly* makes the case for what I call 'the toolkit approach', but in the latter sentence he

reverts to the grand dream of devising a single all-encompassing theory. Many twentieth-century physicists had this same aspiration, which “indeed was the aim of theoretical physics, at least in the 1970s and 1980s when I was a student”, see UQNotes.pdf. I consider it to be a great mistake.

pp.42-52, <5 | Revolt into Pluralism>: In which Russell sets out his 1907 argument against the <doctrine of internal relations>. Constrained by the historical context, it’s difficult to see what all the fuss is about; but it helps to read the Wikipedia definition of this doctrine, see link below, and Russell’s broader analysis in HWP pp.575-576, see HWPNotes.pdf p.50. Insofar as the debate concerns the essential components of a modern language, in my view this has been revolutionised by my analysis in Review05.pdf; and this opinion underpins several other arguments expressed here and elsewhere, for example those on HWP pp.173-184 and pp.410-411, see HWPNotes.pdf p.13 and pp.28-29 respectively.

pp.53-60, <6 | Logical Technique in Mathematics>: <The enlightenment that I derived from Peano came mainly from two purely technical advances of which it is very difficult to appreciate the importance unless one has (as I had) spent years in trying to understand arithmetic. Both these advances had been made at an earlier date by Frege, but I doubt whether Peano knew this, and I did not know it until somewhat later. ... The first advance consisted in separating propositions of the form ‘Socrates is mortal’ from propositions of the form ‘All Greeks are mortal’. ... The second important advance that I learnt from Peano was that a class consisting of one member is not identical with that one member.> An insightful history lesson.

pp.61-71, <7 | *Principia Mathematica*: Philosophical Aspects>: In which Russell describes his discovery of a paradox in Cantor’s (‘naïve’) set theory, and his attempts to address it by means of his <theory of types> and/or his <theory of descriptions>. I took these theories into account (adequately, in my view) when I wrote HMM pp.115-118 and Review05.pdf respectively.

pp.72-85, <8 | *Principia Mathematica*: Mathematical Aspects>: In which Russell describes his <theory of relation-arithmetic>, lamenting that it has gone <largely unnoticed>. I suspect that it has been rendered obsolete by Zermelo’s modifications to the axioms of set theory, and more recently by the relational model for databases as defined by Codd’s rules.

<We defined what we called ‘the multiplicative axiom’: the assumption that it is always possible to make a selection of one representative from each of a set of classes none of which is null. We found no arguments either for or against this axiom, and we therefore included it explicitly in the hypothesis of any proposition which used it. At the same time that we came upon this problem, Zermelo set up what he called ‘the principle of selection’, which is a slightly different but logically equivalent assumption. He was among those who regarded it as a self-evident truth. Since we did not adopt this view, we sought as many devices as possible for dealing with multiplication without assuming the axiom.> What Russell calls Zermelo’s <principle of selection> is also known as his ‘Axiom of Choice’, see W. & M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford 1962) pp.681-683, and my analysis of the barber paradox, *Principia Intellegentia* pp.100-108. In denigrating it as <slightly different but logically equivalent> to his own <multiplicative axiom> Russell appears to be suffering from a surfeit of sour grapes.

pp.86-92, <9 | The External World>: <All the puzzles about the differences between different people’s perceptions of one thing, and about the causal relation between a physical thing and its appearances at different places, and, finally (perhaps most important of all), between mind and matter ... have all been caused by failure to distinguish the three places associated with any given percept which are (I repeat): (1) the place in physical space where the ‘thing’ is; (2) the place in physical space where I am; (3) the place in my perspective which my percept occupies in relation to other percepts.> Well, who knows? In my view all such <puzzles> may be solved by means of my usual statement that “Everything is defined through its associations”, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf.

pp.93-108, <10 | The Impact of Wittgenstein>: <Wittgenstein's doctrines influenced me profoundly. I have come to think that on many points I went too far in agreeing with him>.

Well, who knows? HMM p.123: "Have you ever read anything by Ludwig Wittgenstein or Noam Chomsky? I tried, but failed miserably. Putting it in language that even they would understand, I have absolutely no idea what they're on about." And that's all I have to say about that.

pp.109-114, <11 | Theory of Knowledge>: <I found my thoughts turning to the theory of knowledge and to those parts of psychology and of linguistics which seemed relevant to that subject. ... At the beginning of this work I had no fixed convictions, but only a certain store of maxims and prejudices. I read widely and found, in the end, ... that a great part of what I had read was irrelevant to my purposes. | Amongst the prejudices with which I had started, I should enumerate six as specially important: | First. It seemed to me desirable to emphasise the continuity between animal and human minds. ... This preconception led me to read a great deal of animal psychology. ... It seemed that animals always behave in a manner showing the rightness of the philosophy entertained by the man who observes them. This devastating discovery holds over a wider field. ... There was one region where there was a very considerable body of precise experimental knowledge. It was the region of Pavlov's observations on conditioned reflexes in dogs. These experiments led to a philosophy called Behaviourism which had a considerable vogue. ... as a method to be pursued as far as possible, I thought it valuable. ... Second. Along with prejudice in favour of behaviourist methods there went another prejudice in favour of explanations in terms of physics wherever possible. I have always been deeply persuaded that, from a cosmic point of view, life and experience are causally of little importance. ... Third. I feel that the concept of 'experience' has been very much over-emphasized, especially in the Idealist philosophy, but also in many forms of empiricism. ... Everybody, in fact, accepts innumerable propositions about things not experienced, but when people begin to philosophize they seem to think it necessary to make themselves artificially stupid. I will admit at once that there are difficulties in explaining how we acquire knowledge that transcends experience, but I think the view that we have no such knowledge is utterly untenable. | Fourth. I had, and have, another prejudice which works in the opposite direction from the one we have just been considering. I think that all knowledge as to what there is in the world, if it does not directly report facts known through perception or memory, must be inferred from premisses of which one, at least, is known by perception or memory. ... Fifth. ... Many philosophers speak critically of the 'correspondence theory' of truth, but it always seemed to me that, except in logic and mathematics, no other theory had any chance of being right. | I thought, also, as a consequence of my desire to preserve continuity with animal intelligence, that the importance of language, great as it is, has been over-emphasized. It seemed to me that belief and knowledge have pre-verbal forms, and that they cannot be rightly analysed if this is not realized. ... Sixth. This brings me to the last of my initial prejudices, which has been perhaps the most important in all my thinking. This is concerned with method. My method invariably is to start from something vague but puzzling, something which seems indubitable but which I cannot express with any precision. I go through a process which is like that of first seeing something with the naked eye and then examining it through a microscope. I find that by fixity of attention divisions and distinctions appear where none at first was visible, just as through a microscope you can see the bacilli in impure water>. Here Russell directs his formidable powers of observation and analysis on to his own assumptions and methods. His six <prejudices> have counterparts in my own philosophy, as follows: <First>, "the routine mental processing of an illiterate person will be effectively indistinguishable from that of a non-human animal", Review05.pdf; <Second>, "nothing exists other than the singular material universe", and "all people exist by virtue of the same physical processes that govern their environment", MyPhilosophy03.pdf; <Third>, <Fourth> and <Fifth>, "through all of these judgments together – each in its own way, but none too much – a person establishes the *true truth*, for better or worse", Review05.pdf; and <Sixth>, "true scientific method ... has two components, 'iterative development' and 'the toolkit approach'", MyPhilosophy03.pdf.

pp.115-125, <12 | Consciousness and Experience>: In which Russell analyses the concepts of <awareness>, <consciousness>, <sensation>, <sense-data>, <experience>, <conditioned reflex>, <perception>, and <knowledge>. This extraordinary train-of-thought is to my assertion that “Thinking is nothing more and nothing less than recognition”^{*} as Descartes’ fireside *Meditations* are to his revolutionary insight, *cogito ergo sum*. And yes I have just associated myself directly with both the “Father of Modern Philosophy” and “the greatest of modern philosophers”, see link below and HWPNotes.pdf p.72 respectively. (*See HMM p.159, Review05.pdf.)

pp.126-135, <13 | Language>: In which Russell analyses the <meaning>, <elementary uses>, <understanding>, and <structure> of our words and sentences, thereby anticipating many of my observations in HMM pp.83-86. But while Russell’s precision and depth of analysis far exceed my own, he doesn’t come close to articulating what strikes me as the ‘obvious’ conclusion, “that semantics is mainly concerned with the identification of associated percepts: pattern recognition, in other words.” (This in turn is the basis of my usual statement that “Everything is defined through its associations”, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf.)

pp.136-153, <14 | Universals and Particulars and Names>: <The problems connected with universals and particulars and with the closely related matter of proper names have occupied a great deal of my thought ever since I abandoned the monistic logic. The problems are old, in fact at least as old as Aristotle.> Despite Russell’s intense and persistent focus on these problems, he doesn’t appear to have made any significant contribution to their solution. In comparison, in Review05.pdf I express the radical view that “once an idea has been expressed *in writing* it may be comprehended in just the same way as any other percept. Thus our use of language effectively renders obsolete the traditional philosophical distinction between ‘universals’ and ‘particulars’, and with it the ancient belief that abstract ideas exist independently as Platonic ‘forms’, or that they are bestowed by God.”

pp.154-167, <15 | The Definition of ‘Truth’>: In which Russell sets out numerous arguments in favour of the <correspondence> theory of truth, but against the <coherence> and <pragmatist> theories. One of these arguments commences, <pragmatism holds that a belief is to be judged true if it has certain kinds of *effects*, whereas I hold that an empirical belief is to be judged true if it has certain kinds of *causes*>: which anticipates a similar distinction that I make in my own analysis of truth theories, see HMM pp.166-168. Nevertheless we reach very different conclusions, firstly because like every other philosopher of his time Russell fails to acknowledge *provenance* as a criterion of truth, and secondly because I don’t see the resulting ‘five distinct ways to truth’ as being in competition with one another, but rather as the complementary means by which the ‘true truth’ may be established, see HMM pp.181-182 and Review05.pdf.

pp.168-184, <16 | Non-Demonstrative Inference>: I take this mode of reasoning to be one that “does not produce a full, complete, or final demonstration of a claim, i.e., where fallibility and corrigibility of a conclusion are acknowledged.” This description is from the Wikipedia article on ‘defeasible reasoning’ (see link below), which identifies its subject as “a particular kind of non-demonstrative reasoning”, and further notes that “Other kinds of non-demonstrative reasoning are probabilistic reasoning, inductive reasoning, statistical reasoning, abductive reasoning, and paraconsistent reasoning.” To me this wild proliferation shows that no one method is sufficiently reliable to be of general use. In the <Foreword> Nicholas Griffin assesses Russell’s contribution as follows: <To my knowledge, the five postulates of non-demonstrative inference that Russell explains in Chapter 16 have had no influence on contemporary development of non-monotonic logic, but his priority in identifying the problem and his early attempts to solve it deserve recognition. Non-demonstrative inference was an idea born well before its time.> I disagree: in my view these <five postulates> are simply yet another attempt at the venerable “problem of induction by simple enumeration”, which according to Russell himself “remains unsolved to this day”, see

HWP pp.529-530 (quoted on HWPNotes.pdf p.42, where once again I take the opportunity to promote my alternative notion of ‘scientific method’). Nevertheless in this chapter Russell *does* come up with <an idea born well before its time>, that of cognitive biases: * <I found that, for lack of analysis, people had admitted blocks of non-demonstrative inference because they had a subjective prejudice in favour of certain kinds of knowledge, and had rejected other blocks on account of a contrary prejudice.> (* See link below and HMM chapter 3.)

pp.185-190, <17 | The Retreat from Pythagoras>: <My philosophical development, since the early years of the present century, may be broadly described as a gradual retreat from Pythagoras. The Pythagoreans had a peculiar form of mysticism which was bound up with mathematics. This form of mysticism greatly affected Plato and had, I think, more influence upon him than is generally acknowledged. I had, for a time, a very similar outlook and found in the nature of mathematical logic, as I then supposed its nature to be, something profoundly satisfying in some important emotional respects. ... All this, though I still remember the pleasure of believing it, has come to seem to me largely nonsense, partly for technical reasons and partly from a change in my general outlook upon the world. Mathematics has ceased to seem to me non-human in its subject-matter. I have come to believe, though very reluctantly, that it consists of tautologies. I fear that, to a mind of sufficient intellectual power, the whole of mathematics would appear trivial ... I cannot any longer find any mystical satisfaction in the contemplation of mathematical truth. | The aesthetic pleasure to be derived from an elegant piece of mathematical reasoning remains. But here, too, there were disappointments ... this mood began to pass, and was finally dispelled by the First World War. | One effect of the War was to make it impossible for me to go on living in a world of abstraction. I used to watch young men embarking on troop trains to be slaughtered on the Somme because generals were stupid. I felt an aching compassion for these young men, and found myself united to the actual world in a strange marriage of pain. All the high-flown thoughts that I had had about the abstract world seemed to me thin and rather trivial in view of the vast suffering that surrounded me. The non-human world remained an occasional refuge, but not as a country in which to build one’s permanent habitation. | In this change of mood, something was lost, though something also was gained. What was lost was the hope of finding perfection and finality and certainty. What was gained was a new submission to some truths which were to me repugnant. My abandonment of former beliefs was, however, never complete. Some things remained with me, and still remain: I still think that truth depends on a relation to fact, and that facts in general are non-human; I still think that man is cosmically unimportant, and that a Being, if there was one, who could view the universe impartially, without the bias of *here* and *now*, would hardly mention man, except perhaps in a footnote near the end of the volume; but I no longer have the wish to thrust out human elements from regions where they belong; I have no longer the feeling that intellect is superior to sense, and that only Plato’s world of ideas gives access to the ‘real’ world. I used to think of sense, and of thought which is built on sense, as a prison from which we can be freed by thought which is emancipated from sense. I now have no such feelings. I think of sense, and of thoughts built on sense, as windows, not as prison bars. I think we can, however imperfectly, mirror the world, like Leibniz’s monads; and I think it is the duty of the philosopher to make himself as undistorting a mirror as he can. But it is also his duty to recognize such distortions as are inevitable from our very nature. Of these, the most fundamental is that we view the world from the point of view of the *here* and *now*, not with that large impartiality which theists attribute to the Deity. To achieve such impartiality is impossible for us, but we can travel a certain distance towards it. To show the road to this end is the supreme duty of the philosopher.> The First World War awakens Russell from his dogmatic slumbers. Indeed, “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, | Than are dreamt of in our philosophy.”

pp.191-226, <18 | Some Replies to Criticism>: These <four polemical articles> are enormous fun (for those that like this kind of thing), but there’s nothing substantive which hasn’t been discussed in previous chapters, so there’s no need for further commentary here.

Summary observations and conclusions

Positive:

- I identify strongly with Russell because our philosophical journeys started in a similar way, and because I too have struggled with the fundamental questions that he raises in this book.
- According to Lévi-Strauss, “The scientific mind does not so much provide the right answers as ask the right questions.” I agree; and I apply the same maxim to philosophy; and I claim that it’s Russell’s ability to ask the ‘right questions’ that distinguishes him as a great philosopher.
- I like Russell’s style of writing. It feels as if he’s in the same room, speaking directly to me.

Negative:

- This book’s title, *My Philosophical Development*, is misleading, because its contents are incomplete. It focuses almost exclusively on logic and epistemology; metaphysics (including ontology) is touched on, but not subjected to analysis; theology is mentioned only fleetingly; and ethics, politics, and aesthetics are omitted altogether.
- In Russell’s defence, in HWP pp.750-753 (quoted on HWPNotes.pdf pp.67-68) he states his view that philosophy comprises “two very different elements”, specifically, (i) the analysis of “questions which are scientific or logical” by means of “methods as to which there is general agreement”, and (ii) “an organic whole of ... extra-rational decisions”. In this book he addresses (i). Presumably (ii) is left for his autobiography, which is next on my reading list.
- However, even for (i) this book is incomplete, because while Russell addresses many important questions in epistemology, he doesn’t analyse what I consider to be the most important part, which is *his own method of analysis*. If he’d done so then he’d’ve seen that his approach was entirely negative, and consequently his main contributions to philosophy were also negative. For example, in my view, Russell’s greatest achievement has been his (negative) discovery of a disastrous paradox at the heart of naïve set theory; but none of his (positive) attempts to eliminate this paradox have come to anything. In HWP pp.514-515 (quoted on HWPNotes.pdf p.40) he states that “The men who founded modern science had two merits which are not necessarily found together: immense patience in observation, and great boldness in framing hypotheses.” Russell excels at the former, but not at the latter, and both for the same reason: his unexamined method of analysis.
- In support of the last point, it’s instructive to review my summaries of chapters 12-16 above, in each case comparing Russell’s conclusions with my own. By the criterion of “great boldness in framing hypotheses” it’s clear that in fact there is no comparison: my hypotheses are bold, whereas his are non-existent. And the secret of my success is that, unlike Russell, I’ve honed my method of analysis by *applying it to itself*. That is, my method of analysis – which I prefer to call ‘scientific method’ – is a rare example of a function which when used recursively converges to a stable solution that is neither trivial nor self-contradictory. As I point out on HWPNotes.pdf p.59, in relation to HWP pp.646-647, this stringent test proves more than a match for both the vaunted principle of induction and its upstart challenger, Karl Popper’s falsification criterion: the former because it “cannot be inferred inductively”, and the latter because it “cannot be falsified”. Similarly, if Russell’s method of analysis were to be applied to itself, the inevitable result would be a thoroughly unhelpful ‘Everlasting No’.

Overall:

- I feel justified in repeating my conclusion on HWPNotes.pdf p.72, “Bertrand Russell is the greatest of modern philosophers; a giant on whose shoulders I stand.”

References

References to unpublished notes in .doc format are for my own use, if ever I'd need to trace back my thought processes, so they can be safely ignored with no loss of information. References to online resources, including .pdf documents available on my website, are as follows:

Codd's rules: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codd%27s_12_rules

Cognitive bias: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_bias

Defeasible reasoning: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defeasible_reasoning

Doctrine of internal relations: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doctrine_of_internal_relations

Everlasting No: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Everlasting_No

Father of Modern Philosophy: <https://iep.utm.edu/rene-descartes/>

HWPNotes.pdf: <https://idealectic.com/idealectic/HWPNotes.pdf>

Lévi-Strauss quotations: https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Claude_L%C3%A9vi-Strauss

MyPhilosophy03.pdf: <https://idealectic.com/idealectic/MyPhilosophy03.pdf>

Review05.pdf: <https://idealectic.com/idealectic/Review05.pdf>

The Kingdon Family: <https://idealectic.com/idealectic/KingdonFamily.pdf>

Theory of descriptions: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_descriptions

Theory of types: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_theory

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W. K. Clifford, *The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences*:

<https://archive.org/details/commonsenseexac01clifgoog>

Zermelo set theory: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zermelo_set_theory