

## Review of Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (Second edition 1961, reprinted by Routledge 1991)

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### Read-through quotes and notes

Quotations from *History of Western Philosophy* are delimited using < >, while quotations from elsewhere are delimited using ‘ ’ or “ ”.

p.13, Introduction, first sentence: <The conceptions of life and the world which we call ‘philosophical’ are a product of two factors: one, inherited religious and ethical conceptions; the other, the sort of investigation which may be called ‘scientific’, using this word in its broadest sense.> I disagree: in my view ‘philosophy’ is best understood as the ‘search for truth’, for which the starting point must’ve been the formulation of a set of ‘fundamental questions’ about the nature of reality; with subsequent attempts at answering them resulting in a spectrum of <religious and ethical conceptions>, some of which may well have been <inherited>; complemented in modern times with <the sort of investigation which may be called ‘scientific’>. Thus it seems to me that, right from the off, Russell is putting the cart before the horse. Consequently, even though his very next step is to list a representative selection of these ‘fundamental questions’, he *doesn’t* then enquire how they were addressed throughout the ages, rather he spends the rest of his Introduction (pp.13-22) reinterpreting the history of Western civilisation in terms of his hypothetical dualism between religion and science – which I don’t necessarily accept.

pp.13-14: <Almost all the questions of most interest to speculative minds are such as science cannot answer, and the confident answers of theologians no longer seem so convincing as they did in former centuries. [1] Is the world divided into mind and matter, and, if so, what is mind and what is matter? [2] Is mind subject to matter, or is it possessed of independent powers? [3] Has the universe any unity or purpose? [4] Is it evolving towards some goal? [5] Are there really laws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of our innate love of order? [6] Is man what he seems to the astronomer, a tiny lump of impure carbon and water impotently crawling on a small and unimportant planet? [7] Or is he what he appears to Hamlet? [8] Is he perhaps both at once? [9] Is there a way of living that is noble and another that is base, or are all ways of living merely futile? [9] If there is a way of living that is noble, in what does it consist, and how shall we achieve it? [10] Must the good be eternal in order to deserve to be valued, or is it worth seeking even if the universe is inexorably moving towards death? [11] Is there such a thing as wisdom, or is what seems such merely the ultimate refinement of folly? ... The studying of these questions, if not the answering of them, is the business of philosophy.> To these ‘fundamental questions’ I’ve appended numbers [1]-[11], in order to facilitate their mapping to the Review05.pdf “five main areas of philosophical enquiry”, as follows: {Ontology = [6], [7], [8]; Cosmology = [1], [2]; Teleology = [3], [4]; Deontology = [9], [10]; Epistemology = [5], [11]}. The simplicity and balance of this mapping lends support both to Russell’s agenda and to Review05.pdf’s typology.

p.25: <In all history, nothing is so surprising or so difficult to account for as the sudden rise of civilization in Greece.> Here Russell demonstrates his knack of asking precisely the right question. His subsequent failure to nail down a single convincing answer is less impressive, however. He nearly gets there, with his passing comments on the invention of the alphabet (p.25, pp.30-31); but, instead of coming to the ‘obvious’ conclusion (as set out in Review05.pdf p.2), he gets sidetracked into retelling the history of ancient Greek literature (Homer) and religion. It’s fascinating, but it’s a description, not an explanation.

p.31: <The Egyptians used, at first, a pure picture writing; gradually the pictures, much conventionalized, came to represent syllables (the first syllables of the names of the things pictured), and at last single letters, on the principle of ‘A was an Archer who shot at a frog.’ This last step, which was not taken with any completeness by the Egyptians themselves, but by the Phoenicians, gave the alphabet with all its advantages. The Greeks, borrowing from the Phoenicians, altered the alphabet to suit their language, and made the important innovation of adding vowels instead of having only consonants. There can be no doubt that the acquisition of this convenient method of writing greatly hastened the rise of Greek civilization.> This is terrific, but completely subverted by the very next sentence, <The first notable product of the Hellenic civilization was Homer.>.

p.32: Reference to Gilbert Murray, *Five Stages of Greek Religion* (available online, see link below). These five stages are {I. Saturnia Regna; II. The Olympian Conquest; III. The Great Schools; IV. The Failure of Nerve; V. The Last Protest}, which I’d map to the usual IDEAL ‘lifecycle’ sequence, {Empiricist; Idealist; Activist; Conformist; Theorist}, respectively. In an appendix Murray gives a translation of Sallustius, *On the Gods and the World*, which comprises XXI propositions, including, on p.243, “IV. *That the species of Myth are five ... Of myths some are theological, some physical, some psychic, and again some material, and some mixed from these last two.*” These ‘species’ and their accompanying examples are not at all helpful, and I don’t see the point of trying to map them to IDEAL. Nevertheless it’s encouraging to find yet more evidence of the popularity of ‘pentamania’ through the ages. Sallustius was a fourth century Neoplatonist, see references below.

p.35, p.36, p.41: <The civilized man is distinguished from the savage mainly by *prudence*, or, to use a slightly wider term, *forethought*. ... The worshipper of Dionysus reacts against prudence. ... Prudence versus passion is a conflict that runs through history. It is not a conflict in which we ought to side wholly with either party. ... It was the combination of passion and intellect that made them [the Greeks] great, while they were great. Neither alone would have transformed the world for all future time as they transformed it. Their prototype in mythology is not Olympian Zeus, but Prometheus, who brought fire from heaven and was rewarded with eternal torment.> These points are quoted or endorsed by Stephen Fry in *Mythos*, pp.397-398. My ideas5.doc 20/9/22 review of the latter concludes, “The Prometheus/Dionysus dichotomy appears to describe System 2 versus System 1 behaviour, and also some learning style differences, Theorist versus Empiricist for example. But I don’t think it says anything that can’t be explained using the two-system model and IDEAL.” Specifically, neither Russell nor Fry makes the ‘obvious’ connection between the cognitive skill of prudence/forethought and the technical skill of writing, see *How to Make a Mind* (HMM) pp.103-105 and/or Review05.pdf p.2.

p.53: <It is interesting to observe, in Burnet’s account of the Pythagorean ethic, the opposition to modern values. ... This change of values is connected with a change in the social system – the warrior, the gentleman, the plutocrat, and the dictator, each has his own standard of the good and the true. ... Modern definitions of truth, such as those of pragmatism and instrumentalism, which are practical rather than contemplative, are inspired by industrialism as opposed to aristocracy.> This suggests the IDEAL mapping {Empiricist = Worker; Idealist = Dictator; Activist = Warrior; Conformist = Plutocrat; Theorist = Gentleman}, which in my view is more convincing than the mapping of Plato’s five ‘constitutions of States’, {Empiricist = Democracy; Idealist = Aristocracy; Activist = Tyranny; Conformist = Oligarchy; Theorist = Timocracy}, see *Principia Intellegentia* (PI) p.163. Secondly, in my view there are five definitions of truth, and through all of them “together – each in its own way, but none too much – a person establishes the *true truth*, for better or worse”, see Review05.pdf p.7.

p.55: <Mathematics is, I believe, the chief source of the belief in eternal and exact truth, as well as in a super-sensible intelligible world.> This may well be true – for intellectual mathematicians such as Russell. But mathematics is a tool, and like any other tool it has a finite domain of applicability. Consequently there is nothing in mathematics that can justify a belief in the existence of abstract universals such as <eternal and exact truth> or <a super-sensible intelligible world>.

p.56, Pythagoras: <I do not know of any other man who has been as influential as he was in the sphere of thought. I say this because what appears as Platonism is, when analysed, found to be in essence Pythagoreanism. The whole conception of an eternal world, revealed to the intellect but not to the senses, is derived from him. But for him, Christians would not have thought of Christ as the Word; but for him, theologians would not have sought logical *proofs* of God and immortality.> See my notes for pp.349-350 and pp.446-447 below.

p.58: <It has only been very slowly that scientific method, which seeks to reach principles inductively from observation of particular facts, has replaced the Hellenic belief in deduction from luminous axioms derived from the mind of the philosopher.> In my view the key feature of <scientific method> is not induction, or deduction, or even falsification; it's iteration. See my review of Karl Popper's *Unended Quest*, UQNotes.pdf.

p.68: <Parmenides assumes that words have a constant meaning; this is really the basis of his argument, which he supposes unquestionable. But although the dictionary or the encyclopaedia gives what may be called the official and socially sanctioned meaning of a word, no two people who use the same word have just the same thought in their minds.> In my view "Everything is defined through its associations", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.1.

p.74: <The most famous passage in Plato, in which he compares this world to a cave, in which we see only shadows of the realities in the bright world above, is anticipated by Empedocles; its origin is in the teaching of the Orphics.> See my notes for p.140 and pp.148-149 below.

pp.87-88: <The modern physicist, while he still believes that matter is in some sense atomic, does not believe in empty space. Where there is not matter, there is still *something*, notably light-waves. Matter no longer has the lofty status that it acquired in philosophy through the arguments of Parmenides. It is not unchanging substance, but merely a way of grouping events. Some events belong to groups that can be regarded as material things; others, such as light-waves, do not. It is the events that are the *stuff* of the world, and each of them is of brief duration. In this respect, modern physics is on the side of Heraclitus as against Parmenides. But it was on the side of Parmenides until Einstein and quantum theory. | As regards space, the modern view is that it is neither a substance, as Newton maintained, and as Leucippus and Democritus ought to have said, nor an adjective of extended bodies, as Descartes thought, but a system of relations, as Leibniz held. It is not by any means clear whether this view is compatible with the existence of the void. Perhaps, as a matter of abstract logic, it can be reconciled with the void. We might say that, between any two things, there is a certain greater or smaller *distance*, and that distance does not imply the existence of intermediate things. Such a point of view, however, would be impossible to utilize in modern physics. Since Einstein, distance is between *events*, not between *things*, and involves time as well as space. It is essentially a causal conception, and in modern physics there is no action at a distance. All this, however, is based upon empirical rather than logical grounds. Moreover the modern view cannot be stated except in terms of differential equations, and would therefore be unintelligible to the philosophers of antiquity. | It would seem, accordingly, that the logical development of the views of the atomists is the Newtonian theory of absolute space, which meets the difficulty of attributing reality to not-being. To this theory there are no *logical* objections. The chief objection is that absolute space is absolutely unknowable, and cannot therefore be a necessary hypothesis in an empirical science. The more practical objection is that physics can get on without it. But the world

of the atomists remains logically possible, and is more akin to the actual world than is the world of any other of the ancient philosophers.> Monism, pluralism, holism, atomism, realism, relativism: they're all theories; and any theory, like a model or a tool, has its own constraints, and presents its own distinct perspective of the singular material universe. As for what <The modern physicist> believes or does not believe: well, I'm a physicist, and I try not to make any such statements of belief; because I just don't look at the world in that way.

pp.109-110: <The Platonic Socrates anticipates both the Stoics and the Cynics. The Stoics held that the supreme good is virtue, and that a man cannot be deprived of virtue by outside causes; this doctrine is implicit in the contention of Socrates that his judges cannot harm him. The Cynics despised worldly goods, and showed their contempt by eschewing the comforts of civilization; this is the same point of view that led Socrates to go barefoot and ill-clad. | It seems fairly certain that the preoccupations of Socrates were ethical rather than scientific. In the *Apology*, as we saw, he says: 'I have nothing to do with physical speculations.' The earliest of the Platonic dialogues, which are generally supposed to be the most Socratic, are mainly occupied with the search for definitions of ethical terms. The *Charmides* is concerned with the definition of temperance or moderation; the *Lysis* with friendship; the *Laches* with courage. In all of these, no conclusion is arrived at, but Socrates makes it clear that he thinks it important to examine such questions. The Platonic Socrates consistently maintains that he knows nothing, and is only wiser than others in knowing that he knows nothing; but he does not think knowledge unobtainable. On the contrary, he thinks the search for knowledge of the utmost importance. He maintains that no man sins wittingly, and therefore only knowledge is needed to make all men perfectly virtuous. | The close connection between virtue and knowledge is characteristic of Socrates and Plato. To some degree, it exists in all Greek thought, as opposed to that of Christianity. In Christian ethics, a pure heart is the essential, and is at least as likely to be found among the ignorant as among the learned. This difference between Greek and Christian ethics has persisted down to the present day. | Dialectic, that is to say, the method of seeking knowledge by question and answer, was not invented by Socrates. It seems to have been first practised systematically by Zeno, the disciple of Parmenides; in Plato's dialogue *Parmenides*, Zeno subjects Socrates to the same kind of treatment to which, elsewhere in Plato, Socrates subjects others. But there is every reason to suppose that Socrates practised and developed the method. As we saw, when Socrates is condemned to death he reflects happily that in the next world he can go on asking questions for ever, and cannot be put to death, as he will be immortal. Certainly, if he practised dialectic in the way described in the *Apology*, the hostility to him is easily explained: all the humbugs in Athens would combine against him.> I regard this description of Socrates' character and method as definitive, because of its consistency with everything that's known about the man, and because of the ease and clarity of Russell's writing.

pp.122-124, <Chapter XIII | The Sources of Plato's Opinions>: <Plato and Aristotle were the most influential of all philosophers, ancient, medieval, or modern; and of the two, it was Plato who had the greater effect upon subsequent ages. I say this for two reasons: first, that Aristotle himself is an outcome of Plato; second, that Christian theology and philosophy, at any rate until the thirteenth century, was much more Platonic than Aristotelian. It is necessary, therefore, in a history of philosophic thought, to treat Plato, and to a lesser degree Aristotle, more fully than any of their predecessors or successors. | The most important matters in Plato's philosophy are: first, his Utopia, which was the earliest of a long series; second, his theory of ideas, which was a pioneer attempt to deal with the still unsolved problem of universals; third, his arguments in favour of immortality; fourth, his cosmogony; fifth, his conception of knowledge as reminiscence rather than perception. But before dealing with any of these topics, I shall say a few words about the circumstances of his life and the influences which determined his political and philosophical opinions. | Plato was born in 428-7 B.C., in the early years of the Peloponnesian War. He was a well-to-do aristocrat, related to various people who were concerned in the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. He was a young man when Athens was defeated, and he could attribute the defeat to democracy, which his social position and

his family connections were likely to make him despise. He was a pupil of Socrates, for whom he had a profound affection and respect; and Socrates was put to death by the democracy. It is not, therefore, surprising that he should turn to Sparta for an adumbration of his ideal commonwealth. Plato possessed the art to dress up illiberal suggestions in such a way that they deceived future ages, which admired the *Republic* without ever becoming aware of what was involved in its proposals. It has always been correct to praise Plato, but not to understand him. This is the common fate of great men. My object is the opposite. I wish to understand him, but to treat him with as little reverence as if he were a contemporary English or American advocate of totalitarianism. | The purely philosophical influences on Plato were also such as to predispose him in favour of Sparta. These influences, speaking broadly, were: Pythagoras, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Socrates. | From Pythagoras (whether by way of Socrates or not) Plato derived the Orphic elements in his philosophy: the religious trend, the belief in immortality, the other-worldliness, the priestly tone, and all that is involved in the simile of the cave; also his respect for mathematics, and his intimate intermingling of intellect and mysticism. | From Parmenides he derived the belief that reality is eternal and timeless, and that, on logical grounds, all change must be illusory. | From Heraclitus he derived the negative doctrine that there is nothing permanent in the sensible world. This, combined with the doctrine of Parmenides, led to the conclusion that knowledge is not to be derived from the senses, but is only to be achieved by the intellect. This, in turn, fitted in well with Pythagoreanism. | From Socrates he probably learnt his preoccupation with ethical problems, and his tendency to seek teleological rather than mechanical explanations of the world. 'The Good' dominated his thought more than that of the pre-Socratics, and it is difficult not to attribute this fact to the influence of Socrates. | How is all this connected with authoritarianism in politics? | In the first place: Goodness and Reality being timeless, the best state will be the one which most nearly copies the heavenly model, by having a minimum of change and a maximum of static perfection, and its rulers should be those who best understand the eternal Good. | In the second place: Plato, like all mystics, has, in his beliefs, a core of certainty which is essentially incommunicable except by a way of life. The Pythagoreans had endeavoured to set up a rule of the initiate, and this is, at bottom, what Plato desires. If a man is to be a good statesman, he must know the Good; this he can only do by a combination of intellectual and moral discipline. If those who have not gone through this discipline are allowed a share in the government, they will inevitably corrupt it. | In the third place: much education is needed to make a good ruler on Plato's principles. It seems to us unwise to have insisted on teaching geometry to the younger Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, in order to make him a good king, but from Plato's point of view it was essential. He was sufficiently Pythagorean to think that without mathematics no true wisdom is possible. This view implies an oligarchy. | In the fourth place: Plato, in common with most Greek philosophers, took the view that leisure is essential to wisdom, which will therefore not be found among those who have to work for their living, but only among those who have independent means, or who are relieved by the state from anxieties as to their subsistence. This point of view is essentially aristocratic. | Two general questions arise in confronting Plato with modern ideas. The first is: is there such a thing as 'wisdom'? The second is: granted that there is such a thing, can any constitution be devised that will give it political power? | 'Wisdom,' in the sense supposed, would not be any kind of specialized skill, such as is possessed by the shoemaker or the physician or the military tactician. It must be something more generalized than this, since its possession is supposed to make a man capable of governing wisely. I think Plato would have said that it consists in knowledge of the good, and would have supplemented this definition with the Socratic doctrine that no man sins wittingly, from which it follows that whoever knows what is good does what is right. To us, such a view seems remote from reality. We should more naturally say that there are divergent interests, and that the statesman should arrive at the best available compromise. The members of a class or a nation may have a common interest, but it will usually conflict with the interests of other classes or other nations. There are, no doubt, some interests of mankind as a whole, but they do not suffice to determine political action. Perhaps they will do so at some future date, but certainly not so long as there are many sovereign States. And even then the most difficult part of the pursuit of the general interest would consist in arriving at

compromises among mutually hostile special interests. | But even if we suppose that there is such a thing as ‘wisdom,’ is there any form of constitution which will give the government to the wise? It is clear that majorities, like general councils, may err, and in fact have erred. Aristocracies are not always wise; kings are often foolish; Popes, in spite of infallibility, have committed grievous errors. Would anybody advocate entrusting the government to university graduates, or even to doctors of divinity? Or to men who, having been born poor, have made great fortunes? It is clear that no legally definable selection of citizens is likely to be wiser, in practice, than the whole body. | It might be suggested that men could be given political wisdom by a suitable training. But the question would arise: what is a suitable training? And this would turn out to be a party question. | The problem of finding a collection of ‘wise’ men and leaving the government to them is thus an insoluble one. That is the ultimate reason for democracy.> I’ve copied this chapter in full because of (i) the way it introduces the following five chapters, (ii) the brilliance of Russell’s writing, and (iii) the following correspondences with my own perspective.

- <The most important matters in Plato’s philosophy> map to Review05.pdf’s “five main areas of philosophical enquiry” as follows: {Ontology = <his arguments in favour of immortality>; Cosmology = <his cosmogony>; Teleology = <his Utopia>; Deontology = <his theory of ideas>; Epistemology = <his conception of knowledge>}. Another striking endorsement of this insightful typology.
- Russell’s account of the different forms of constitution may be mapped to IDEAL as follows: {Empiricist = Democracy; Idealist = Monarchy; Activist = Oligarchy; Conformist = Theocracy; Theorist = Aristocracy}. This is supported by his references to <kings> (Monarchy), <the younger Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse> (Oligarchy), <Popes> and <doctors of divinity> (Theocracy), and <leisure> (Aristocracy). The odd-one-out is Democracy, which Plato associated with mob rule, but Russell upholds as the only possible solution to <The problem of finding a collection of ‘wise’ men>. My view is that *none* of these forms of constitution is perfect, and that a healthy society ‘churns’ through all of them in a never-ending cycle, see Review05.pdf p.5. Other differences between this mapping and those identified above, p.53, may be attributed to Russell’s novel perspective, some aspects of which might be challenged. In particular, it’s not at all clear how Plato’s insistence on <teaching geometry to the younger Dionysius ... implies an oligarchy>, and it’s a puzzle that Russell makes no mention of Plato’s ‘Timocracy’. Nevertheless, for me the important feature is not the precise interpretation or mapping of these different forms of constitution, but that there are five of them: which indeed appears to be the case, from Russell’s descriptions.
- Russell’s argument that <It is clear that no legally definable selection of citizens is likely to be wiser, in practice, than the whole body> anticipates the line of reasoning that led to my notion of a ‘Pentocracy’, see PI pp.161-171 and HMM pp.193-195.

p.130: <Under the influence of democratic theory, we have come to associate justice with equality, while for Plato it has no such implication. ‘Justice’, in the sense in which it is almost synonymous with ‘law’ – as when we speak of ‘courts of justice’ – is concerned mainly with property rights, which have nothing to do with equality. The first suggested definition of ‘justice’, at the beginning of the *Republic*, is that it consists in paying debts.> In my view ‘justice’ and ‘equality’ are two of the *five* possible definitions of ‘fairness’, see Review05.pdf p.5.

p.133: <Is there any standard of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, except what the man using these words desires?> In my view “Plato’s ‘forms’, also known as ‘universals’, do not exist”, and therefore “concepts which traditionally are seen as absolute and universal and innate, such as values and principles and beliefs, have no such special status”, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.4.

pp.125-134, <Chapter XIV | Plato’s Utopia>: This chapter gives ample support for my view that “one person’s Utopia is another person’s Hell”, see Review05.pdf p.5.

pp.136-137: <There is ... something of great importance in Plato's doctrine which is not traceable to his predecessors, and that is the theory of 'ideas' or 'forms'. This theory is partly logical, partly metaphysical. The logical part has to do with the meaning of general words. There are many individual animals of whom we can truly say 'this is a cat'. What do we mean by the word 'cat'? Obviously something different from each particular cat. An animal is a cat, it would seem, because it participates in a general nature common to all cats. Language cannot get on without general words such as 'cat', and such words are evidently not meaningless. But if the word 'cat' means anything, it means something which is not this or that cat, but some kind of universal cattyness. This is not born when a particular cat is born, and does not die when it dies. In fact, it has no position in space or time; it is 'eternal'. This is the logical part of the doctrine. The arguments in its favour, whether ultimately valid or not, are strong, and quite independent of the metaphysical part of the doctrine. | According to the metaphysical part of the doctrine, the word 'cat' means a certain ideal cat, 'the cat', created by God, and unique. Particular cats partake of the nature of *the* cat, but more or less imperfectly; it is only owing to this imperfection that there can be many of them. *The* cat is real; particular cats are only *apparent*. | In the last book of the *Republic*, as a preliminary to a condemnation of painters, there is a very clear exposition of the doctrine of ideas or forms. | Here Plato explains that, whenever a number of individuals have a common name, they have also a common 'idea' or 'form'. For instance, though there are many beds, there is only one 'idea' or 'form' of a bed. Just as a reflection of a bed in a mirror is only apparent and not 'real', so the various particular beds are unreal, being only copies of the 'idea', which is the one real bed, and is made by God.> In my view, "once an idea has been expressed *in writing* it may be comprehended in just the same way as any other percept. Thus our use of language effectively renders obsolete the traditional philosophical distinction between 'universals' and 'particulars', and with it the ancient belief that abstract ideas exist independently as Platonic 'forms', or that they are bestowed by God", see Review05.pdf p.3.

pp.138-139: <Every one who has done any kind of creative work has experienced, in a greater or less degree, the state of mind in which, after long labour, truth, or beauty, appears, or seems to appear, in a sudden glory – it may be only about some small matter, or it may be about the universe. The experience is, at the moment, very convincing; doubt may come later, but at the time there is utter certainty. I think most of the best creative work, in art, in science, in literature, and in philosophy, has been the result of such a moment. Whether it comes to others as to me, I cannot say. For my part, I have found that, when I wish to write a book on some subject, I must first soak myself in detail, until all the separate parts of the subject-matter are familiar; then, some day, if I am fortunate, I perceive the whole, with all its parts duly interrelated. After that, I only have to write down what I have seen. The nearest analogy is first walking all over a mountain in a mist, until every path and ridge and valley is separately familiar, and then, from a distance, seeing the mountain whole and clear in bright sunshine. | This experience, I believe, is necessary to good creative work, but it is not sufficient; indeed the subjective certainty that it brings with it may be fatally misleading.> I too have experienced this feeling of 'universal enlightenment', see HMM p.45 and pp.181-182, the latter also quoted in Review05.pdf p.6.

pp.139-140: <There is, at this point, a difficulty which did not escape Plato's notice, and was evident to modern idealistic philosophers. We saw that God made only one bed, and it would be natural to suppose that he made only one straight line. But if there is a heavenly triangle, he must have made at least three straight lines. The objects of geometry, though ideal, must exist in many examples; we need the possibility of two intersecting circles, and so on. This suggests that geometry, on Plato's theory, should not be capable of ultimate truth, but should be condemned as part of the study of appearance. We will, however, ignore this point, as to which Plato's answer is somewhat obscure.> Well, that about wraps it up for Plato's <'ideas' or 'forms'>.

p.140: <the famous simile of the cave or den, according to which those who are destitute of philosophy may be compared to prisoners in a cave, who are only able to look in one direction because they are bound, and who have a fire behind them and a wall in front. Between them and the wall there is nothing; all that they see are shadows of themselves, and of objects behind them, cast on the wall by the light of the fire. Inevitably they regard these shadows as real, and have no notion of the objects to which they are due. At last some man succeeds in escaping from the cave to the light of the sun; for the first time he sees real things, and becomes aware that he had hitherto been deceived by shadows. If he is the sort of philosopher who is fit to become a guardian, he will feel it his duty to those who were formerly his fellow-prisoners to go down again into the cave, instruct them as to the truth, and show them the way up. But he will have difficulty in persuading them, because, coming out of the sunlight, he will see shadows less clearly than they do, and will seem to them stupider than before his escape.> I can see why the allegory of the cave is so attractive to religious devotees, whose leaders claim to have seen the light. It all depends on the existence of a spiritual realm in addition to the singular material universe, which I reject, see UQNNotes.pdf.

pp.141-142: <Plato's doctrine of ideas contains a number of obvious errors. But in spite of these it marks a very important advance in philosophy, since it is the first theory to emphasise the problem of universals, which, in varying forms, has persisted to the present day. Beginnings are apt to be crude, but their originality should not be overlooked on this account. Something remains of what Plato had to say, even after all necessary corrections have been made. The absolute minimum of what remains, even in the view of those most hostile to Plato, is this: that we cannot express ourselves in a language composed wholly of proper names, but must have also general words such as 'man', 'dog', 'cat'; or, if not these, then relational words such as 'similar', 'before', and so on. Such words are not meaningless noises, and it is difficult to see how they can have meaning if the world consists entirely of particular things, such as are designated by proper names. There may be ways of getting round this argument, but at any rate it affords a *prima facie* case in favour of universals.> No, <it affords a *prima facie* case in favour of> my argument in Review05.pdf p.3.

pp.144-145: <The philosopher who is to be a guardian must, according to Plato, return into the cave, and live among those who have never seen the sun of truth. It would seem that God Himself, if He wishes to amend His creation, must do likewise; a Christian Platonist might so interpret the Incarnation. But it remains completely impossible to explain why God was not content with the world of ideas. The philosopher finds the cave in existence, and is actuated by benevolence in returning to it; but the Creator, if He created everything, might, one would think, have avoided the cave altogether.> Well, that about wraps it up for <God Himself>.

pp.148-149: <Death, says Socrates, is the separation of soul and body. Here we come upon Plato's dualism: between reality and appearance, ideas and sensible objects, reason and sense-perception, soul and body. These pairs are connected: the first in each pair is superior to the second both in reality and in goodness. An ascetic morality was the natural consequence of this dualism. Christianity adopted this doctrine in part, but never wholly. There were two obstacles. The first was that the creation of the visible world, if Plato was right, must have been an evil deed, and therefore the Creator could not be good. The second was that orthodox Christianity could never bring itself to condemn marriage, though it held celibacy to be nobler. The Manichæans were more consistent in both respects. | The distinction between mind and matter, which has become a commonplace in philosophy and science and popular thought, has a religious origin, and began as the distinction of soul and body. The Orphic, as we saw, proclaims himself the child of earth and of the starry heaven; from earth comes the body, from heaven the soul. It is this theory that Plato seeks to express in the language of philosophy.> Regardless of the <language> it's expressed in, material-spiritual duality <has a religious origin>, such that its inclusion in philosophy is more a matter of belief than reason. Thus in my view this duality simply doesn't belong as a core philosophical principle; and, even at the risk of contradicting my reaction to pp.87-88, *I don't believe it.*



p.156: <The Platonic Socrates was a pattern to subsequent philosophers for many ages. What are we to think of him ethically? (I am concerned only with the man as Plato portrays him.) His merits are obvious. He is indifferent to worldly success, so devoid of fear that he remains calm and urbane and humourous to the last moment, caring more for what he believes to be truth than for anything else whatever. He has, however, some very grave defects. He is dishonest and sophistical in argument, and in his private thinking he uses intellect to prove conclusions that are to him agreeable, rather than in a disinterested search for knowledge. There is something smug and unctuous about him, which reminds one of a bad type of cleric. His courage in the face of death would have been more remarkable if he had not believed that he was going to enjoy eternal bliss in the company of the gods. Unlike some of his predecessors, he was not scientific in his thinking, but was determined to prove the universe agreeable to his ethical standards. This is treachery to truth, and the worst of philosophic sins. As a man, we may believe him admitted to the communion of saints; but as a philosopher he needs a long residence in a scientific purgatory.> Well, that about wraps it up for <The Platonic Socrates>.

pp.160-161: <The theory of the regular solids, which is set forth in the thirteenth book of Euclid, was, in Plato's day, a recent discovery; it was completed by Theaetetus, who appears as a very young man in the dialogue that bears his name. It was, according to tradition, he who first proved that there are only five kinds of regular solids, and discovered the octahedron and the icosahedron. The regular tetrahedron, octahedron, and icosahedron, have equilateral triangles for their faces; the dodecahedron has regular pentagons, and cannot therefore be constructed out of Plato's two triangles. For this reason he does not use it in connection with the four elements. | As for the dodecahedron, Plato says only 'there was yet a fifth combination which God used in the delineation of the universe'. This is obscure, and suggests that the universe is a dodecahedron; but elsewhere it is said to be a sphere. The pentagram has always been prominent in magic, and apparently owes this position to the Pythagoreans, who called it 'Health' and used it as a symbol of recognition of members of the brotherhood: It seems that it owed its properties to the fact that the dodecahedron has pentagons for its faces, and is, in some sense, a symbol of the universe. This topic is attractive, but it is difficult to ascertain much that is definite about it.> Indeed! And PI is full of this kind of thing, see pp.196-199 for example.

p.167: <A percept ... is not knowledge, but merely something that happens, and that belongs equally to the world of physics and to the world of psychology. We naturally think of perception, as Plato does, as a relation between a percipient and an object: we say 'I see a table.' But here 'I' and 'table' are logical constructions. The core of crude occurrence is merely certain patches of colour. These are associated with images of touch, they may cause words, and they may become a source of memories. The percept as filled out with images of touch becomes an 'object', which is supposed physical; the percept as filled out with words and memories becomes a 'perception', which is part of a 'subject' and is considered mental. The percept is just an occurrence, and neither true nor false; the percept as filled out with words is a judgment, and capable of truth or falsehood. This judgment I call a 'judgment of perception'. The proposition 'knowledge is perception' must be interpreted as meaning 'knowledge is judgments of perception'. It is only in this form that it is grammatically capable of being correct.> Here Russell demonstrates his phenomenal precision with words. His distinction between a percept which is <just an occurrence, and neither true nor false>, but when <filled out with words is a judgment, and capable of truth or falsehood>, anticipates my distinction between 'data' and 'control', see HMM p.229 endnote 158.

pp.122-172, Plato's philosophy: There's nothing here which hasn't been taken into account, and improved upon, in MyPhilosophy03.pdf and Review05.pdf. Well, that about wraps it up for Plato.

p.173: <In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways: with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous. For his demerits, however, his successors are more responsible than he is. He came at the end of the creative period in Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who could be regarded as approximately his equal. Towards the end of this long period his authority had become almost as unquestioned as that of the Church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress. Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, almost every serious intellectual advance has had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine; in logic, this is still true at the present day. But it would have been at least as disastrous if any of his predecessors (except perhaps Democritus) had acquired equal authority. To do him justice, we must, to begin with, forget his excessive posthumous fame, and the equally excessive posthumous condemnation to which it led.> Another brilliant pen-portrait. Russell is so good at this kind of thing.

pp.173-174: <Everything one would wish to know of the relations of Aristotle and Alexander is unascertainable, the more so as legends were soon invented on the subject. There are letters between them which are generally regarded as forgeries. People who admire both men suppose that the tutor influenced the pupil. Hegel thinks that Alexander's career shows the practical usefulness of philosophy. As to this, A. W. Benn says: 'It would be unfortunate if philosophy had no better testimonial to show for herself than the character of Alexander. ... Arrogant, drunken, cruel, vindictive, and grossly superstitious, he united the vices of a Highland chieftain to the frenzy of an Oriental despot.' | For my part, while I agree with Benn about the character of Alexander, I nevertheless think that his work was enormously important and enormously beneficial, since, but for him, the whole tradition of Hellenic civilization might well have perished. As to Aristotle's influence on him, we are left free to conjecture whatever seems to us most plausible. For my part, I should suppose it *nil*. Alexander was an ambitious and passionate boy, on bad terms with his father, and presumably impatient of schooling. Aristotle thought no State should have as many as one hundred thousand citizens, and preached the doctrine of the golden mean. I cannot imagine his pupil regarding him as anything but a prosy old pedant, set over him by his father to keep him out of mischief. Alexander, it is true, had a certain snobbish respect for Athenian civilization, but this was common to his whole dynasty, who wished to prove that they were not barbarians. It was analogous to the feeling of nineteenth-century Russian aristocrats for Paris. This, therefore, was not attributable to Aristotle's influence. And I do not see anything else in Alexander that could possibly have come from this source. | It is more surprising that Alexander had so little influence on Aristotle, whose speculations on politics were blandly oblivious of the fact that the era of City States had given way to the era of empires. I suspect that Aristotle, to the end, thought of him as 'that idle and headstrong boy, who never could understand anything of philosophy'. On the whole, the contacts of these two great men seem to have been as unfruitful as if they had lived in different worlds.> See my notes for pp.236-261 below.

pp.175-177: <It is difficult to decide at what point to begin an account of Aristotle's metaphysics, but perhaps the best place is his criticism of the theory of ideas and his own alternative doctrine of universals. He advances against the ideas a number of very good arguments, most of which are already to be found in Plato's *Parmenides*. ... Aristotle's metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense. He is difficult because Plato and common sense do not mix easily. When one tries to understand him, one thinks part of the time that he is expressing the ordinary views of a person innocent of philosophy, and the rest of the time that he is setting forth Platonism with a new vocabulary. It does not do to lay too much stress on any single passage, because there is liable to be a correction or modification of it in some later passage. On the whole, the easiest way to understand both his theory of universals and his theory of matter and form is to set forth first the common-sense doctrine which is half of his view, and then to consider the Platonic

modifications to which he subjects it. | Up to a certain point, the theory of universals is quite simple. In language, there are proper names, and there are adjectives. The proper names apply to 'things' or 'persons', each of which is the only thing or person to which the name in question applies. The sun, the moon, France, Napoleon, are unique; there are not a number of instances of things to which these names apply. On the other hand, words like 'cat', 'dog', 'man' apply to many different things. The problem of universals is concerned with the meanings of such words, and also of adjectives, such as 'white', 'hard', 'round', and so on. He says: 'By the term "universal" I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by "individual" that which is not thus predicated.' | What is signified by a proper name is a 'substance', while what is signified by an adjective or class-name, such as 'human' or 'man', is called a 'universal'. ... The true ground of the distinction is, in fact, linguistic; it is derived from syntax. There are proper names, adjectives, and relation-words; we may say 'John is wise, James is foolish, John is taller than James.' Here 'John' and 'James' are proper names, 'wise' and 'foolish' are adjectives, and 'taller' is a relation-word. Metaphysicians, ever since Aristotle, have interpreted these syntactical differences metaphysically: John and James are substances, wisdom and folly are universals. (Relation-words were ignored or misinterpreted.) It may be that, given sufficient care, metaphysical differences can be found that have some relation to these syntactical differences, but, if so, it will be only by means of a long process, involving, incidentally, the creation of an artificial philosophical language. And this language will contain no such names as 'John' and 'James', and no such adjectives as 'wise' and 'foolish'; all the words of ordinary languages will have yielded to analysis, and been replaced by words having a less complex significance. Until this labour has been performed, the question of particulars and universals cannot be adequately discussed. And when we reach the point at which we can at last discuss it, we shall find that the question we are discussing is quite different from what we supposed it to be at the outset. | If, therefore, I have failed to make Aristotle's theory of universals clear, that is (I maintain) because it is not clear. But it is certainly an advance on the theory of ideas, and is certainly concerned with a genuine and very important problem.>

pp.177-179: <The next point in Aristotle's metaphysics is the distinction of 'form' and 'matter'. (It must be understood that 'matter', in the sense in which it is opposed to 'form', is different from 'matter' as opposed to 'mind'.) | Here, again, there is a common-sense basis for Aristotle's theory, but here, more than in the case of universals, the Platonic modifications are very important. We may start with a marble statue; here marble is the matter, while the shape conferred by the sculptor is the form. ... We now come to a new statement, which at first sight seems difficult. The soul, we are told, is the form of the body. Here it is clear that 'form' does not mean 'shape'. I shall return later to the sense in which the soul is the form of the body; for the present, I will only observe that, in Aristotle's system, the soul is what makes the body one thing, having unity of purpose, and the characteristics that we associate with the word 'organism'. The purpose of an eye is to see, but it cannot see when parted from its body. In fact, it is the soul that sees. | It would seem, then, that 'form' is what gives unity to a portion of matter, and that this unity is usually, if not always, teleological. But 'form' turns out to be much more than this, and the more is very difficult. | The form of a thing, we are told, is its essence and primary substance. Forms are substantial, although universals are not. ... The view that forms are substances, which exist independently of the matter in which they are exemplified, seems to expose Aristotle to his own arguments against Platonic ideas. A form is intended by him to be something quite different from a universal, but it has many of the same characteristics. Form is, we are told, more real than matter; this is reminiscent of the sole reality of the ideas. The change that Aristotle makes in Plato's metaphysic is, it would seem, less than he represents it as being.>

pp.179-180: <The doctrine of matter and form in Aristotle is connected with the distinction of potentiality and actuality. Bare matter is conceived as a potentiality of form; all change is what we should call 'evolution', in the sense that after the change the thing in question has more form than before. That which has more form is considered to be more 'actual'. God is pure form and pure

actuality; in Him, therefore, there can be no change. It will be seen that this doctrine is optimistic and teleological: the universe and everything in it is developing towards something continually better than what went before. | The concept of potentiality is convenient in some connections, provided it is so used that we can translate our statements into a form in which the concept is absent. 'A block of marble is a potential statue' means 'from a block of marble, by suitable acts, a statue is produced.' But when potentiality is used as a fundamental and irreducible concept, it always conceals confusion of thought. Aristotle's use of it is one of the bad points in his system.>

p.181: <The conception of an unmoved mover is a difficult one. To a modern mind, it would seem that the cause of a change must be a previous change, and that, if the universe were ever wholly static, it would remain so eternally. To understand what Aristotle means, we must take account of what he says about causes. There are, according to him, four kinds of causes, which were called, respectively, material, formal, efficient, and final. Let us take again the man who is making a statue. The material cause of the statue is the marble, the formal cause is the essence of the statue to be produced, the efficient cause is the contact of the chisel with the marble, and the final cause is the end that the sculptor has in view. In modern terminology, the word 'cause' would be confined to the efficient cause. The unmoved mover may be regarded as a final cause: it supplies a purpose for change, which is essentially an evolution towards likeness with God.>

pp.182-183: <In his book *On the Soul*, he [Aristotle] regards the soul as bound up with the body, and ridicules the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration. The soul, it seems, perishes with the body: 'it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body'; but he immediately adds: 'or at any rate certain parts of it are'. Body and soul are related as matter and form: 'the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a material body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized'. ... In this book, he distinguishes between 'soul' and 'mind', making mind higher than soul, and less bound to the body. After speaking of the relation of soul and body, he says: 'The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed'. Again: 'We have no evidence as yet about mind or the power to think; it seems to be a widely different kind of soul, differing as what is eternal from what is perishable; it alone is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers. All the other parts of soul, it is evident from what we have said, are, in spite of certain statements to the contrary, incapable of separate existence'. The mind is the part of us that understands mathematics and philosophy; its objects are timeless, and therefore it is regarded as itself timeless. The soul is what moves the body and perceives sensible objects; it is characterized by self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and motivity; but the mind has the higher function of thinking, which has no relation to the body or to the senses. Hence the mind can be immortal, though the rest of the soul cannot.>

p.184: <It seems, from these passages, that individuality – what distinguishes one man from another – is connected with the body and the irrational soul, while the rational soul or mind is divine and impersonal. One man likes oysters, and another likes pineapples; this distinguishes between them. But when they think about the multiplication table, provided they think correctly, there is no difference between them. The irrational separates us, the rational unites us. Thus the immortality of mind or reason is not a personal immortality of separate men, but a share in God's immortality. It does not appear that Aristotle believed in *personal* immortality, in the sense in which it was taught by Plato and afterwards by Christianity. He believed only that, in so far as men are rational, they partake of the divine, which is immortal. It is open to man to increase the element of the divine in his nature, and to do so is the highest virtue. But if he succeeded completely, he would have ceased to exist as a separate person. This is perhaps not the only possible interpretation of Aristotle's words, but I think it is the most natural.>

pp.173-184, <Chapter XIX | Aristotle’s Metaphysics>: I agree with Russell’s verdict that <Aristotle’s metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense>. In this context <Plato> refers to his <theory of ‘ideas’ or ‘forms’> and his <dualism: between reality and appearance, ideas and sensible objects, reason and sense-perception, soul and body>, both of which I’ve rejected already. As for <common sense>, this refers to the insightful distinctions that Aristotle draws between <‘substance’> and <‘universal’>, <‘form’ and ‘matter’>, <potentiality and actuality>, <four kinds of causes>, and <‘soul’ and ‘mind’>. For the first of these I agree with Russell’s point that <The true ground of the distinction is, in fact, linguistic; it is derived from syntax>. Indeed, I’d extend this argument by mapping these distinctions (with one exception, see note [1] below) to those made in Review05.pdf p.3, as follows:

<b>Distinctions drawn by a language capable of expressing abstract ideas</b>	<b>Aristotle’s distinctions</b>
(1) A subject from its setting	Substance (proper name) and universal (class-name and/or adjective)
(2) An object from its associations	Substance (proper name) and universal (relation-word)
(3) An action from its effects	Four kinds of causes
(4) A rule from its implementation	Potentiality and actuality
(5) A plan from its scenario	Soul and mind [2]

From this mapping I conclude that there’s nothing in Aristotle’s metaphysics which hasn’t been taken into account, and improved upon, in Review05.pdf.

Notes:

[1] The odd-one-out is <‘form’ and ‘matter’>, which appears to be a rephrasing of material-spiritual duality, and as such is no more than <Platonism with a new vocabulary>.

[2] As well as this mapping, Aristotle’s distinction between <‘soul’ and ‘mind’> perhaps anticipates the two-system model of the mind, see HMM chapter 3 and Review05.pdf p.2.

p.185: <The views of Aristotle on ethics represent, in the main, the prevailing opinions of educated and experienced men of his day. They are not, like Plato’s, impregnated with mystical religion; nor do they countenance such unorthodox theories as are to be found in the *Republic* concerning property and the family. Those who neither fall below nor rise above the level of decent, well-behaved citizens will find in the *Ethics* a systematic account of the principles by which they hold that their conduct should be regulated. Those who demand anything more will be disappointed. The book appeals to the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling it cannot but be repulsive. | The good, we are told, is *happiness*, which is an activity of the soul. Aristotle says that Plato was right in dividing the soul into two parts, one rational, the other irrational. The irrational part itself he divides into the vegetative (which is found even in plants) and the appetitive (which is found in all animals). The appetitive part may be in some degree rational, when the goods that it seeks are such as reason approves of. This is essential to the account of virtue, for reason alone, in Aristotle, is purely contemplative, and does not, without the help of appetite, lead to any practical activity.> In my view, “one can be happy; but as an *aim in life* this is quite meaningless”, see Review05.pdf p.6.

p.186: <We now come to the famous doctrine of the golden mean. Every virtue is a mean between two extremes, each of which is a vice. This is proved by an examination of the various virtues. Courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness; liberality, between prodigality and meanness; proper pride, between vanity and humility; ready wit, between buffoonery and boorishness; modesty, between bashfulness and shamelessness. Some virtues do not seem to fit into this scheme; for instance, truthfulness. Aristotle says that this is a mean between boastfulness and mock-modesty, but this only applies to truthfulness about oneself. I do not see how truthfulness in any wider sense can be fitted into the scheme. There was once a mayor who had adopted Aristotle’s

doctrine; at the end of his term of office he made a speech saying that he had endeavoured to steer the narrow line between partiality on the one hand and impartiality on the other. The view of truthfulness as a mean seems scarcely less absurd.> This problem doesn't arise for my practical implementation of <the golden mean>, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.4 and Review05.pdf pp.6-7.

p.186: <Aristotle's opinions on moral questions are always such as were conventional in his day. On some points they differ from those of our time, chiefly where some form of aristocracy comes in. We think that human beings, at least in ethical theory, all have equal rights, and that justice involves equality; Aristotle thinks that justice involves, not equality, but right proportion, which is only *sometimes* equality.> My comment to p.130 applies here as well.

p.195: <There is in Aristotle an almost complete absence of what may be called benevolence or philanthropy. The sufferings of mankind, in so far as he is aware of them, do not move him emotionally; he holds them, intellectually, to be an evil, but there is no evidence that they cause him unhappiness except when the sufferers happen to be his friends. | More generally, there is an emotional poverty in the *Ethics*, which is not found in the earlier philosophers. There is something unduly smug and comfortable about Aristotle's speculations on human affairs; everything that makes men feel a passionate interest in each other seems to be forgotten. Even his account of friendship is tepid. He shows no sign of having had any of those experiences which make it difficult to preserve sanity; all the more profound aspects of the moral life are apparently unknown to him. He leaves out, one may say, the whole sphere of human experience with which religion is concerned. What he has to say is what will be useful to comfortable men of weak passions; but he has nothing to say to those who are possessed by a god or a devil, or whom outward misfortune drives to despair. For these reasons, in my judgment, his *Ethics*, in spite of its fame, is lacking in intrinsic importance.> I agree. Well, that about wraps it up for Aristotle's ethics.

pp.198-199, in Aristotle's *Politics*: <The natural way to get wealth is by skilful management of house and land. To the wealth that can be made in this way there is a limit, but to what can be made by trade there is none. Trade has to do with *money*, but wealth is not the acquisition of coin. Wealth derived from trade is justly hated, because it is unnatural. 'The most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it. For money was intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. ... Of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural'. ... 'Usury' means *all* lending money at interest, not only, as now, lending at an exorbitant rate. From Greek times to the present day, mankind, or at least the economically more developed portion of them, have been divided into debtors and creditors; debtors have disapproved of interest, and creditors have approved of it. At most times, landowners have been debtors, while men engaged in commerce have been creditors. The views of philosophers, with few exceptions, have coincided with the pecuniary interests of their class. Greek philosophers belonged to, or were employed by, the landowning class; they therefore disapproved of interest. Mediaeval philosophers were churchmen, and the property of the Church was mainly in land; they therefore saw no reason to revise Aristotle's opinion. Their objection to usury was reinforced by anti-Semitism, for most fluid capital was Jewish. Ecclesiastics and barons had their quarrels, sometimes very bitter; but they could combine against the wicked Jew who had tided them over a bad harvest by means of a loan, and considered that he deserved some reward for his thrift. | With the Reformation, the situation changed. Many of the most earnest Protestants were business men, to whom lending money at interest was essential. Consequently first Calvin, and then other Protestant divines, sanctioned interest. At last the Catholic Church was compelled to follow suit, because the old prohibitions did not suit the modern world. Philosophers, whose incomes are derived from the investments of universities, have favoured interest ever since they ceased to be ecclesiastics and therefore connected with landowning. At every stage, there has been a wealth of theoretical argument to support the economically convenient opinion.> Fascinating!

pp.199-200: <Plato's communism annoys Aristotle. It would lead, he says, to anger against lazy people, and to the sort of quarrels that are common between fellow-travellers. It is better if each mind his own business. Property should be private, but people should be so trained in benevolence as to allow the use of it to be largely common. Benevolence and generosity are virtues, and without private property they are impossible. Finally we are told that, if Plato's plans were good, someone would have thought of them sooner. I do not agree with Plato, but if anything could make me do so, it would be Aristotle's arguments against him.> Well, that about wraps it up for Aristotle's politics.

pp.200-201: <A government is good when it aims at the good of the whole community, bad when it cares only for itself. There are three kinds of government that are good: monarchy, aristocracy, and constitutional government (or polity); there are three that are bad: tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. There are also many mixed intermediate forms. It will be observed that the good and bad governments are defined by the ethical qualities of the holders of power, not by the form of the constitution. This, however, is only partly true. An aristocracy is a rule of men of virtue, an oligarchy is a rule of the rich, and Aristotle does not consider virtue and wealth strictly synonymous. ... Monarchy is better than aristocracy, aristocracy is better than polity. But the corruption of the best is worst; therefore tyranny is worse than oligarchy, and oligarchy than democracy. In this way Aristotle arrives at a qualified defence of democracy; for most actual governments are bad, and therefore, among actual governments, democracies tend to be best.> Together with Plato's five 'constitutions of States', Aristotle's six <kinds of government> triggered my interest in the variety of political systems, which after much reading and thinking (logged in PoliticsNotes.doc and ideas4.doc) resulted in my model of societal 'churn', see Review05.pdf p.5.

p.203: <Large cities, we are told, are never well governed, because a great multitude cannot be orderly. A State ought to be large enough to be more or less self-sufficing, but not too large for constitutional government. It ought to be small enough for the citizens to know each other's characters, otherwise right will not be done in elections and lawsuits. The territory should be small enough to be surveyed in its entirety from a hill-top. We are told both that it should be self-sufficient and that it should have an export and import trade, which seems an inconsistency.> Aristotle recognises that there are limits to growth, beyond which alienation is inevitable, and the government ceases to be fully representative. I agree; and this is one of the reasons why I don't trust notions of Utopia.

pp.204-205: <Aristotle's fundamental assumptions, in his *Politics*, are very different from those of any modern writer. The aim of the State, in his view, is to produce cultured gentlemen – men who combine the aristocratic mentality with love of learning and the arts. This combination existed, in its highest perfection, in the Athens of Pericles, not in the population at large, but among the well-to-do. It began to break down in the last years of Pericles. The populace, who had no culture, turned against the friends of Pericles, who were driven to defend the privileges of the rich, by treachery, assassination, illegal despotism, and other such not very gentlemanly methods. After the death of Socrates, the bigotry of the Athenian democracy diminished, and Athens remained the centre of ancient culture, but political power went elsewhere. Throughout later antiquity, power and culture were usually separate: power was in the hands of rough soldiers, culture belonged to powerless Greeks, often slaves. This is only partially true of Rome in its great days, but it is emphatically true before Cicero and after Marcus Aurelius. After the barbarian invasion, the 'gentlemen' were northern barbarians, the men of culture subtle southern ecclesiastics. This state of affairs continued, more or less, until the Renaissance, when the laity began to acquire culture. From the Renaissance onwards, the Greek conception of government by cultured gentlemen gradually prevailed more and more, reaching its acme in the eighteenth century. | Various forces have put an end to this state of affairs. First, democracy, as embodied in the French Revolution and its aftermath. The cultured gentlemen, as after the age of Pericles, had to defend their privileges against the populace, and in the process ceased to be either gentlemen or cultured. A second cause was the rise of industrialism,

with a scientific technique very different from traditional culture. A third cause was popular education, which conferred the power to read and write, but did not confer culture; this enabled a new type of demagogue to practise a new type of propaganda, as seen in the dictatorships. | Both for good and evil, therefore, the day of the cultured gentleman is past.> Another insightful history lesson.

p.206: <Aristotle's influence, which was very great in many different fields, was greatest of all in logic. In late antiquity, when Plato was still supreme in metaphysics, Aristotle was the recognized authority in logic, and he retained this position throughout the Middle Ages. It was not till the thirteenth century that Christian philosophers accorded him supremacy in the field of metaphysics. This supremacy was largely lost after the Renaissance, but his supremacy in logic survived. Even at the present day, all Catholic teachers of philosophy and many others still obstinately reject the discoveries of modern logic, and adhere with a strange tenacity to a system which is as definitely antiquated as Ptolemaic astronomy. This makes it difficult to do historical justice to Aristotle. His present-day influence is so inimical to clear thinking that it is hard to remember how great an advance he made upon all his predecessors (including Plato), or how admirable his logical work would still seem if it had been a stage in a continual progress, instead of being (as in fact it was) a dead end, followed by over two thousand years of stagnation.> This is uplifting and depressing in equal measure.

pp.206-208: <Aristotle's most important work in logic is the doctrine of the syllogism. ... This system was the beginning of formal logic, and, as such, was both important and admirable. But considered as the end, not the beginning, of formal logic, it is open to three kinds of criticism ... Let us begin with the two statements 'Socrates is a man' and 'all Greeks are men'. It is necessary to make a sharp distinction between these two, which is not done in Aristotelian logic. The statement 'all Greeks are men' is commonly interpreted as implying that there are Greeks; without this implication, some of Aristotle's syllogisms are not valid. ... If we are to be explicit, we must therefore divide the one statement 'all Greeks are men' into two, one saying 'there are Greeks', and the other saying 'if anything is a Greek, it is a man'. The latter statement is purely hypothetical, and does not imply that there are Greeks.> Again, Russell's precision with words is outstanding.

pp.208-209: <Metaphysical errors arose through supposing that 'all men' is the subject of 'all men are mortal' in the same sense as that in which 'Socrates' is the subject of 'Socrates is mortal'. It made it possible to hold that, in some sense, 'all men' denotes an entity of the same sort as that denoted by 'Socrates'. This led Aristotle to say that in a sense a species is a substance. He is careful to qualify this statement, but his followers, especially Porphyry, showed less caution. | Another error into which Aristotle falls through this mistake is to think that a predicate of a predicate can be a predicate of the original subject. If I say 'Socrates is Greek, all Greeks are human', Aristotle thinks that 'human' is a predicate of 'Greek', while 'Greek' is a predicate of 'Socrates', and obviously 'human' is a predicate of 'Socrates'. But in fact 'human' is not a predicate of 'Greek'. The distinction between names and predicates, or, in metaphysical language, between particulars and universals, is thus blurred, with disastrous consequences to philosophy.> In both cases the logic has been mired in a morass of Platonic dualisms. My solution is to insist that "Everything is defined through its associations", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.1.

pp.209-210: <The Greeks in general attached more importance to deduction as a source of knowledge than modern philosophers do. In this respect, Aristotle was less at fault than Plato; he repeatedly admitted the importance of induction, and he devoted considerable attention to the question: how do we know the first premisses from which deduction must start? Nevertheless, he, like other Greeks, gave undue prominence to deduction in his theory of knowledge. ... All the important inferences outside logic and pure mathematics are inductive, not deductive; the only exceptions are law and theology, each of which derives its first principles from an unquestionable



text, viz. the statute books or the scriptures.> In my view <the important inferences outside logic and pure mathematics> are neither inductive nor deductive, they're iterative. See my notes for p.58 above, and HMM Appendix 1, which describes the "practical or informal methods and procedures" of scientists, centred on "The iterative modification of the equations and/or boundary conditions, to improve the fit between prediction and experiment".

p.210: <What, exactly, is meant by the word 'category', whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel, I must confess that I have never been able to understand. I do not myself believe that the term 'category' is in any way useful in philosophy, as representing any clear idea. There are, in Aristotle, ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. The only definition offered of the term 'category' is: 'expressions which are in no way composite signify' – and then follows the above list. This seems to mean that every word of which the meaning is not compounded of the meanings of other words signifies a substance or a quantity or etc. There is no suggestion of any principle on which the list of ten categories has been compiled.> Although I share Russell's doubts, I'm prepared to hazard the opinion that by <category> is meant an irreducible aspect or factor of a given system. For instance, literary theorist Kenneth Burke argued that a dramatic scene would be fully-defined if its "Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose" were specified, see HMM pp.169-170. Similarly, in ideas4.doc 13/3/21 I noted that "an agent in an environment" may be defined in terms of its "Identities, Perspectives, Goals, Rules, Tools". Possibly each of these terms is a <category>; but who knows?

pp.210-212: <The notion of essence is an intimate part of every philosophy subsequent to Aristotle, until we come to modern times. It is, in my opinion, a hopelessly muddle-headed notion, but its historical importance requires us to say something about it. | The 'essence' of a thing appears to have meant 'those of its properties which it cannot change without losing its identity'. Socrates may be sometimes happy, sometimes sad; sometimes well, sometimes ill. Since he can change these properties without ceasing to be Socrates, they are no part of his essence. But it is supposed to be of the essence of Socrates that he is a man, though a Pythagorean, who believes in transmigration, will not admit this. In fact, the question of 'essence' is one as to the use of words. We apply the same name, on different occasions, to somewhat different occurrences, which we regard as manifestations of a single 'thing' or 'person'. In fact, however, this is only a verbal convenience. The 'essence' of Socrates thus consists of those properties in the absence of which we should not use the name 'Socrates'. The question is purely linguistic: a *word* may have an essence, but a *thing* cannot. | The conception of 'substance', like that of 'essence', is a transference to metaphysics of what is only a linguistic convenience. ... 'Substance', in a word, is a metaphysical mistake, due to transference to the world-structure of the structure of sentences composed of a subject and a predicate.> In my view "Everything is defined through its associations", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.1.

p.212: <I conclude that the Aristotelian doctrines with which we have been concerned in this chapter are wholly false, with the exception of the formal theory of the syllogism, which is unimportant. Any person in the present day who wishes to learn logic will be wasting his time if he reads Aristotle or any of his disciples. None the less, Aristotle's logical writings show great ability, and would have been useful to mankind if they had appeared at a time when intellectual originality was still active. Unfortunately, they appeared at the very end of the creative period of Greek thought, and therefore came to be accepted as authoritative. By the time that logical originality revived, a reign of two thousand years had made Aristotle very difficult to dethrone. Throughout modern times, practically every advance in science, in logic, or in philosophy has had to be made in the teeth of the opposition from Aristotle's disciples.> These views may well reflect Russell's own experiences. Not having encountered any of <Aristotle's disciples> I can afford to be more charitable, and express the view that Aristotle's logic was an amazing achievement, especially given that it had to be consistent with the metaphysics of the day, which with hindsight we judge to be <wholly false>.

p.213: <In this chapter I propose to consider two of Aristotle's books, the one called *Physics* and the one called *On the Heavens*. These two books are closely connected; the second takes up the argument at the point at which the first has left it. Both were extremely influential, and dominated science until the time of Galileo. Words such as 'quintessence' and 'sublunary' are derived from the theories expressed in these books. The historian of philosophy, accordingly, must study them, in spite of the fact that hardly a sentence in either can be accepted in the light of modern science.> Well, that about wraps it up for Aristotle's physics.

p.213: <To understand the views of Aristotle, as of most Greeks, on physics, it is necessary to apprehend their imaginative background. Every philosopher, in addition to the formal system which he offers to the world, has another, much simpler, of which he may be quite unaware. If he is aware of it, he probably realizes that it won't quite do; he therefore conceals it, and sets forth something more sophisticated, which he believes because it is like his crude system, but which he asks others to accept because he thinks he has made it such as cannot be disproved. The sophistication comes in by way of refutation of refutations, but this alone will never give a positive result: it shows, at best, that a theory may be true, not that it must be. The positive result, however little the philosopher may realize it, is due to his imaginative preconceptions, or to what Santayana calls 'animal faith'.> In a word: ouch!

pp.214-215: <The 'nature' of a thing, Aristotle says, is its end, that for the sake of which it exists. Thus the word has a teleological implication. ... This whole conception of 'nature', though it might well seem admirably suited to explain the growth of animals and plants, became, in the event, a great obstacle to the progress of science, and a source of much that was bad in ethics. In the latter respect, it is still harmful.> Indeed.

p.216: <The treatise *On the Heavens* sets forth a pleasant and simple theory. Things below the moon are subject to generation and decay; from the moon upwards, everything is ungenerated and indestructible. The earth, which is spherical, is at the centre of the universe. In the sublunary sphere, everything is composed of the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire; but there is a fifth element, of which the heavenly bodies are composed. The natural movement of the terrestrial elements is rectilinear, but that of the fifth element is circular. The heavens are perfectly spherical, and the upper regions are more divine than the lower. The stars and planets are not composed of fire, but of the fifth element; their motion is due to that of spheres to which they are attached. (All this appears in poetical form in Dante's *Paradiso*.)> Compare pp.160-161 above.

p.221: <Euclid's *Elements* is certainly one of the greatest books ever written, and one of the most perfect monuments of the Greek intellect.> Wow!

pp.223-225: <Aristarchus of Samos, who lived approximately from 310 to 230 B.C., and was thus about twenty-five years older than Archimedes, is the most interesting of all ancient astronomers, because he advanced the complete Copernican hypothesis, that all the planets, including the earth, revolve in circles round the sun, and that the earth rotates on its axis once in twenty-four hours. ... The Copernican hypothesis, after being advanced, whether positively or tentatively, by Aristarchus, was definitely adopted by Seleucus, but by no other ancient astronomer. This general rejection was mainly due to Hipparchus, who flourished from 161 to 126 B.C. He is described by Heath as 'the greatest astronomer of antiquity'. He was the first to write systematically on trigonometry; he discovered the precession of the equinoxes; he estimated the length of the lunar month with an error of less than one second; he improved Aristarchus's estimates of the sizes and distances of the sun and moon; he made a catalogue of eight hundred and fifty fixed stars, giving their latitude and longitude. As against the heliocentric hypothesis of Aristarchus, he adopted and improved the theory of epicycles which had been invented by Apollonius, who flourished about 220 B.C.; it was

a development of this theory that came to be known, later, as the Ptolemaic system, after the astronomer Ptolemy, who flourished in the middle of the second century A.D. | Copernicus came to know something, though not much, of the almost forgotten hypothesis of Aristarchus, and was encouraged by finding ancient authority for his innovation. Otherwise, the effect of this hypothesis on subsequent astronomy was practically *nil*.> Again: wow!

pp.225-226: <The merit of the Copernican hypothesis is not *truth*, but simplicity; in view of the relativity of motion, no question of truth is involved. The Greeks, in their search for hypotheses which would 'save the phenomena', were in effect, though not altogether in intention, tackling the problem in the scientifically correct way. A comparison with their predecessors, and with their successors until Copernicus, must convince every student of their truly astonishing genius.> The criterion of <simplicity>, also known as 'Ockham's razor', "is a direct consequence of the 'toolkit approach' to scientific investigation and modelling", see HMM p.223 endnote 102 and its reference, PI pp.72-73.

p.226: <Two very great men, Archimedes and Apollonius, in the third century B.C., complete the list of first-class Greek mathematicians. Archimedes was a friend, probably a cousin, of the king of Syracuse, and was killed when that city was captured by the Romans in 212 B.C. Apollonius, from his youth, lived at Alexandria. Archimedes was not only a mathematician, but also a physicist and student of hydrostatics. Apollonius is chiefly noted for his work on conic sections. I shall say no more about them, as they came too late to influence philosophy. | After these two men, though respectable work continued to be done in Alexandria, the great age was ended. Under the Roman domination, the Greeks lost the self-confidence that belongs to political liberty, and in losing it acquired a paralysing respect for their predecessors. The Roman soldier who killed Archimedes was a symbol of the death of original thought that Rome caused throughout the Hellenic world.>

pp.218-226, <Chapter XXIV | Early Greek Mathematics and Astronomy>: These were amazing achievements, especially given that they didn't use a positional numeral system. In my view the greatest omission is any contribution to epistemology, in particular, a formulation of what we now call 'scientific method'. If only ...

pp.236-237: <The influence of non-Greek religion and superstition in the Hellenistic world was mainly, but not wholly, bad. This might not have been the case. Jews, Persians, and Buddhists all had religions that were very definitely superior to the popular Greek polytheism, and could even have been studied with profit by the best philosophers. Unfortunately it was the Babylonians, or Chaldeans, who most impressed the imagination of the Greeks. There was, first of all, their fabulous antiquity; the priestly records went back for thousands of years, and professed to go back for thousands more. Then there was some genuine wisdom: the Babylonians could more or less predict eclipses long before the Greeks could. But these were merely causes of receptiveness; what was received was mainly astrology and magic. ... As we shall see, the majority even of the best philosophers fell in with the belief in astrology. It involved, since it thought the future predictable, a belief in necessity or fate, which could be set against the prevalent belief in fortune. No doubt most men believed in both, and never noticed the inconsistency. | The general confusion was bound to bring moral decay, even more than intellectual enfeeblement.> What Alexander brought (1/2).

p.238, quoting C. F. Angus: <Metaphysics sink into the background, and ethics, now individual, become of the first importance. Philosophy is no longer the pillar of fire going before a few intrepid seekers after truth: it is rather an ambulance following in the wake of the struggle for existence and picking up the weak and wounded.> What Alexander brought (2/2).

p.239: <The relation of intellectually eminent men to contemporary society has been very different in different ages. In some fortunate epochs they have been on the whole in harmony with their surroundings – suggesting, no doubt, such reforms as seemed to them necessary, but fairly confident that their suggestions would be welcomed, and not disliking the world in which they found themselves even if it remained unreformed. At other times they have been revolutionary, considering that radical alterations were called for, but expecting that, partly as a result of their advocacy, these alterations would be brought about in the near future. At yet other times they have despaired of the world, and felt that, though they themselves knew what was needed, there was no hope of its being brought about. This mood sinks easily into the deeper despair which regards life on earth as essentially bad, and hopes for good only in a future life or in some mystical transfiguration.> The moods of philosophers. I have known them all, but none too much: which perspective bestows a *fifth* mood, ‘detachment’.

p.241, p.243, p.252, p.261, Hellenistic schools of thought:

School	Founder	Principle
Cynics	Diogenes	Indifference
Sceptics	Pyrrho	Doubt
Epicureans	Epicurus	Tranquillity
Stoics	Zeno	Virtue

Of these, the first two barely survived their founders, so they can be ignored. But with Plato’s Academy (which saw value in <The Good>, see pp.122-124), Aristotle’s Lyceum (which saw value in nurturing the <rational soul or mind>, see pp.182-184), and Alexander’s conquest-mania (which can only be described as the ‘will to power’), we have five classical ‘schools of thought’, which may be mapped to IDEAL as follows: {Empiricist = Epicurus, Tranquillity; Idealist = Plato, Good; Activist = Alexander, Power; Conformist = Zeno, Virtue; Theorist = Aristotle, Mind}. (I first thought of this mapping when reading *What is Ancient Philosophy?* by Pierre Hadot, see WAPNotes.doc.)

pp.271-275, Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations*: <What is impersonal in the *Meditations* agrees closely with Epictetus. Marcus Aurelius is doubtful about immortality, but says, as a Christian might: ‘Since it is possible that thou mayst depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly.’ Life in harmony with the universe is what is good; and harmony with the universe is the same thing as obedience to the will of God. | ‘Everything harmonizes with me which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early or too late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature: from thee are all things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say, Dear city of Zeus?’ | One sees that Saint Augustine’s City of God was in part taken over from the pagan Emperor. | Marcus Aurelius is persuaded that God gives every man a special daemon as his guide – a belief which reappears in the Christian guardian angel. He finds comfort in the thought of the universe as a closely-knit whole; it is, he says, one living being, having one substance and one soul. One of his maxims is: ‘Frequently consider the connection of all things in the universe.’ ‘Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread of thy being.’ There goes with this, in spite of his position in the Roman State, the Stoic belief in the human race as one community: ‘My city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world.’ There is the difficulty that one finds in all Stoics, of reconciling determinism with the freedom of the will. ‘Men exist for the sake of one another,’ he says, when he is thinking of his duty as ruler. ‘The wickedness of one man does no harm to another,’ he says on the same page, when he is thinking of the doctrine that the virtuous will alone is good. He never inferred that the goodness of one man does no good to another, and that he would do no harm to anybody but himself if he were as bad an Emperor as Nero; and yet this conclusion seems to follow. | ‘It is peculiar to man,’ he says, ‘to love even those who do wrong. And this happens if, when they do wrong, it occurs to thee that they are kinsmen,

and that they do wrong through ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it was before.’ | And again: ‘Love mankind. Follow God. ... And it is enough to remember that Law rules all.’ | These passages bring out very clearly the inherent contradictions in Stoic ethics and theology. On the one hand, the universe is a rigidly deterministic single whole, in which all that happens is the result of previous causes. On the other hand, the individual will is completely autonomous, and no man can be forced to sin by outside causes. This is one contradiction, and there is a second closely connected with it. Since the will is autonomous, and the virtuous will alone is good, one man cannot do either good or harm to another; therefore benevolence is an illusion. Something must be said about each of these contradictions. | The contradiction between free will and determinism is one of those that run through philosophy from early times to our own day, taking different forms at different times. ... There is, in fact, an element of sour grapes in Stoicism. We can’t be happy, but we can be good; let us therefore pretend that, so long as we are good, it doesn’t matter being unhappy. This doctrine is heroic, and, in a bad world, useful; but it is neither quite true nor, in a fundamental sense, quite sincere.> Another superb summary, and pithy critique.

pp.275-276: <Although the main importance of the Stoics was ethical, there were two respects in which their teaching bore fruit in other fields. One of these is theory of knowledge; the other is the doctrine of natural law and natural rights. | In theory of knowledge, in spite of Plato, they accepted perception; the deceptiveness of the senses, they held, was really false judgment, and could be avoided by a little care. ... On the whole, this doctrine was sane and scientific. | Another doctrine of theirs in theory of knowledge was more influential, though more questionable. This was their belief in innate ideas and principles. Greek logic was wholly deductive, and this raised the question of first premisses. First premisses had to be, at least in part, general, and no method existed of proving them. The Stoics held that there are certain principles which are luminously obvious, and are admitted by all men; these could be made, as in Euclid *Elements*, the basis of deduction. Innate ideas, similarly, could be used as the starting-point of definitions. This point of view was accepted throughout the Middle Ages, and even by Descartes. | The doctrine of natural right, as it appears in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, is a revival of a Stoic doctrine, though with important modifications. It was the Stoics who distinguished *jus naturale* from *jus gentium*. Natural law was derived from first principles of the kind held to underlie all general knowledge. By nature, the Stoics held, all human beings are equal. Marcus Aurelius, in his *Meditations*, favours ‘a polity in which there is the same law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal freedom of speech, and a kingly government which respects most of all the freedom of the governed’. This was an ideal which could not be consistently realized in the Roman Empire, but it influenced legislation, particularly in improving the status of women and slaves. Christianity took over this part of Stoic teaching along with much of the rest. And when at last, in the seventeenth century, the opportunity came to combat despotism effectually, the Stoic doctrines of natural law and natural equality, in their Christian dress, acquired a practical force which, in antiquity, not even an emperor could give to them.> I get the strong impression that most or all of the intellectual content of Christianity has been plagiarised from ancient Greek philosophy.

pp.277-278: <Originally, Rome was a small City State, not very unlike those of Greece, especially such as, like Sparta, did not depend upon foreign commerce. Kings, like those of Homeric Greece, had been succeeded by an aristocratic republic. Gradually, while the aristocratic element, embodied in the Senate, remained powerful, democratic elements were added; the resulting compromise was regarded by Panaetius the Stoic (whose views are reproduced by Polybius and Cicero) as an ideal combination of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements.> This <compromise> brings to mind Aristotle’s <polity>, see my notes for pp.200-201 above.

p.281: <Constantine's most important innovation was the adoption of Christianity as the State religion, apparently because a large proportion of the soldiers were Christian. The result of this was that when, during the fifth century, the Germans destroyed the Western Empire, its prestige caused them to adopt the Christian religion, thereby preserving for western Europe so much of ancient civilization as had been absorbed by the Church.> Interesting!

p.283: <On the whole, ... Rome acted as a blight on the Greek-speaking part of the Empire. Thought and art alike declined. Until the end of the second century A.D., life, for the well-to-do, was pleasant and easy-going; there was no incentive to strenuousness, and little opportunity for great achievement. The recognized schools of philosophy – the Academy, the Peripatetics, the Epicureans, and the Stoics – continued to exist until they were closed by Justinian. None of these, however, showed any vitality throughout the time after Marcus Aurelius, except the Neoplatonists in the third century A.D. ... ; and these men were hardly at all influenced by Rome. The Latin and Greek halves of the Empire became more and more divergent; the knowledge of Greek became rare in the west, and after Constantine Latin, in the east, survived only in law and in the army.>

pp.283-284: <When the Romans first came in contact with Greeks, they became aware of themselves as comparatively barbarous and uncouth. The Greeks were immeasurably their superiors in many ways: in manufacture and in the technique of agriculture; in the kinds of knowledge that are necessary for a good official; in conversation and the art of enjoying life; in art and literature and philosophy. The only things in which the Romans were superior were military tactics and social cohesion. The relation of the Romans to the Greeks was something like that of the Prussians to the French in 1814 and 1815; but this latter was temporary, whereas the other lasted a long time. After the Punic Wars, young Romans conceived an admiration for the Greeks. They learnt the Greek language, they copied Greek architecture, they employed Greek sculptors. The Roman gods were identified with the gods of Greece. The Trojan origin of the Romans was invented to make a connection with the Homeric myths. Latin poets adopted Greek metres, Latin philosophers took over Greek theories. To the end, Rome was culturally parasitic on Greece. The Romans invented no art forms, constructed no original system of philosophy, and made no scientific discoveries. They made good roads, systematic legal codes, and efficient armies; for the rest they looked to Greece.> Compare and contrast with the previous quote!

p.286: <Constantine's adoption of Christianity was politically successful, whereas earlier attempts to introduce a new religion failed; but the earlier attempts were, from a governmental point of view, very similar to his. All alike derived their possibility of success from the misfortunes and weariness of the Roman world. The traditional religions of Greece and Rome were suited to men interested in the terrestrial world, and hopeful of happiness on earth. Asia, with a longer experience of despair, had evolved more successful antidotes in the form of other-worldly hopes; of all these, Christianity was the most effective in bringing consolation. But Christianity, by the time it became the State religion, had absorbed much from Greece, and transmitted this, along with the Judaic element, to succeeding ages in the West.> What have <other-worldly hopes> ever done for us?

pp.286-287: <We owe it first to Alexander and then to Rome that the achievements of the great age of Greece were not lost to the world, like those of the Minoan age. ... In certain respects, political and ethical, Alexander and the Romans were the causes of a better philosophy than any that was professed by Greeks in their days of freedom. The Stoics, as we have seen, believed in the brotherhood of man, and did not confine their sympathies to the Greeks. The long dominion of Rome accustomed men to the idea of a single civilization under a single government. ... The conception of one human family, one Catholic religion, one universal culture, and one worldwide State, has haunted men's thoughts ever since its approximate realization by Rome.> What have <Alexander and the Romans> ever done for us?

p.288: <In philosophy, the Arabs were better as commentators than as original thinkers. Their importance, for us, is that they, and not the Christians, were the immediate inheritors of those parts of the Greek tradition which only the Eastern Empire had kept alive. Contact with the Mohammedans, in Spain, and to a lesser extent in Sicily, made the West aware of Aristotle; also of Arabic numerals, algebra, and chemistry. It was this contact that began the revival of learning in the eleventh century, leading to the Scholastic philosophy. It was much later, from the thirteenth century onward, that the study of Greek enabled men to go direct to the works of Plato and Aristotle and other Greek writers of antiquity. But if the Arabs had not preserved the tradition, the men of the Renaissance might not have suspected how much was to be gained by the revival of classical learning.> What have <the Arabs> ever done for us?

p.289-290: <Plotinus (A.D. 204-270), the founder of Neoplatonism, is the last of the great philosophers of antiquity. ... Dean Inge, in his invaluable book on Plotinus, rightly emphasises what Christianity owes to him. 'Platonism,' he says, 'is part of the vital structure of Christian theology, with which no other philosophy, I venture to say, can work without friction.' There is, he says, an 'utter impossibility of excising Platonism from Christianity without tearing Christianity to pieces'. He points out that Saint Augustine speaks of Plato's system as 'the most pure and bright in all philosophy', and of Plotinus as a man in whom 'Plato lived again', and who, if he had lived a little later, would have 'changed a few words and phrases and become Christian'. Saint Thomas Aquinas, according to Dean Inge, 'is nearer to Plotinus than to the *real* Aristotle'. | Plotinus, accordingly, is historically important as an influence in moulding the Christianity of the Middle Ages and of Catholic theology.> I wonder, if Plato had lived at the time of Augustine – eight hundred years later! – would he too have <changed a few words and phrases and become Christian>? Or if T. S. Eliot had been writing this review, would he have concluded, 'This is the way the search ends | Not with a truth but a rewrite'? The point is that such 'counterfactual conditionals' simply don't belong in a work that purports to 'search for truth'.

p.292: <The metaphysics of Plotinus begins with a Holy Trinity: The One, Spirit and Soul. These three are not equal, like the Persons of the Christian Trinity; the One is supreme, Spirit comes next, and Soul last.> But which <Holy Trinity> came first?

p.293: <We now come to the Second Person, whom Plotinus calls *nous*. It is always difficult to find an English word to represent *nous*. The standard dictionary translation is 'mind', but this does not have the correct connotations, particularly when the word is used in a religious philosophy. If we were to say that Plotinus put mind above soul, we should give a completely wrong impression. McKenna, the translator of Plotinus, uses 'Intellectual-Principle', but this is awkward, and does not suggest an object suitable for religious veneration. Dean Inge uses 'Spirit', which is perhaps the best word available. But it leaves out the intellectual element which was important in all Greek religious philosophy after Pythagoras. Mathematics, the world of ideas, and all thought about what is not sensible, have, for Pythagoras, Plato, and Plotinus, something divine; they constitute the activity of *nous*, or at least the nearest approach to its activity that we can conceive. It was this intellectual element in Plato's religion that led Christians – notably the author of Saint John's Gospel – to identify Christ with the *Logos*. *Logos* should be translated 'reason' in this connection; this prevents us from using 'reason' as the translation of *nous*. I shall follow Dean Inge in using 'Spirit', but with the proviso that *nous* has an intellectual connotation which is absent from 'Spirit' as usually understood.> See my notes for pp.349-350 below.

p.297: <In the *Fourth Ennead*, which is on the Soul, one section, the Seventh Tractate, is devoted to the discussion of immortality. ... The soul is neither matter nor the form of a material body, but Essence, and Essence is eternal. This view is implicit in Plato's argument that the soul is immortal because ideas are eternal; but it is only with Plotinus that it becomes explicit.> So material-spiritual duality passed from Plato to Christianity via Plotinus.

p.300: <Plotinus is both an end and a beginning – an end as regards the Greeks, a beginning as regards Christendom. To the ancient world, weary with centuries of disappointment, exhausted by despair, his doctrine might be acceptable, but could not be stimulating. To the cruder barbarian world, where superabundant energy needed to be restrained and regulated rather than stimulated, what could penetrate in his teaching was beneficial, since the evil to be combated was not languor but brutality. The work of transmitting what could survive of his philosophy was performed by the Christian philosophers of the last age of Rome.> This sense of exhaustion is apparent also from Hadot’s description: “especially from the third century A.D. onward, almost all philosophical works had their origin in oral commentaries on texts, which were subsequently written down either by the master or by a disciple. Alternatively, like many of Plotinus’ treatises, they were dissertations on ‘questions’ posed by the texts of Plato. | Henceforth, philosophers and their students did not talk about the problems themselves, or about things themselves; instead, they talked about what Plato, Aristotle, or Chrysippus had said about such problems or things.” It’s clear that by the third century the ancient philosophy had become completely ossified, and its rich gems – like those of the Roman Empire – were there for the taking.

p.303: <The Church brought philosophic beliefs into a closer relation to social and political circumstances than they have ever had before or since the medieval period, which we may reckon from about A.D. 400 to about A.D. 1400. The Church is a social institution built upon a creed, partly philosophic, partly concerned with sacred history. It achieved power and wealth by means of its creed. The lay rulers, who were in frequent conflict with it, were defeated because the great majority of the population, including most of the lay rulers themselves, were profoundly convinced of the truth of the Catholic faith. There were traditions, Roman and Germanic, against which the Church had to fight. The Roman tradition was strongest in Italy, especially among lawyers; the German tradition was strongest in the feudal aristocracy that arose out of the barbarian conquest. But for many centuries neither of these traditions proved strong enough to generate a successful opposition to the Church; and this was largely due to the fact that they were not embodied in any adequate philosophy.> I disagree: in my view, since <the great majority of the population> were illiterate, the Church <achieved power and wealth by means of its> exclusive control of the written word, see my notes for pp.25-41 above. And once this control had been established it could be maintained through the consistent application of reactionary groupthink/peer pressure. That is, <the truth of the Catholic faith> or having an <adequate philosophy> simply didn’t come into it.

p.304: <The medieval world, as contrasted with the world of antiquity, is characterized by various forms of dualism. There is the dualism of clergy and laity, the dualism of Latin and Teuton, the dualism of the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world, the dualism of the spirit and the flesh. All these are exemplified in the dualism of Pope and Emperor. The dualism of Latin and Teuton is an outcome of the barbarian invasion, but the others have older sources. The relations of clergy and laity, for the Middle Ages, were to be modelled on the relations of Samuel and Saul; the demand for the supremacy of the clergy arose out of the period of Arian or semi-Arian emperors and kings. The dualism of the kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world is found in the New Testament, but was systematized in Saint Augustine’s *City of God*. The dualism of the spirit and the flesh is to be found in Plato, and was emphasized by the Neoplatonists; it is important in the teaching of St Paul; and it dominated the Christian asceticism of the fourth and fifth centuries.> While recognising the *practical* impact of these <various forms of dualism> on <The medieval world>, from a *theoretical* perspective I continue to reject them as false. And since “A theory which involves a contradiction is ... entirely useless *as a theory*” (Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* p.319), I conclude that for as long as the Church allowed no other perspective (that is, throughout the entire medieval period) there was no *theoretical* progress. In my opinion.



p.305: <The first great period of Catholic philosophy was dominated by St Augustine, and by Plato among the pagans. The second period culminates in St Thomas Aquinas, for whom, and for his successors, Aristotle far outweighs Plato. The dualism of *The City of God*, however, survives in full force. The Church represents the City of God, and politically philosophers stand for the interests of the Church. Philosophy was concerned to defend the faith, and invoked reason to enable it to argue with those who, like the Mohammedans, did not accept the validity of the Christian revelation. By this invocation of reason the philosophers challenged criticism, not merely as theologians, but as inventors of systems designed to appeal to men of no matter what creed. In the long run, the appeal to reason was perhaps a mistake, but in the thirteenth century it seemed highly successful.> This underlines my previous comment. In the medieval period <Philosophy was concerned to defend the faith>, not to pursue the ‘search for truth’.

p.306: <No joy of life was possible, except, in fortunate moments, to those who retained the thoughtlessness of children.> Or, put another way, “The good life comes to those who embrace their suspension of disbelief”, see Review05.pdf p.6.

p.307: <In the attempt to make the genesis and significance of Catholic philosophy intelligible, I have found it necessary to devote more space to general history than is demanded in connection with either ancient or modern philosophy.> Thus, even though it’s very interesting, I don’t feel the need to copy and comment upon much of this <general history>.

pp.319-321: <The New Testament ... is not such a completely new beginning as it is apt to seem to those who know nothing of Jewish literature in the times just before the birth of Christ. ... Take, for instance, ‘The Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,’ written between 109 and 107 B.C. by a Pharisee who admired John Hyrcanus, a high priest of the Hasmonean dynasty. This book, in the form in which we have it, contains Christian interpolations, but these are all concerned with dogma. When they are excised, the ethical teaching remains closely similar to that of the Gospels. As the Rev. Dr R. H. Charles says: ‘The Sermon on the Mount reflects in several instances the spirit and even reproduces the very phrases of our text: many passages in the Gospels exhibit traces of the same, and St Paul seems to have used the book as a vade mecum’> Well, that about wraps it up for the <New Testament>.

p.331: <Elements of mystery religions, both Orphic and Asiatic, enter largely into Christian theology; in all of them, the central myth is that of the dying god who rises again.> This sounds like something straight out of *The Golden Bough*. Quite right too.

pp.349-350, Augustine, *Confessions* Book VII chapter IX: <There is a very interesting chapter in which he compares the Platonic philosophy with Christian doctrine. The Lord, he says, at this time provided him with ‘certain books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. And therein I read, not indeed in these words, but to the same purpose, enforced by many and diverse reasons, that “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God: the same was in the beginning with God; all things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made: that which was made by Him is life, and the life was the light of men, and the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not.” And that the soul of man, though it “bears witness to the light”, yet itself “is not that light”, but God, the Word of God, “is that true light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world”. And that “He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not.” But that “He came unto His own, and His own received Him not; but as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on His Name”: this I read not there.’ He also did not read there that ‘The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us’; nor that ‘He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross’; nor that ‘at the name of Jesus every knee should bow’. | Broadly speaking, he found in the Platonists the metaphysical doctrine of the Logos, but not the doctrine of

the Incarnation and the consequent doctrine of human salvation. Something not unlike these doctrines existed in Orphism and the other mystery religions; but of this St Augustine appears to have been ignorant. In any case, none of these were connected with a comparatively recent historical event, as Christianity was.> Hadot comments that “Christian philosophy was made possible by the ambiguity of the Greek word *Logos*. Since Heraclitus, the notion of the *Logos* has been a central concept of Greek philosophy, since it could signify ‘word’ and ‘discourse’ as well as ‘reason.’ In particular, the Stoics believe that the *Logos*, conceived as a rational force, was immanent in the world, in human beings, and in each individual. This is why, when the prologue to the Gospel of John identified Jesus with the Eternal *Logos* and the Son of God, it enables Christianity to be presented as a philosophy. The substantial Word of God could be conceived as the Reason which created the world and guided human thought.” All this refers to John 1:1-15: “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. | The same was in the beginning with God. | All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. | In him was life; and the life was the light of men. | And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not. | There was a man sent from God, whose name was John. | The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe. | He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. | That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. | He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. | He came unto his own, and his own received him not. | But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name: | Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. | And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, (and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father,) full of grace and truth. | John bare witness of him, and cried, saying, This was he of whom I spake, He that cometh after me is preferred before me: for he was before me.” It’s clear that Augustine knew that Christianity derived much of its metaphysics from <the Platonists>; and, indeed, made a virtue of it.

pp.351-353: <St Augustine, at most times, does not occupy himself with pure philosophy, but when he does he shows very great ability. He is the first of a long line whose purely speculative views are influenced by the necessity of agreeing with Scripture. This cannot be said of earlier Christian philosophers, e.g., Origen; in Origen, Christianity and Platonism lie side by side, and do not interpenetrate. In St Augustine, on the other hand, original thinking in pure philosophy is stimulated by the fact that Platonism, in certain respects, is not in harmony with Genesis. | The best purely philosophical work in St Augustine’s writings is the eleventh book of the *Confessions*. Popular editions of the *Confessions* end with Book X, on the ground that what follows is uninteresting; it is uninteresting because it is good philosophy, not biography. Book XI is concerned with the problem: Creation having occurred as the first chapter of Genesis asserts, and as Augustine maintains against the Manichæans, it should have occurred as soon as possible. So he imagines an objector arguing. | The first point to realize, if his answer is to be understood, is that creation out of nothing, which was taught in the Old Testament, was an idea wholly foreign to Greek philosophy. When Plato speaks of creation, he imagines a primitive matter to which God gives form; and the same is true of Aristotle. Their God is an artificer or architect, rather than a Creator. Substance is thought of as eternal and uncreated; only form is due to the will of God. As against this view, St Augustine maintains, as every orthodox Christian must, that the world was created not from any certain matter, but from nothing. God created substance, not only order and arrangement. | The Greek view, that creation out of nothing is impossible, has recurred at intervals in Christian times, and has led to pantheism. Pantheism holds that God and the world are not distinct, and that everything in the world is part of God. This view is developed most fully in Spinoza, but is one to which almost all mystics are attracted. It has thus happened, throughout the Christian centuries, that mystics have had difficulty in remaining orthodox, since they find it hard to believe that the world is outside God. Augustine, however, feels no difficulty on this point; Genesis is explicit, and that is enough for him. His view on this matter is essential to his theory of time. | Why was the world not created sooner? Because

there was no 'sooner'. Time was created when the world was created. God is eternal, in the sense of being timeless; in God there is no before and after, but only an eternal present. God's eternity is exempt from the relation of time; all time is present to Him at once. He did not *precede* His own creation of time, for that would imply that He was in time, whereas He stands eternally outside the stream of time. This leads St Augustine to a very admirable relativistic theory of time. | 'What, then, is time?' he asks. 'If no one asks of me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not.' Various difficulties perplex him. Neither past nor future, he says, but only the present, really is; the present is only a moment, and time can only be measured while it is passing. Nevertheless, there really is time past and future. We seem here to be led into contradictions. The only way Augustine can find to avoid these contradictions is to say that past and future can only be thought of as present: 'past' must be identified with memory, and 'future' with expectation, memory and expectation being both present facts. There are, he says, three times: 'a present of things past, a present of things present, and a present of things future'. 'The present of things past is memory; the present of things present is sight; and the present of things future is expectation.' To say that there are three times, past, present, and future, is a loose way of speaking. | He realizes that he has not really solved all difficulties by this theory. 'My soul yearns to know this most entangled enigma,' he says, and he prays to God to enlighten him, assuring Him that his interest in the problem does not arise from vain curiosity. 'I confess to Thee, O Lord, that I am as yet ignorant what time is.' But the gist of the solution he suggests is that time is subjective: time is in the human mind, which expects, considers, and remembers. It follows that there can be no time without a created being, and that to speak of time before the Creation is meaningless. | I do not myself agree with this theory, in so far as it makes time something mental. But it is clearly a very able theory, deserving to be seriously considered. I should go further, and say that it is a great advance on anything to be found on the subject in Greek philosophy. It contains a better and clearer statement than Kant's of the subjective theory of time – a theory which, since Kant, has been widely accepted among philosophers. | The theory that time is only an aspect of our thoughts is one of the most extreme forms of that subjectivism which, as we have seen, gradually increased in antiquity from the time of Protagoras and Socrates onwards. Its emotional aspect is obsession with sin, which came later than its intellectual aspects. St Augustine exhibits both kinds of subjectivism. Subjectivism led him to anticipate not only Kant's theory of time, but Descartes' *cogito*. In his *Soliloquia* he says: 'You, who wish to know, do you know you are? I know it. Whence are you? I know not. Do you feel yourself single or multiple? I know not. Do you feel yourself moved? I know not. Do you know that you think? I do.' This contains not only Descartes' *cogito*, but his reply to Gassendi's *ambulo ergo sum*. As a philosopher, therefore, Augustine deserves a high place.> Regarding <The Greek view, that creation out of nothing is impossible>, this can be countered with reference to "open and dynamic environments such as the surface of the Earth, where it seems that complexity only ever gives rise to yet more complexity", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.2. And regarding Augustine's <theory of time>, what's missing here is the 'toolkit approach', see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.5. Like loveliness or completeness or competence or fairness or entropy, time is a parameter which has meaning only within a particular frame or system or application or context or model; but which when used outside its domain can lead to apparent contradictions and paradoxes; and so the toolkit approach simply forbids any such misuse. Thus in the case of Genesis it's perfectly all right to say that <Time was created when the world was created>, and to refuse to contemplate what happened 'before' then; just as long as one also accepts that (according to the toolkit approach) there may be many other possible explanations for <Creation>, and the key criterion for judging between them all (including Genesis) is their *efficacy*, that is, whether or not they are 'the right tool for the job'. Also of interest in this passage is Russell's view that Augustine's <theory of time> <is a great advance on anything to be found on the subject in Greek philosophy>, and that <It contains a better and clearer statement than Kant's>. Plus it had an obvious influence on Eliot's *Burnt Norton*, with which Russell would have been well-acquainted.

pp.362-363: <There is only one intellectual difficulty that really troubles St Augustine. This is not that it seems a pity to have created Man, since the immense majority of the human race are predestined to eternal torment. What troubles him is that, if original sin is inherited from Adam, as St Paul teaches, the soul, as well as the body, must be propagated by the parents, for sin is of the soul, not the body. He sees difficulties in this doctrine, but says that, since Scripture is silent, it cannot be necessary to salvation to arrive at a just view on the matter. He therefore leaves it undecided. | It is strange that the last men of intellectual eminence before the dark ages were concerned, not with saving civilization or expelling the barbarians or reforming the abuses of the administration, but with preaching the merit of virginity and the damnation of unbaptized infants. Seeing that these were the preoccupations that the Church handed on to the converted barbarians, it is no wonder that the succeeding age surpassed almost all other fully historical periods in cruelty and superstition.> Well, that about wraps it up for <the last men of intellectual eminence before the dark ages>.

p.373: <It was from the East that monasticism came to Greek-speaking countries, chiefly owing to St Basil (about 360). His monasteries were less ascetic; they had orphanages, and schools for boys (not only for such as intended to become monks).> This sounds enlightened! It's a pity it came to naught, in my view because of *monotheistic totalitarianism*, see my notes for p.418 below.

p.380: <[Pope] Gregory was no friend to secular learning. To Desiderius, bishop of Vienne in France, he writes: | 'It came to our ears, what we cannot mention without shame, that thy Fraternity is [i.e. thou art] in the habit of expounding grammar to certain persons. This thing we took so much amiss, and so strongly disapproved it, that we changed what had been said before into groaning and sadness, since the praises of Christ cannot find room in one mouth with the praises of Jupiter. ... In proportion as it is execrable for such a thing to be related of a priest, it ought to be ascertained by strict and veracious evidence whether or not it be so.' | This hostility to pagan learning survived in the Church for at least four centuries, till the time of Gerbert (Sylvester II). It was only from the eleventh century onward that the Church became friendly to learning.> Meanwhile in the West: this quote provides ample support for my contention that the Church exercised "exclusive control of the written word", see p.303 above.

p.387: <In the West, but not in the East, the laity were mostly illiterate for many centuries, and this gave the Church an advantage in the West which it did not possess in the East.> Like I said.

p.395: <There is an imperialism of culture which is harder to overcome than the imperialism of power. Long after the Western Empire fell – indeed until the Reformation – all European culture retained a tincture of Roman imperialism. It now has, for us, a West-European imperialistic flavour. I think that, if we are to feel at home in the world after the present war, we shall have to admit Asia to equality in our thoughts, not only politically, but culturally. What changes this will bring about, I do not know, but I am convinced that they will be profound and of the greatest importance.> In my view statements like this make Russell the 'Renaissance Man of the Twentieth Century'.

pp.410-411: <St Anselm was, like Lanfranc, an Italian, a monk at Bec, and archbishop of Canterbury (1093-1109), in which capacity he followed the principles of Gregory VII and quarrelled with the king. He is chiefly known to fame as the inventor of the 'ontological argument' for the existence of God. As he put it, the argument is as follows: We define 'God' as the greatest possible object of thought. Now if an object of thought does not exist, another, exactly like it, which does exist, is greater. Therefore the greatest of all objects of thought must exist, since, otherwise, another, still greater, would be possible. Therefore God exists. | This argument has never been accepted, by theologians. It was adversely criticized at the time; then it was forgotten till the latter half of the thirteenth century. Thomas Aquinas rejected it, and among theologians his authority has prevailed ever since. But among philosophers it has had a better fate. Descartes revived it in a

somewhat amended form; Leibniz thought that it could be made valid by the addition of a supplement to prove that God is *possible*. Kant considered that he had demolished it once for all. Nevertheless, in some sense, it underlies the system of Hegel and his followers, and reappears in Bradley's principle: 'What may be and must be, is.' | Clearly an argument with such a distinguished history is to be treated with respect, whether valid or not. The real question is: Is there anything we can think of which, by the mere fact that we can think of it, is shown to exist outside our thought? Every philosopher would *like* to say yes, because a philosopher's job is to find out things about the world by thinking rather than observing. If yes is the right answer, there is a bridge from pure thought to things; if not, not. In this generalized form, Plato uses a kind of ontological argument to prove the objective reality of ideas. But no one before Anselm had stated the argument in its naked logical purity. In gaining purity, it loses plausibility; but this also is to Anselm's credit.> In my view the <objective reality of ideas> and the associated <ontological argument> are fallacies resulting from our neglecting "the foundational role played by language", see Review05.pdf p.3. As for <Bradley's principle>: you can no more get an 'is' from a 'may' or a 'must' than you can from a 'has' or an 'ought'; and indeed my Review05.pdf analysis treats these (five) grammatical operators as distinct and incommensurable.

pp.415-416: <The political and social system of the Arabs had defects similar to those of the Roman Empire, together with some others. Absolute monarchy combined with polygamy led, as it usually does, to dynastic wars whenever a ruler died, ending with the victory of one of the ruler's sons and the death of all the rest. There were immense numbers of slaves, largely as a result of successful wars; at times there were dangerous servile insurrections. Commerce was greatly developed, the more so as the caliphate occupied a central position between East and West. 'Not only did the possession of enormous wealth create a demand for costly articles, such as silks from China and furs from Northern Europe, but trade was promoted by certain special conditions, such as the vast extent of the Muslim empire, the spread of Arabic as a world-language, and the exalted status assigned to the merchant in the Muslim system of ethics; it was remembered that the Prophet himself had been a merchant and had commended trading during the pilgrimage to Mecca.' [Footnote:] *Cambridge Medieval History*, IV, 286.> It also helped that they tolerated the <people of the Book>, p.414. In my view it was this combination of *trade* and *literacy* that brought the eventual breakdown of the <Pope and Emperor> diarchy, see p.468 below.

pp.417-418: <Avicenna (Ibn Sina) (980-1037) ... was the author of an encyclopedia, almost unknown to the East because of the hostility of theologians, but influential in the West through Latin translations. His psychology has an empirical tendency. | His philosophy is nearer to Aristotle, and less Neoplatonic, than that of his Muslim predecessors. Like the Christian scholastics later, he is occupied with the problem of universals. Plato said they were anterior to things. Aristotle has two views, one when he is thinking, the other when he is combating Plato. This makes him ideal material for the commentator. | Avicenna invented a formula, which was repeated by Averroes and Albertus Magnus: 'Thought brings about the generality in forms.' From this it might be supposed that he did not believe in universals apart from thought. This, however, would be an unduly simple view. Genera – that is, universals – are, he says, at once before things, in things, and after things. He explains this as follows. They are *before* things in God's understanding. (God decides, for instance, to create cats. This requires that He should have the idea 'cat', which is thus, in this respect, anterior to particular cats.) Genera are *in* things in natural objects. (When cats have been created, felinity is in each of them.) Genera are *after* things in our thought. (When we have seen many cats, we notice their likeness to each other, and arrive at the general idea 'cat'.) This view is obviously intended to reconcile different theories.> Well, I don't <believe in universals>, apart from whatever we express in writing, see Review05.pdf p.3.

p.418: <Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126-98) lived at the opposite end of the Muslim world from Avicenna. He was born at Cordova, where his father and grandfather had been cadis; he himself was a cadi, first in Seville, then in Cordova. ... Al-Mansur published an edict to the effect that God had decreed hell-fire for those who thought that truth could be found by the unaided reason. All the books that could be found on logic and metaphysics were given to the flames. ... Shortly after this time the Moorish territory in Spain was greatly diminished by Christian conquests. Muslim philosophy in Spain ended with Averroes; and in the rest of the Mohammedan world a rigid orthodoxy put an end to speculation.> In reviewing M. R. Menocal, *The Ornament of the World*, ideas5.doc 3/11/22, I noted “the close control on literature and learning exercised over centuries by the religious authorities, typically through their prescribing the supremacy of a single book (Torah/Bible/Quran) and language (Hebrew/Latin/Arabic)”, underlining “the key role of *literacy*, which in my view was the chief means by which Andalusia acquired great power and wealth.”

p.420: <Arabic philosophy is not important as original thought. Men like Avicenna and Averroes are essentially commentators. ... Between ancient and modern European civilization, the dark ages intervened. The Mohammedans and the Byzantines, while lacking the intellectual energy required for innovation, preserved the apparatus of civilization – education, books, and learned leisure.> What have <The Mohammedans and the Byzantines> ever done for us?

pp.420-421: <The Spanish Jews produced one philosopher of importance, Maimonides. He was born in Cordova in 1135, but went to Cairo at the age of thirty, and stayed there for the rest of his life. He wrote in Arabic, but was immediately translated into Hebrew. A few decades after his death, he was translated into Latin, probably at the request of the Emperor Frederick II. He wrote a book called *Guide to Wanderers*, addressed to philosophers who have lost their faith. Its purpose is to reconcile Aristotle with Jewish theology. Aristotle is the authority on the sublunary world, revelation on the heavenly. But philosophy and revelation come together in the knowledge of God. The pursuit of truth is a religious duty. Astrology is rejected. The Pentateuch is not always to be taken literally; when the literal sense conflicts with reason, we must seek an allegorical interpretation. As against Aristotle, he maintains that God created not only form, but matter, out of nothing. He gives a summary of the *Timaeus* (which he knew in Arabic), preferring it on some points to Aristotle. The essence of God is unknowable, being above all predicated perfections. The Jews considered him heretical, and went so far as to invoke the Christian ecclesiastical authorities against him.> Ditto. There’s an obvious pattern here.

p.427: <The Crusades need not concern us as wars, but they have a certain importance in relation to culture. It was natural for the papacy to take the lead in the initiating of a Crusade, since the object was (at least ostensibly) religious; thus the power of the popes was increased by the war propaganda and by the religious zeal that was excited. Another important effect was the massacre of large numbers of Jews; those who were not massacred were often despoiled of their property and forcibly baptized. There were large-scale murders of Jews in Germany at the time of the first Crusade, and in England, at the time of the third Crusade, on the accession of Richard Cœur de Lion. York, where the first Christian Emperor had begun his reign, was, aptly enough, the scene of one of the most appalling mass-atrocities against Jews. The Jews, before the Crusades, had almost a monopoly of the trade in Eastern goods throughout Europe; after the Crusades, as a result of the persecution of Jews, this trade was largely in Christian hands. | Another and very different effect of the Crusades was to stimulate literary intercourse with Constantinople. During the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, many translations from Greek into Latin were made as a result of this intercourse. There had always been much trade with Constantinople, especially by Venetians; but Italian traders did not trouble themselves with Greek classics, any more than English or American traders in Shanghai troubled themselves with the classics of China. (European knowledge of Chinese classics was derived mainly from missionaries.)> Another insightful history lesson.

pp.429-430: <Abélard (or Abailard) ... was born near Nantes in 1079, was a pupil of William of Champeaux (a realist) in Paris, and then a teacher in the Paris cathedral school, where he combated William's views and compelled him to modify them. ... Abélard's most famous book, composed in 1121-22, is *Sic et Non*, 'Yes and No'. Here he gives dialectical arguments for and against a great variety of theses, often without attempting to arrive at a conclusion; clearly he likes the disputation itself, and considers it useful as sharpening the wits. The book had a considerable effect in waking people from their dogmatic slumbers. Abélard's view, that (apart from Scripture) dialectic is the sole road to truth, while no empiricist can accept it, had, at the time, a valuable effect as a solvent of prejudices and an encouragement to the fearless use of the intellect. Nothing outside the Scriptures, he said, is infallible; even Apostles and Fathers may err. | His valuation of logic was, from a modern point of view, excessive. He considered it preeminently *the* Christian science, and made play with its derivation from 'Logos'. 'In the beginning was the Logos', says St John's Gospel, and this, he thought, proves the dignity of Logic. | His chief importance is in logic and theory of knowledge. His philosophy is a critical analysis, largely linguistic. As for universals, i.e., what can be predicated of many different things, he holds that we do not predicate a *thing*, but a *word*. In this sense he is a nominalist. But as against Roscelin he points out that a '*flatus vocis*' is a thing; it is not the word as a physical occurrence that we predicate, but the word as *meaning*. Here he appeals to Aristotle. Things, he says, resemble each other, and these resemblances give rise to universals. But the point of resemblance between two similar things is not itself a thing; this is the mistake of realism. He says some things that are even more hostile to realism, for example, that general concepts are not based in the nature of things, but are confused images of many things. Nevertheless he does not wholly refuse a place to Platonic ideas: they exist in the divine mind as patterns for creation; they are, in fact, God's concepts. | All this, whether right or wrong, is certainly very able. The most modern discussions of the problem of universals have not got much further.> But it's precisely this <problem of universals> that I claim to have solved, see Review05.pdf p.3.

p.442: <If Satan existed, the future of the order founded by St Francis would afford him the most exquisite gratification. The saint's immediate successor as head of the order, Brother Elias, wallowed in luxury, and allowed a complete abandonment of poverty. The chief work of the Franciscans in the years immediately following the death of their founder was as recruiting sergeants in the bitter and bloody wars of Guelfs and Ghibellines. The Inquisition, founded seven years after his death, was, in several countries, chiefly conducted by Franciscans. A small minority, called the Spirituals, remained true to his teaching; many of these were burnt by the Inquisition for heresy. These men held that Christ and the Apostles owned no property, not even the clothes they wore; this opinion was condemned as heretical in 1323 by John XXII. The net result of St Francis's life was to create yet one more wealthy and corrupt order, to strengthen the hierarchy, and to facilitate the persecution of all who excelled in moral earnestness or freedom of thought. In view of his own aims and character, it is impossible to imagine any more bitterly ironical outcome.> Well, that about wraps it up for St Francis.

pp.442-443: <The Dominicans were even more active than the Franciscans in the work of the Inquisition. They performed, however, a valuable service to mankind by their devotion to learning. This was no part of St Dominic's intention; he had decreed that his friars were 'not to learn secular sciences or liberal arts except by dispensation'. This rule was abrogated in 1259, after which date everything was done to make a studious life easy for Dominicans. Manual labour was no part of their duties, and the hours of devotion were shortened to give them more time for study. They devoted themselves to reconciling Aristotle and Christ; Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, both Dominicans, accomplished this task as well as it is capable of being accomplished. The authority of Thomas Aquinas was so overwhelming that subsequent Dominicans did not achieve much in philosophy; though Francis, even more than Dominic, had disliked learning, the greatest names in the immediately following period are Franciscan: Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus, and William of Occam were all Franciscans.> Well, that about wraps it up for St Dominic.

pp.444-445: <Thomas Aquinas (b. 1225 or 1226, d. 1274) is regarded as the greatest of scholastic philosophers. In all Catholic educational institutions that teach philosophy his system has to be taught as the only right one; this has been the rule since a rescript of 1879 by Leo XIII. St Thomas, therefore, is not only of historical interest, but is a living influence, like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel – more, in fact, than the latter two. ... After a period in Cologne and Paris, he returned to Italy in 1259, where he spent the rest of his life except for the three years 1269-72. During these three years he was in Paris, where the Dominicans, on account of their Aristotelianism, were in trouble with the university authorities, and were suspected of heretical sympathy with the Averroists, who had a powerful party in the university. The Averroists held, on the basis of their interpretation of Aristotle, that the soul, in so far as it is individual, is not immortal; immortality belongs only to the intellect, which is impersonal, and identical in different intellectual beings. When it was forcibly brought to their notice that this doctrine is contrary to the Catholic faith, they took refuge in the subterfuge of ‘double truth’: one sort, based on reason, in philosophy, and another, based on revelation, in theology. All this brought Aristotle into bad odour, and St Thomas, in Paris, was concerned to undo the harm done by too close adherence to Arabian doctrines. In this he was singularly successful.> The <subterfuge of ‘double truth’> is so scary.

pp.446-447: <The existence of God is proved, as in Aristotle, by the argument of the unmoved mover. ... There are things which are only moved, and other things which both move and are moved. Whatever is moved is moved by something, and, since an endless regress is impossible, we must arrive somewhere at something which moves without being moved. This unmoved mover is God. It might be objected that this argument involves the eternity of movement, which Catholics reject. This would be an error: it is valid on the hypothesis of the eternity of movement, but is only strengthened by the opposite hypothesis, which involves a beginning, and therefore a First Cause. | In the *Summa Theologiae*, five proofs of God’s existence are given. First, the argument of the unmoved mover, as above. Second, the argument of the First Cause, which again depends upon the impossibility of an infinite regress. Third, that there must be an ultimate source of all necessity; this is much the same as the second argument. Fourth, that we find various perfections in the world, and that these must have their source in something completely perfect. Fifth, that we find even lifeless things serving a purpose, which must be that of some being outside them, since only living things can have an internal purpose.>

pp.449-450: <Book II is mainly occupied with the soul in man. All intellectual substances are immaterial and incorruptible; angels have no bodies, but in men the soul is united to a body. It is the form of the body, as in Aristotle. There are not three souls in man, but only one. The whole soul is present entire in every part of the body. The souls of animals, unlike those of men, are not immortal. The intellect is part of each man’s soul; there is not, as Averroes maintained, only one intellect, in which various men participate. The soul is not transmitted with the semen, but is created afresh with each man. There is, it is true, a difficulty: when a man is born out of wedlock, this seems to make God an accomplice in adultery. This objection, however, is only specious. (There is a grave objection, which troubled St Augustine, and that is as to the transmission of original sin. It is the soul that sins, and if the soul is not transmitted, but created afresh, how can it inherit the sin of Adam? This is not discussed.) | In connection with the intellect, the problem of universals is discussed. St Thomas’s position is that of Aristotle. Universals do not subsist outside the soul, but the intellect, in understanding universals, understands things that are outside the soul.>



p.450: <Astrology is to be rejected, for the usual reasons. In answer to the question ‘Is there such a thing as fate?’ Aquinas replies that we *might* give the name ‘fate’ to the order impressed by Providence, but it is wiser not to do so, as ‘fate’ is a pagan word. This leads to an argument that prayer is useful although Providence is unchangeable. (I have failed to follow this argument.) God sometimes works miracles, but no one else can. Magic, however, is possible with the help of demons; this is not properly miraculous, and is not by the help of the stars.>

pp.452-454: <In its general outlines, the philosophy of Aquinas agrees with that of Aristotle, and will be accepted or rejected by a reader in the measure in which he accepts or rejects the philosophy of the Stagyrte. The originality of Aquinas is shown in his adaptation of Aristotle to Christian dogma, with a minimum of alteration. In his day he was considered a bold innovator; even after his death many of his doctrines were condemned by the universities of Paris and Oxford. He was even more remarkable for systematizing than for originality. Even if every one of his doctrines were mistaken, the *Summa* would remain an imposing intellectual edifice. When he wishes to refute some doctrine, he states it first, often with great force, and almost always with an attempt at fairness. The sharpness and clarity with which he distinguishes arguments derived from reason and arguments derived from revelation are admirable. He knows Aristotle well, and understands him thoroughly, which cannot be said of any earlier Catholic philosopher. | These merits, however, seem scarcely sufficient to justify his immense reputation. The appeal to reason is, in a sense, insincere, since the conclusion to be reached is fixed in advance. Take, for example, the indissolubility of marriage. This is advocated on the ground that the father is useful in the education of the children, (a) because he is more rational than the mother, (b) because, being stronger, he is better able to inflict physical punishment. A modern educator might retort (a) that there is no reason to suppose men in general more rational than women, (b) that the sort of punishment that requires great physical strength is not desirable in education. He might go on to point out that fathers, in the modern world, have scarcely any part in education. But no follower of St Thomas would, on that account, cease to believe in lifelong monogamy, because the real grounds of belief are not those which are alleged. | Or take again the arguments professing to prove the existence of God. All of these, except the one from teleology in lifeless things, depend upon the supposed impossibility of a series having no first term. Every mathematician knows that there is no such impossibility; the series of negative integers ending with minus one is an instance to the contrary. But here again no Catholic is likely to abandon belief in God even if he becomes convinced that St Thomas’s arguments are bad; he will invent other arguments, or take refuge in revelation. | The contentions that God’s essence and existence are one and the same, that God is His own goodness, His own power, and so on, suggest a confusion, found in Plato, but supposed to have been avoided by Aristotle, between the manner of being of particulars and the manner of being of universals. God’s essence is, one must suppose, of the nature of universals, while His existence is not. It is not easy to state this difficulty satisfactorily, since it occurs within a logic that can no longer be accepted. But it points clearly to some kind of syntactical confusion, without which much of the argumentation about God would lose its plausibility. | There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times.> Whilst it’s rare for me to think in terms of acceptance or rejection, I’ve definitely moved on from <the philosophy of the Stagyrte>, and therefore I’m inclined to give <the philosophy of Aquinas> short shrift as well. But, even with the benefit of the doubt, on the basis of the above extracts it’s clear to me that Aquinas indeed suffered from a surfeit of <syntactical confusion> and <special pleading>.

p.455, p.457: <Roger Bacon (*ca.* 1214-*ca.* 1294) was not greatly admired in his own day, but in modern times has been praised far beyond his deserts. He was not so much a philosopher, in the narrow sense, as a man of universal learning with a passion for mathematics and science. Science, in his day, was mixed up with alchemy, and thought to be mixed up with black magic; Bacon was constantly getting into trouble through being suspected of heresy and magic. ... In modern times Bacon has been praised because he valued experiment, as a source of knowledge, more than argument. Certainly his interests and his way of dealing with subjects are very different from those of the typical scholastics. His encyclopaedic tendencies are like those of the Arabic writers, who evidently influenced him more profoundly than they did most other Christian philosophers. They, like him, were interested in science, and believed in magic and astrology, whereas Christians thought magic wicked and astrology a delusion. He is astonishing because he differs so widely from other medieval Christian philosophers, but he had little influence in his own time, and was not, to my mind, so scientific as is sometimes thought. English writers used to say that he invented gunpowder, but this, of course, is untrue.> Well, that about wraps it up for Roger Bacon.

pp.458-459: <Duns Scotus held that, since there is no difference between being and essence, the 'principle of individuation' – i.e., that which makes one thing not identical with another – must be form, not matter. The 'principle of individuation' was one of the important problems of the scholastic philosophy. In various forms, it has remained a problem to the present day. ... Various stages have to be traversed before we can state this problem in modern terms. The first step, which was taken by Leibniz, was to get rid of the distinction between essential and accidental properties, which, like many that the scholastics took over from Aristotle, turns out to be unreal as soon as we attempt to state it carefully. ... A further step is required in modernizing the problem, and that is, to get rid of the conception of 'substance'. When this is done, a 'thing' has to be a bundle of qualities, since there is no longer any kernel of pure 'thinghood'. It would seem to follow that, if 'substance' is rejected, we must take a view more akin to that of Scotus than to that of Aquinas. This, however, involves much difficulty in connection with space and time. I have treated the question as I see it, under the heading 'Proper Names', in my *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*.> I've taken a look at Russell's *Inquiry* (which is available online, see link below), but its contribution to my understanding of this (or, indeed, any) problem has been <practically *nil*>, so instead I'll fall back on my usual statements that "Everything is defined through its associations", and "our use of language effectively renders obsolete the traditional philosophical distinction between 'universals' and 'particulars'", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.1 and Review05.pdf p.3 respectively.

p.459, p.462: <William of Occam is, after St Thomas, the most important schoolman. The circumstances of his life are very imperfectly known. He was born probably between 1290 and 1300; he died on April 10, but whether in 1349 or 1350 is uncertain. (The Black Death was raging in 1349, so that this is perhaps the more probable year.) ... It is time now to turn to Occam's purely philosophical doctrines. On this subject there is a very good book, *The Logic of William of Occam*, by Ernest E. Moody. Much of what I shall have to say is based on this book, which takes a somewhat unusual view, but, I think, a correct one. There is a tendency in writers on history of philosophy to interpret men in the light of their successors, but this is generally a mistake. Occam has been regarded as bringing about the breakdown of scholasticism, as a precursor of Descartes or Kant or whoever might be the particular commentator's favourite among modern philosophers. According to Moody, with whom I agree, all this is a mistake. Occam, he holds, was mainly concerned to restore a pure Aristotle, freed from both Augustinian and Arabic influences. This had also been, to a considerable extent, the aim of St Thomas; but the Franciscans, as we have seen, had continued to follow St Augustine much more closely than he did. The interpretation of Occam by modern historians, according to Moody, has been vitiated by the desire to find a *gradual* transition from scholastic to modern philosophy; this has caused people to read modern doctrines into him, when in fact he is only interpreting Aristotle.> Russell agrees with Moody. Me too.

pp.462-463: <Occam is best known for a maxim which is not to be found in his works, but has acquired the name of 'Occam's razor'. This maxim says: 'Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity.' Although he did not say this, he said something which has much the same effect, namely: 'It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer.' That is to say, if everything in some science can be interpreted without assuming this or that hypothetical entity, there is no ground for assuming it. I have myself found this a most fruitful principle in logical analysis.> Me too, see my notes for pp.225-226 above.

p.465: <By insisting on the possibility of studying logic and human knowledge without reference to metaphysics and theology, Occam's work encouraged scientific research. The Augustinians, he said, erred in first supposing things unintelligible and men unintelligent, and then adding a light from Infinity by which knowledge became possible. He agreed in this with Aquinas, but differed in emphasis, for Aquinas was primarily a theologian, and Occam was, so far as logic is concerned, primarily a secular philosopher. | His attitude gave confidence to students of particular problems, for instance, his immediate follower Nicholas of Oresme (d. 1382), who investigated planetary theory. This man was, to a certain extent, a precursor of Copernicus; he set forth both the geocentric and the heliocentric theories, and said that each would explain all the facts known in his day, so that there was no way of deciding between them. | After William of Occam there are no more great scholastics. The next period for great philosophers began in the late Renaissance.> Well, that about wraps it up for the <scholastics>.

p.467: <Christianity combined elements of strength from various sources. ... The Old Testament, the mystery religions, Greek philosophy, and Roman methods of administration were all blended in the Catholic Church, and combined to give it a strength which no earlier social organization had equalled.> In my view the Church's great strength came not from any intellectual advance but from brute sectarianism (that is, the religious expression of the herd instinct, see references). In other words, not System 2 but System 1.

p.468: <Outward events had more to do than philosophy with the disintegration of the Catholic synthesis which began in the fourteenth century. The Byzantine Empire was conquered by the Latins in 1204, and remained in their hands till 1261. During this time the religion of its government was Catholic, not Greek; but after 1261 Constantinople was lost to the Pope and never recovered, in spite of nominal union at Ferrara in 1438. The defeat of the Western Empire in its conflict with the papacy proved useless to the Church, owing to the rise of national monarchies in France and England; throughout most of the fourteenth century the Pope was, politically, a tool in the hands of the King of France. More important than these causes was the rise of a rich commercial class and the increase of knowledge in the laity. Both of these began in Italy, and remained more advanced in that country than in other parts of the West until the middle of the sixteenth century. North Italian cities were much richer, in the fourteenth century, than any of the cities of the North; and learned laymen, especially in law and medicine, were becoming increasingly numerous. The cities had a spirit of independence which, now that the Emperor was no longer a menace, was apt to turn against the Pope.> Other key events in this period were Marco Polo's account of his journeys along the Silk Road (1271-1295), and the Black Death (1346-1353). None of these <Outward events> had anything to do with <philosophy>, but they had a lot to do with *trade* and *literacy*. Thus <the truth of the Catholic faith> was no more a factor in its decline than it was in its ascent, see p.303.

pp.301-475, <Book Two| Catholic Philosophy>: From Russell's narrative I conclude that the contribution of <the Church> to the 'search for truth' has been <practically *nil*>. As with the early Greeks, see pp.218-226, what's missing is any procedure equivalent to 'scientific method' by which the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14 may be investigated from multiple perspectives; compare MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.5 and Review05.pdf pp.6-7. Well, that about wraps it up for <the Church>.

p.479: <The period of history which is commonly called ‘modern’ has a mental outlook which differs from that of the medieval period in many ways. Of these, two are the most important: the diminishing authority of the Church, and the increasing authority of science. With these two, others are connected. The culture of modern times is more lay than clerical. States increasingly replace the Church as the governmental authority that controls culture. The government of nations is, at first, mainly in the hands of kings; then, as in ancient Greece, the kings are gradually replaced by democracies or tyrants. The power of the national State, and the functions that it performs, grow steadily throughout the whole period (apart from some minor fluctuations); but at most times the State has less influence on the opinions of philosophers than the Church had in the Middle Ages. The feudal aristocracy, which, north of the Alps, had been able, till the fifteenth century, to hold its own against central governments, loses first its political and then its economic importance. It is replaced by the king in alliance with rich merchants; these two share power in different proportions in different countries. There is a tendency for the rich merchants to become absorbed into the aristocracy. From the time of the American and French Revolutions onwards, democracy, in the modern sense, becomes an important political force. Socialism, as opposed to democracy based on private property, first acquires governmental power in 1917. This form of government, however, if it spreads, must obviously bring with it a new form of culture; the culture with which we shall be concerned is in the main ‘liberal’, that is to say, of the kind most naturally associated with commerce. To this there are important exceptions, especially in Germany; Fichte and Hegel, to take two examples, have an outlook which is totally unconnected with commerce. But such exceptions are not typical of their age.> Russell reintroduces his p.13 dualism between religion and science. Of particular note is his description of a <liberal> culture as being <of the kind most naturally associated with commerce>, with no mention of individual rights or civil liberties. To me this highlights the key role of *trade* in the genesis of the modern world. By comparison, it’s not at all clear (from this paragraph, at least) what part science played in this momentous transition.

p.480: <So far, I have been speaking of *theoretical* science, which is an attempt to *understand* the world. *Practical* science, which is an attempt to *change* the world, has been important from the first, and has continually increased in importance, until it has almost ousted theoretical science from men’s thoughts. The practical importance of science was first recognized in connection with war; Galileo and Leonardo obtained government employment by their claim to improve artillery and the art of fortification. From their time onwards, the part of the men of science in war has steadily grown greater. Their part in developing machine production, and accustoming the population to the use, first of steam, then of electricity, came later, and did not begin to have important political effects until near the end of the eighteenth century. The triumph of science has been mainly due to its practical utility, and there has been an attempt to divorce this aspect from that of theory, thus making science more and more a technique, and less and less a doctrine as to the nature of the world. The penetration of this point of view to the philosophers is very recent.> I have several problems with this paragraph, as follows.

- What about *experimental* science, which is the quintessential <attempt to *understand* the world> through direct observation, and yet fits neither of Russell’s descriptions?
- Isn’t Russell’s <*Practical* science> simply what we’d call ‘engineering’?
- The statement that <Their part in developing machine production ... did not begin to have important political effects until near the end of the eighteenth century> appears to contradict the earlier claim that <*Practical* science ... has been important from the first>.
- It’s unclear what Russell means by <technique>. If it’s ‘scientific method’ then he should call it that. Otherwise it’s ‘engineering’. In either case it’s unlikely that much survives of his argument about science becoming <less and less a doctrine as to the nature of the world>.
- The last sentence appears to be a tacit admission that Russell *himself* has only just thought of <this point of view>; in which case it’s disingenuous of him not to say so, instead preferring anonymity within a mysterious (and fictional?) collective.

p.481: <Until the seventeenth century, there was nothing of importance in philosophy.> Wow!

p.481: <Modern philosophy, however, has retained, for the most part, an individualistic and subjective character. This is very marked in Descartes, who builds up all knowledge from the certainty of his own existence, and accepts clearness and distinctness (both subjective) as criteria of truth. It is not prominent in Spinoza, but reappears in Leibniz's windowless monads. Locke, whose *temperament* is thoroughly objective, is forced reluctantly into the subjective doctrine that knowledge is of the agreement or disagreement of ideas – a view so repulsive to him that he escapes from it by violent inconsistencies. Berkeley, after abolishing matter, is only saved from complete subjectivism by a use of God which most subsequent philosophers have regarded as illegitimate. In Hume, the empiricist philosophy culminated in a scepticism which none could refute and none could accept. Kant and Fichte were subjective in temperament as well as in doctrine; Hegel saved himself by means of the influence of Spinoza. Rousseau and the romantic movement extended subjectivity from theory of knowledge to ethics and politics, and ended, logically, in complete anarchism such as that of Bakunin. This extreme of subjectivism is a form of madness.>  
Again: wow! I may or may not agree with these extraordinarily concise summaries, but together they constitute a masterful overview of the nature and direction of modern philosophy.

pp.481-482: <Meanwhile science as technique was building up in practical men a quite different outlook from any that was to be found among theoretical philosophers. Technique conferred a sense of power: man is now much less at the mercy of his environment than he was in former times. But the power conferred by technique is social, not individual; an average individual wrecked on a desert island could have achieved more in the seventeenth century than he could now. Scientific technique requires the co-operation of a large number of individuals organized under a single direction. Its tendency, therefore, is against anarchism and even individualism, since it demands a well-knit social structure. Unlike religion, it is ethically neutral: it assures men that they can perform wonders, but does not tell them what wonders to perform. In this way it is incomplete. In practice, the purposes to which scientific skill will be devoted depend largely on chance. The men at the head of the vast organizations which it necessitates can, within limits, turn it this way or that as they please. The power impulse thus has a scope which it never had before. The philosophies that have been inspired by scientific *technique* are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything non-human as mere raw material. Ends are no longer considered; only the skilfulness of the process is valued. This also is a form of madness. It is, in our day, the most dangerous form, and the one against which a sane philosophy should provide an antidote.> To me Russell's rhetoric is intoxicating, and I find it impossible not to be carried along by his argument, my reservations about <technique> notwithstanding. His verdict of <madness> here and in the preceding paragraph anticipates my conclusion that "Learning style extremists are monomaniacs, and monomaniacs are mad", such that "The only effective counter to extremism is to engage with all five IDEAL learning styles in a balanced fashion", see PI pp.13-15.

p.482: <The problem of a durable and satisfactory social order can only be solved by combining the solidity of the Roman Empire with the idealism of Saint Augustine's City of God. To achieve this a new philosophy will be needed.> Russell's stirring call to arms. For this <new philosophy> look no further than my 'Pentocracy', but note also my deep misgivings about this or any other vision of Utopia: see PI pp.161-171, HMM pp.193-195, and Review05.pdf p.5.

pp.479-482, <Chapter I | General Characteristics>: In this chapter Russell presents a coherent and compelling argument for a <new philosophy>. However, this argument is predicated on a simplistic dualism between religion and science which fails to account for the distinct roles of trade, literacy, experimentation, and engineering. Therefore it needs to be taken with a big pinch of salt.

p.487: <The Renaissance was not a period of great achievement in philosophy, but it did certain things which were essential preliminaries to the greatness of the seventeenth century. In the first place, it broke down the rigid scholastic system, which had become an intellectual strait jacket. It revived the study of Plato, and thereby demanded at least so much independent thought as was required for choosing between him and Aristotle. In regard to both, it promoted a genuine and first-hand knowledge, free from the glosses of Neoplatonists and Arabic commentators. More important still, it encouraged the habit of regarding intellectual activity as a delightful social adventure, not a cloistered meditation aiming at the preservation of a predetermined orthodoxy.> Awakenings.

p.489: <Morally, the first effect of emancipation was equally disastrous. ... I cannot think of any crime, except the destruction of ancient manuscripts, of which the men of the Renaissance were not frequently guilty.> The exception proves the rule, and the role, of literacy!

pp.489-490: <Outside the sphere of morals, the Renaissance had great merits. In architecture, painting, and poetry, it has remained renowned. It produced very great men, such as Leonardo, Michelangelo, and Machiavelli. It liberated educated men from the narrowness of medieval culture, and, even while still a slave to the worship of antiquity, it made scholars aware that a variety of opinions had been held by reputable authorities on almost every subject. By reviving the knowledge of the Greek world, it created a mental atmosphere in which it was again possible to rival Hellenic achievements, and in which individual genius could flourish with a freedom unknown since the time of Alexander. The political conditions of the Renaissance favoured individual development, but were unstable; the instability and the individualism were closely connected, as in ancient Greece. A stable social system is necessary, but every stable system hitherto devised has hampered the development of exceptional artistic or intellectual merit. How much murder and anarchy are we prepared to endure for the sake of great achievements such as those of the Renaissance? In the past, a great deal; in our own time, much less. No solution of this problem has hitherto been found, although increase of social organization is making it continually more important.> I too have found that overzealous organisation in the workplace (in the name of efficiency and economy) is the enemy of inventiveness, see HMM chapter 2.

p.491: <The Renaissance, though it produced no important theoretical philosopher, produced one man of supreme eminence in *political* philosophy, Niccolò Machiavelli.>

pp.494-495: <The tone of the *Discourses*, which are nominally a commentary on Livy, is very different. There are whole chapters which seem almost as if they had been written by Montesquieu; most of the book could have been read with approval by an eighteenth-century liberal. The doctrine of checks and balances is set forth explicitly. Princes, nobles, and people should all have a part in the Constitution; 'then these three powers will keep each other reciprocally in check'. The constitution of Sparta, as established by Lycurgus, was the best, because it embodied the most perfect balance; that of Solon was too democratic, and therefore led to the tyranny of Peisistratus. The Roman republican constitution was good, owing to the conflict of Senate and people.>

p.497: <Machiavelli's political thinking, like that of most of the ancients, is in one respect somewhat shallow. He is occupied with great law givers, such as Lycurgus and Solon, who are supposed to create a community all in one piece, with little regard to what has gone before. The conception of a community as an organic growth, which the statesmen can only affect to a limited extent, is in the main modern, and has been greatly strengthened by the theory of evolution. This conception is not to be found in Machiavelli any more than in Plato.> But it is to be found in my model of societal 'churn', see Review05.pdf p.5.

p.499: <Neither Erasmus nor More was a philosopher in the strict sense of the word. My reason for speaking of them is that they illustrate the temper of a pre-revolutionary age, when there is a widespread demand for moderate reform, and timid men have not yet been frightened into reaction by extremists. They exemplify also the dislike of everything systematic in theology or philosophy which characterized the reaction against scholasticism.>

p.501, in Russell's summary of Erasmus' *The Praise of Folly*: <The happiest men are those who are nearest the brutes and divest themselves of reason. The best happiness is that which is based on delusion, since it costs least: it is easier to imagine oneself a king than to make oneself a king in reality.> This anticipates my recent idea, "The good life comes to those who embrace their suspension of disbelief", see Review05.pdf p.6.

p.502: <Erasmus on his second visit to England, remained for five years (1509-14), partly in London, partly at Cambridge. He had a considerable influence in stimulating English humanism. The education at English public schools remained, until recently, almost exactly what he would have wished: a thorough grounding in Greek and Latin, involving not only translation, but verse and prose composition. Science, although intellectually dominant since the seventeenth century, was thought unworthy the attention of a gentleman or a divine; Plato should be studied, but not the subjects which Plato thought worth studying. All this is in line with the influence of Erasmus.>

pp.502-503: <The men of the Renaissance had an immense curiosity; 'these minds', says Huizinga, 'never had their desired share of striking incidents, curious details, rarities and anomalies'. But at first they sought these things, not in the world, but in old books. Erasmus was interested in the world, but could not digest it in the raw: it had to be dished up in Latin or Greek before he could assimilate it. Travellers' tales were discounted, but any marvel in Pliny was believed. Gradually, however, curiosity became transferred from books to the real world; men became interested in the savages and strange animals that were actually discovered, rather than in those described by classical authors. Caliban comes from Montaigne, and Montaigne's cannibals come from travellers. 'The anthropophagi and men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders' had been seen by Othello, not derived from antiquity. | And so the curiosity of the Renaissance, from having been literary, gradually became scientific. Such a cataract of new facts overwhelmed men that they could, at first, only be swept along with the current. The old systems were evidently wrong; Aristotle's physics and Ptolemy's astronomy and Galen's medicine could not be stretched to include the discoveries that had been made. Montaigne and Shakespeare are content with confusion: discovery is delightful, and system is its enemy. It was not till the seventeenth century that the system-building faculty caught up with the new knowledge of matters of fact. All this, however, has taken us far from Erasmus, to whom Columbus was less interesting than the Argonauts.> Trade begat exploration; exploration begat curiosity; curiosity begat science: and all was enabled by books, and the ability to read them. Thus it all comes down to *trade* and *literacy*. Like I said.

pp.507-508: <More's *Utopia* was in many ways astonishingly liberal. I am not thinking so much of the preaching of communism, which was in the tradition of many religious movements. I am thinking rather of what is said about war, about religion and religious toleration, against the wanton killing of animals (there is a most eloquent passage against hunting), and in favour of a mild criminal law. (The book opens with an argument against the death penalty for theft.) It must be admitted, however, that life in More's *Utopia*, as in most others, would be intolerably dull. Diversity is essential to happiness, and in *Utopia* there is hardly any. This is a defect of all planned social systems, actual as well as imaginary.> Well, that about wraps it up for <More's *Utopia*>.

p.509: <The three great men of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation are Luther, Calvin, and Loyola. All three, intellectually, are medieval in philosophy, as compared either with the Italians who immediately preceded them, or with such men as Erasmus and More. Philosophically, the century following the beginning of the Reformation is a barren one.> Back to the cave!

pp.510-511: <The Jesuits acquired prestige by their missionary zeal, especially in the Far East. They became popular as confessors, because (if Pascal is to be believed) they were more lenient, except towards heresy, than other ecclesiastics. They concentrated on education, and thus acquired a firm hold on the minds of the young. Whenever theology did not interfere, the education they gave was the best obtainable; we shall see that they taught Descartes more mathematics than he would have learnt elsewhere. Politically, they were a single united disciplined body, shrinking from no dangers and no exertions; they urged Catholic princes to practise relentless persecution, and, following in the wake of conquering Spanish armies, re-established the terror of the Inquisition, even in Italy, which had had nearly a century of free-thought.> Clearly the Jesuits understood the power of literacy.

p.512: <Almost everything that distinguishes the modern world from earlier centuries is attributable to science, which achieved its most spectacular triumphs in the seventeenth century. The Italian Renaissance, though not medieval, is not modern; it is more akin to the best age of Greece. The sixteenth century, with its absorption in theology, is more medieval than the world of Machiavelli. The modern world, so far as mental outlook is concerned, begins in the seventeenth century. No Italian of the Renaissance would have been unintelligible to Plato or Aristotle; Luther would have horrified Thomas Aquinas, but would not have been difficult for him to understand. With the seventeenth century it is different: Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas and Occam, could not have made head or tail of Newton.> This is a startling shift of perspective, looking from the ancient to the modern. It's so original – and effective!

pp.514-515: <There is an interesting book by E. A. Burt, called *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (1925), which sets forth with much force the many unwarrantable assumptions made by the men who founded modern science. He points out quite truly that there were in the time of Copernicus no known facts which compelled the adoption of his system, and several which militated against it. 'Contemporary empiricists, had they lived in the sixteenth century, would have been the first to scoff out of court the new philosophy of the universe.' The general purpose of the book is to discredit modern science by suggesting that its discoveries were lucky accidents springing by chance from superstitions as gross as those of the Middle Ages. I think this shows a misconception of the scientific attitude: it is not *what* the man of science believes that distinguishes him, but *how* and *why* he believes it. His beliefs are tentative, not dogmatic; they are based on evidence, not on authority or intuition. Copernicus was right to call his theory a hypothesis; his opponents were wrong in thinking new hypotheses undesirable. | The men who founded modern science had two merits which are not necessarily found together: immense patience in observation, and great boldness in framing hypotheses. The second of these merits had belonged to the earliest Greek philosophers; the first existed, to a considerable degree, in the later astronomers of antiquity. But no one among the ancients, except perhaps Aristarchus, possessed both merits, and no one in the Middle Ages possessed either. Copernicus, like his great successors, possessed both. ... Apart from the revolutionary effect on cosmic imagination, the great merits of the new astronomy were two: first, the recognition that what had been believed since ancient times might be false; second, that the test of scientific truth is patient collection of facts, combined with bold guessing as to laws binding the facts together. Neither merit is so fully developed in Copernicus as in his successors, but both are already present in a high degree in his work.> Russell's analysis is spot-on. In describing <immense patience in observation, and great boldness in framing hypotheses> he anticipates the 'later Popper' of *Conjectures and Refutations*.



p.515: <Protestant clergy were at least as bigoted as Catholic ecclesiastics; nevertheless there soon came to be much more liberty of speculation in Protestant than in Catholic countries, because in Protestant countries the clergy had less power. The important aspect of Protestantism was schism, not heresy, for schism led to national Churches, and national Churches were not strong enough to control the lay government. This was wholly a gain, for the Churches, everywhere, opposed as long as they could practically every innovation that made for an increase of happiness or knowledge here on earth.> Ouch!

p.516: <Kepler (1571-1630) is one of the most notable examples of what can be achieved by patience without much in the way of genius. He was the first important astronomer after Copernicus to adopt the heliocentric theory, but Tycho Brahe's data showed that it could not be quite right in the form given to it by Copernicus. He was influenced by Pythagoreanism, and more or less fancifully inclined to sun-worship, though a good Protestant. These motives no doubt gave him a bias in favour of the heliocentric hypothesis. His Pythagoreanism also inclined him to follow Plato's *Timaeus* in supposing that cosmic significance must attach to the five regular solids. He used them to suggest hypotheses to his mind; at last, by good luck, one of these worked.> Whatever works! See also my comments to pp.160-161 and p.216 above.

p.517: <Galileo (1564-1642) is the greatest of the founders of modern science, with the possible exception of Newton. He was born on about the day on which Michelangelo died, and he died in the year in which Newton was born. I commend these facts to those (if any) who still believe in metempsychosis.> Ha!

pp.522-524: <The result of the scientific work we have been considering was that the outlook of educated men was completely transformed. At the beginning of the century, Sir Thomas Browne took part in trials for witchcraft; at the end, such a thing would have been impossible. In Shakespeare's time, comets were still portents; after the publication of Newton's *Principia* in 1687, it was known that he and Halley had calculated the orbits of certain comets, and that they were as obedient as the planets to the law of gravitation. The reign of law had established its hold on men's imaginations, making such things as magic and sorcery incredible. In 1700 the mental outlook of educated men was completely modern; in 1600, except among a very few, it was still largely medieval. | In the remainder of this chapter I shall try to state briefly the philosophical beliefs which appeared to follow from seventeenth century science, and some of the respects in which modern science differs from that of Newton. | The first thing to note is the removal of almost all traces of animism from the laws of physics. ... Another thing that resulted from science was a profound change in the conception of man's place in the universe. ... The world might have a purpose, but purposes could no longer enter into scientific explanations. ... There were of course many other reasons for self-satisfaction. The Tartars had been confined to Asia, and the Turks were ceasing to be a menace. Comets had been humbled by Halley, and as for earthquakes, though they were still formidable, they were so interesting that men of science could hardly regret them. Western Europeans were growing rapidly richer, and were becoming lords of all the world: they had conquered North and South America, they were powerful in Africa and India, respected in China and feared in Japan. When to all this were added the triumphs of science, it is no wonder that the men of the seventeenth century felt themselves to be fine fellows, not the miserable sinners that they still proclaimed themselves on Sundays.> Another insightful history lesson.

pp.526-527: <Francis Bacon (1561-1626), although his philosophy is in many ways unsatisfactory, has permanent importance as the founder of modern inductive method and the pioneer in the attempt at logical systematization of scientific procedure. ... After five years spent in retirement, he died of a chill caught while experimenting on refrigeration by stuffing a chicken full of snow.> Ha!

p.527: <Bacon's most important book, *The Advancement of Learning*, is in many ways remarkably modern. He is commonly regarded as the originator of the saying 'Knowledge is power', and though he may have had predecessors who said the same thing, he said it with new emphasis. The whole basis of his philosophy was practical: to give mankind mastery over the forces of nature by means of scientific discoveries and inventions. He held that philosophy should be kept separate from theology, not intimately blended with it as in scholasticism. He accepted orthodox religion; he was not the man to quarrel with the government on such a matter. But while he thought that reason could show the existence of God, he regarded everything else in theology as known only by revelation. Indeed he held that the triumph of faith is greatest when to the unaided reason a dogma appears most absurd. Philosophy, however, should depend only upon reason. He was thus an advocate of the doctrine of 'double truth', that of reason and that of revelation. This doctrine had been preached by certain Averroists in the thirteenth century, but had been condemned by the Church.> And with good reason, see my comment to pp.444-445. In my view there are not two but five definitions of truth, see Review05.pdf p.7.

p.528: <One of the most famous parts of Bacon's philosophy is his enumeration of what he calls 'idols', by which he means bad habits of mind that cause people to fall into error.> I have mapped these <idols> to the IDEAL learning styles, see PI p.92.

pp.529-530: <Bacon's inductive method is faulty through insufficient emphasis on hypothesis. He hoped that mere orderly arrangement of data would make the right hypothesis obvious, but this is seldom the case. As a rule, the framing of hypotheses is the most difficult part of scientific work, and the part where great ability is indispensable. So far, no method has been found which would make it possible to invent hypotheses by rule. Usually some hypothesis is a necessary preliminary to the collection of facts, since the selection of facts demands some way of determining relevance. Without something of this kind, the mere multiplicity of facts is baffling. | The part played by deduction in science is greater than Bacon supposed. Often, when a hypothesis has to be tested, there is a long deductive journey from the hypothesis to some consequence that can be tested by observation. Usually the deduction is mathematical, and in this respect Bacon underestimated the importance of mathematics in scientific investigation. | The problem of induction by simple enumeration remains unsolved to this day. Bacon was quite right in rejecting simple enumeration where the details of scientific investigation are concerned, for in dealing with details we may assume general laws on the basis of which, so long as they are taken as valid, more or less cogent methods can be built up. John Stuart Mill framed four canons of inductive method, which can be usefully employed so long as the law of causality is assumed; but this law itself, he had to confess, is to be accepted solely on the basis of induction by simple enumeration. The thing that is achieved by the theoretical organization of science is the collection of all subordinate inductions into a few that are very comprehensive – perhaps only one. Such comprehensive inductions are confirmed by so many instances that it is thought legitimate to accept, as regards them, an induction by simple enumeration. This situation is profoundly unsatisfactory, but neither Bacon nor any of his successors have found a way out of it.> But I <have found a way out of it> by formulating a working definition of 'scientific method', whereby hypotheses are framed through a simple process of iterative development, then they are compared with one another not in a <comprehensive> hierarchy but as specialised tools in a toolkit: see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.5.

p.531: <Hobbes (1588-1679) is a philosopher whom it is difficult to classify. He was an empiricist, like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but unlike them, he was an admirer of mathematical method, not only in pure mathematics, but in its applications. His general outlook was inspired by Galileo rather than Bacon. From Descartes to Kant, Continental philosophy derived much of its conception of the nature of human knowledge from mathematics, but it regarded mathematics as known independently of experience. It was thus led, like Platonism, to minimize the part played by perception, and over-emphasize the part played by pure thought. English empiricism, on the other

hand, was little influenced by mathematics, and tended to have a wrong conception of scientific method. Hobbes had neither of these defects. It is not until our own day that we find any other philosophers who were empiricists and yet laid due stress on mathematics. In this respect, Hobbes's merit is great. He has, however, grave defects, which make it impossible to place him quite in the first rank. He is impatient of subtleties, and too much inclined to cut the Gordian knot. His solutions of problems are logical, but are attained by omitting awkward facts. He is vigorous, but crude; he wields the battle-axe better than the rapier. Nevertheless, his theory of the State deserves to be carefully considered, the more so as it is more modern than any previous theory, even that of Machiavelli.> Another brilliant pen-portrait.

pp.533-536: <We will now consider the doctrines of the *Leviathan*, upon which the fame of Hobbes mainly rests. | He proclaims, at the very beginning of the book, his thorough-going materialism. Life, he says, is nothing but a motion of the limbs, and therefore automata have an artificial life. The commonwealth, which he calls Leviathan, is a creation of art, and is in fact an artificial man. This is intended as more than an analogy, and is worked out in some detail. The sovereignty is an artificial soul. The pacts and covenants by which 'Leviathan' is first created take the place of God's fiat when He said 'Let Us make man'. | The first part deals with man as an individual, and with such general philosophy as Hobbes deems necessary. ... The succession of our thoughts is not arbitrary, but governed by laws – sometimes those of association, sometimes those depending upon a purpose in our thinking. (This is important as an application of determinism to psychology.) | Hobbes, as might be expected, is an out-and-out nominalist. There is, he says, nothing universal but names, and without words we could not conceive any general ideas. Without language, there would be no truth or falsehood, for 'true' and 'false' are attributes of speech. ... Unlike most defenders of despotic government, Hobbes holds that all men are naturally equal. In a state of nature, before there is any government, every man desires to preserve his own liberty, but to acquire dominion over others; both these desires are dictated by the impulse to self-preservation. From their conflict arises a war of all against all, which makes life 'nasty, brutish, and short'. In a state of nature, there is no property, no justice or injustice; there is only war, and 'force and fraud are, in war, the two cardinal virtues'. | The second part tells how men escape from these evils by combining into communities each subject to a central authority. This is represented as happening by means of a social contract. It is supposed that a number of people come together and agree to choose a sovereign, or a sovereign body, which shall exercise authority over them and put an end to the universal war. I do not think this 'covenant' (as Hobbes usually calls it) is thought of as a definite historical event; it is certainly irrelevant to the argument to think of it as such. It is an explanatory myth, used to explain why men submit, and should submit, to the limitations on personal freedom entailed in submission to authority. The purpose of the restraint men put upon themselves, says Hobbes, is self-preservation from the universal war resulting from our love of liberty for ourselves and of dominion over others. ... Hobbes prefers monarchy, but all his abstract arguments are equally applicable to all forms of government in which there is one supreme authority not limited by the legal rights of other bodies. He could tolerate Parliament alone, but not a system in which governmental power is shared between King and Parliament. This is the exact antithesis to the views of Locke and Montesquieu. The English Civil War occurred, says Hobbes, because power was divided between King, Lords, and Commons.> In my view "Plato's 'forms', also known as 'universals', do not exist", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.4. Whether or not that makes me <an out-and-out nominalist> like Hobbes is a matter of opinion. I don't like labels: they rarely make one the wiser; the only label I'll easily acknowledge for myself is 'free thinker'; and I'm averse to applying them to others. On the other hand, I don't accept that, in the absence of government, <every man desires to preserve his own liberty, but to acquire dominion over others>. Granted, *some* people are like that, even when they ought to know better, because there *is* an effective government; I tend to regard them as 'Activists', and steer well clear. But <every man>? I think not. I conclude that, for me, *Leviathan* is like the proverbial curate's egg: good in parts.

pp.539-541: <Let us now try to decide what we are to think of the *Leviathan*. The question is not easy, because the good and the bad in it are so closely intermingled. | In politics, there are two different questions, one as to the best form of the State, the other as to its powers. The best *form* of State, according to Hobbes, is monarchy, but this is not the important part of his doctrine. The important part is his contention that the *powers* of the State should be absolute. ... Every community is faced with two dangers, anarchy and despotism. The Puritans, especially the Independents, were most impressed by the danger of despotism. Hobbes, on the contrary, was obsessed by the fear of anarchy. The liberal philosophers who arose after the Restoration, and acquired control after 1688, realized both dangers; they disliked both Strafford and the Anabaptists. This led Locke to the doctrine of division of powers, and of checks and balances ... The reason that Hobbes gives for supporting the State, namely that it is the only alternative to anarchy, is in the main a valid one. A State may, however, be so bad that temporary anarchy seems preferable to its continuance, as in France in 1789 and in Russia in 1917. Moreover the tendency of every government towards tyranny cannot be kept in check unless governments have some fear of rebellion. Governments would be worse than they are if Hobbes's submissive attitude were universally adopted by subjects. This is true in the political sphere, where governments will try, if they can, to make themselves personally irremovable; it is true in the economic sphere, where they will try to enrich themselves and their friends at the public expense; it is true in the intellectual sphere, where they will suppress every new discovery or doctrine that seems to menace their power. These are reasons for not thinking only of the risk of anarchy, but also of the danger of injustice and ossification that is bound up with omnipotence in government. | The merits of Hobbes appear most clearly when he is contrasted with earlier political theorists. He is completely free from superstition; he does not argue from what happened to Adam and Eve at the time of the Fall. He is clear and logical; his ethics, right or wrong, is completely intelligible, and does not involve the use of any dubious concepts. Apart from Machiavelli, who is much more limited, he is the first really modern writer on political theory. Where he is wrong, he is wrong from over-simplification, not because the basis of his thought is unreal and fantastic. For this reason, he is still worth refuting. | Without criticizing Hobbes's metaphysics or ethics, there are two points to make against him. The first is that he always considers the national interest as a whole, and assumes, tacitly, that the major interests of all citizens are the same. He does not realize the importance of the clash between different classes, which Marx makes the chief cause of social change. This is connected with the assumption that the interests of a monarch are roughly identical with those of his subjects. In time of war there is a unification of interests, especially if the war is fierce; but in time of peace the clash may be very great between the interests of one class and those of another. It is not by any means always true that, in such a situation, the best way to avert anarchy is to preach the absolute power of the sovereign. Some concession in the way of sharing power may be the only way to prevent civil war. This should have been obvious to Hobbes from the recent history of England. | Another point in which Hobbes's doctrine is unduly limited is in regard to the relations between different States. There is not a word in *Leviathan* to suggest any relation between them except war and conquest, with occasional interludes. This follows, on his principles, from the absence of an international government, for the relations of States are still in a state of nature, which is that of a war of all against all. So long as there is international anarchy, it is by no means clear that increase of efficiency in the separate States is in the interest of mankind, since it increases the ferocity and destructiveness of war. Every argument that he adduces in favour of government, in so far as it is valid at all, is valid in favour of international government. So long as national States exist and fight each other, only inefficiency can preserve the human race. To improve the fighting quality of separate States without having any means of preventing war is the road to universal destruction.> In my view it's a critical weakness that Hobbes' <fear of anarchy> led him to conceive his *Leviathan* as having a top-down command hierarchy, rather than being an organic 'body politic' based on the <division of powers>; see HMM pp.192-195. As for Russell's latter point, this is a compelling argument <in favour of international government>; but only if <the relations of States are still in a state of nature>, which clearly they aren't, Trump and Putin notwithstanding.

p.542: <René Descartes (1596-1650) is usually considered the founder of modern philosophy, and, I think, rightly. He is the first man of high philosophic capacity whose outlook is profoundly affected by the new physics and astronomy. While it is true that he retains much of scholasticism, he does not accept foundations laid by predecessors, but endeavours to construct a complete philosophic edifice *de novo*. This had not happened since Aristotle, and is a sign of the new self-confidence that resulted from the progress of science. There is a freshness about his work that is not to be found in any eminent previous philosopher since Plato. All the intermediate philosophers were teachers, with the professional superiority belonging to that avocation. Descartes writes, not as a teacher, but as a discoverer and explorer, anxious to communicate what he has found. His style is easy and unpedantic, addressed to intelligent men of the world rather than to pupils. It is, moreover, an extraordinarily excellent style. It is very fortunate for modern philosophy that the pioneer had such admirable literary sense. His successors, both on the Continent and in England, until Kant, retain his unprofessional character, and several of them retain something of his stylistic merit.>  
Another brilliant pen-portrait. And since I get the impression that Russell has consciously modelled his own literary style on that of Descartes, he's effectively also praising himself in this paragraph.

pp.544-546: <Descartes was a philosopher, a mathematician, and a man of science. In philosophy and mathematics, his work was of supreme importance; in science, though creditable, it was not so good as that of some of his contemporaries. | His great contribution to geometry was the invention of co-ordinate geometry, though not quite in its final form. He used the analytic method, which supposes a problem solved, and examines the consequences of the supposition; and he applied algebra to geometry. In both of these he had had predecessors – as regards the former, even among the ancients. What was original in him was the use of co-ordinates, i.e. the determination of the position of a point in a plane by its distance from two fixed lines. He did not himself discover all the power of this method, but he did enough to make further progress easy. This was by no means his sole contribution to mathematics, but it was his most important. | The book in which he set forth most of his scientific theories was *Principia Philosophiae*, published in 1644. There were however some other books of importance: *Essais philosophiques* (1637) deals with optics as well as geometry, and one of his books is called *De la formation du foetus*. He welcomed Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood, and was always hoping (though in vain) to make some discovery of importance in medicine. He regarded the bodies of men and animals as machines; animals he regarded as automata, governed entirely by the laws of physics, and devoid of feeling or consciousness. Men are different: they have a soul, which resides in the pineal gland. There the soul comes in contact with the 'vital spirits', and through this contact there is interaction between soul and body. The total quantity of motion in the universe is constant, and therefore the soul cannot affect it; but it can alter the direction of motion of the animal spirits, and hence, indirectly, of other parts of the body. ... In mechanics, Descartes accepts the first law of motion, according to which a body left to itself will move with constant velocity in a straight line. But there is no action at a distance, as later in Newton's theory of gravitation. There is no such thing as a vacuum, and there are no atoms; yet all interaction is of the nature of impact. If we knew enough, we should be able to reduce chemistry and biology to mechanics; the process by which a seed develops into an animal or a plant is purely mechanical. There is no need of Aristotle's three souls; only one of them, the rational soul, exists, and that only in man.>

pp.546-550: <I come now to Descartes's two most important books, so far as pure philosophy is concerned. These are the *Discourse on Method* (1637) and the *Meditations* (1642). They largely overlap, and it is not necessary to keep them apart. | In these books Descartes begins by explaining the method of 'Cartesian doubt', as it has come to be called. In order to have a firm basis for his philosophy, he resolves to make himself doubt everything that he can manage to doubt. ... He begins with scepticism in regard to the senses. ... Even in regard to arithmetic and geometry, however, doubt is possible. ... There remains, however, something that I cannot doubt: no demon,

however cunning, could deceive me if I did not exist. I may have no *body*: this might be an illusion. But thought is different. ‘While I wanted to think everything false, it must necessarily be that I who thought was something; and remarking that this truth, *I think, therefore I am*, was so solid and so certain that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were incapable of upsetting it, I judged that I could receive it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy that I sought.’ [Footnote: <The above argument, ‘I think, therefore I am’ (*cogito ergo sum*), is known as Descartes’s *cogito*, and the process by which it is reached is called ‘Cartesian doubt’.>] | This passage is the kernel of Descartes’s theory of knowledge, and contains what is most important in his philosophy. Most philosophers since Descartes have attached importance to the theory of knowledge, and their doing so is largely due to him. ‘I think, therefore I am’ makes mind more certain than matter, and my mind (for me) more certain than the minds of others. There is thus, in all philosophy derived from Descartes, a tendency to subjectivism, and to regarding matter as something only knowable, if at all, by inference from what is known of mind. These two tendencies exist both in Continental idealism and in British empiricism – in the former triumphantly, in the latter regrettably. There has been, in quite recent times, an attempt to escape from this subjectivism by the philosophy known as instrumentalism, but of this I will not speak at present. With this exception, modern philosophy has very largely accepted the formulation of its problems from Descartes, while not accepting his solutions. | The reader will remember that St Augustine advanced an argument closely similar to the *cogito*. [See pp.351-353] He did not, however, give prominence to it, and the problem which it is intended to solve occupied only a small part of his thoughts. Descartes’s originality, therefore, should be admitted, though it consists less in inventing the argument than in perceiving its importance. | Having now secured a firm foundation, Descartes sets to work to rebuild the edifice of knowledge. The I that has been proved to exist has been inferred from the fact that I think, therefore I exist while I think, and only then. If I ceased to think, there would be no evidence of my existence. I am a thing that thinks, a substance of which the whole nature or essence consists in thinking, and which needs no place or material thing for its existence. The soul, therefore, is wholly distinct from the body and easier to know than the body; it would be what it is even if there were no body. | Descartes next asks himself: why is the *cogito* so evident? He concludes that it is only because it is clear and distinct. He therefore adopts as a general rule the principle: *All things that we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are true*. He admits, however, that there is sometimes difficulty in knowing which these things are. | ‘Thinking’ is used by Descartes in a very wide sense. A thing that thinks, he says, is one that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, imagines, and feels – for feeling, as it occurs in dreams, is a form of thinking. Since thought is the essence of mind, the mind must always think, even during deep sleep. ... But these considerations have not disposed of the sceptical arguments which threw doubt on the existence of the external world. This can only be done by first proving the existence of God. | Descartes’s proofs of the existence of God are not very original; in the main they come from scholastic philosophy. They were better stated by Leibniz, and I will omit consideration of them until we come to him. | When God’s existence has been proved, the rest proceeds easily. Since God is good, He will not act like the deceitful demon whom Descartes has imagined as a ground for doubt. Now God has given me such a strong inclination to believe in bodies that He would be deceitful if there were none; therefore bodies exist. He must, moreover, have given me the faculty of correcting errors. I use this faculty when I employ the principle that what is clear and distinct is true. This enables me to know mathematics, and physics also, if I remember that I must know the truth about bodies by the mind alone, not by mind and body jointly.> In allowing, early in his argument, that <I may have no *body* ... But thought is different>, Descartes is begging the question: he’s assuming precisely the material-spiritual duality that he wishes to prove (or, at least, that he wishes to *use* later in his proof). As for <When God’s existence has been proved, the rest proceeds easily>, I take the view that “nothing at all may be implied from the existence of God”, see my comparative review of several Bahai-authored books on science and religion, [SciRelRev.pdf](#). But despite these significant challenges there’s still enough in the *cogito* to initiate what I consider to be a very promising and original line of enquiry, see [Review05.pdf](#) p.2.

pp.550-551: <The constructive part of Descartes's theory of knowledge is much less interesting than the earlier destructive part. It uses all sorts of scholastic maxims, such as that an effect can never have more perfection than its cause, which have somehow escaped the initial critical scrutiny. No reason is given for accepting these maxims, although they are certainly less self-evident than one's own existence, which is *proved* with a flourish of trumpets. Plato, St Augustine, and St Thomas contain most of what is affirmative in the *Meditations*. | The method of critical doubt, though Descartes himself applied it only half-heartedly, was of great philosophic importance. It is clear, as a matter of logic, that it can only yield positive results if scepticism is to stop somewhere. If there is to be both logical and empirical knowledge, there must be two kinds of stopping points: indubitable facts, and indubitable principles of inference. Descartes's indubitable facts are his own thoughts – using 'thought' in the widest possible sense. 'I think' is his ultimate premiss. Here the word 'I' is really illegitimate; he ought to state his ultimate premiss in the form 'there are thoughts'. The word 'I' is grammatically convenient, but does not describe a datum. When he goes on to say 'I am a *thing* which thinks', he is already using uncritically the apparatus of categories handed down by scholasticism. He nowhere proves that thoughts need a thinker, nor is there reason to believe this except in a grammatical sense. The decision, however, to regard thoughts rather than external objects as the prime empirical certainties was very important, and had a profound effect on all subsequent philosophy. | In two other respects the philosophy of Descartes was important. First: it brought to completion, or very nearly to completion, the dualism of mind and matter which began with Plato and was developed, largely for religious reasons, by Christian philosophy. Ignoring the curious transactions in the pineal gland, which were dropped by the followers of Descartes, the Cartesian system presents two parallel but independent worlds, that of mind and that of matter, each of which can be studied without reference to the other. ... From the religious point of view, however, there was a grave drawback to this theory; and this brings me to the second characteristic of Cartesianism that I alluded to above. | In the whole theory of the material world, Cartesianism was rigidly deterministic. ... Consequently Cartesians had difficulty about free will. And for those who paid more attention to Descartes's science than to his theory of knowledge, it was not difficult to extend the theory that animals are automata: why not say the same of man, and simplify the system by making it a consistent materialism? This step was actually taken in the eighteenth century. | There is in Descartes an unresolved dualism between what he learnt from contemporary science and the scholasticism that he had been taught at La Flèche. This led him into inconsistencies, but it also made him more rich in fruitful ideas than any completely logical philosopher could have been. Consistency might have made him merely the founder of a new scholasticism, whereas inconsistency made him the source of two important but divergent schools of philosophy.> What I really want to know is, how does <Descartes's theory of knowledge> help us to answer the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14? Russell's nit-picking about the use of the word <I>, and other minutiae, suggests to me that he's studiously avoiding this central issue: which is curious in such a clear-thinking giant of the field. Maybe he's trying to maintain the noncommittal stance of an 'objective' historian? Maybe he's saving his gunpowder for a climactic salvo near the end? Or maybe the *cogito* has such a permanence in the lore of 'modern' philosophy that he doesn't feel qualified to express his own assessment of its true worth? But if not him, then who? Karl Popper was never one to hold back, declaring, "I think that I was always a Cartesian dualist" (to which I've reacted, predictably, "I am sure that I am *not* a Cartesian dualist", see UQNotes.pdf); but what does Russell think? I'm more than two-thirds of the way through his book, and still it's no clearer to me *what is his view*. It would be nice to know!

pp.552-562, <Chapter X | Spinoza>: <Spinoza (1632-77) is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers. Intellectually, some others have surpassed him, but ethically he is supreme. As a natural consequence, he was considered, during his lifetime and for a century after his death, a man of appalling wickedness. He was born a Jew, but the Jews excommunicated him. Christians abhorred him equally; although his whole philosophy is dominated by the idea of God, the orthodox

accused him of atheism. Leibniz, who owed much to him, concealed his debt, and carefully abstained from saying a word in his praise; he even went so far as to lie about the extent of his personal acquaintance with the heretic Jew. ... In forming a critical estimate of Spinoza's importance as a philosopher, it is necessary to distinguish his ethics from his metaphysics, and to consider how much of the former can survive the rejection of the latter. | Spinoza's metaphysic is the best example of what may be called 'logical monism' – the doctrine, namely, that the world as a whole is a single substance, none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone. The ultimate basis for this view is the belief that every proposition has a single subject and a single predicate, which leads us to the conclusion that relations and plurality must be illusory. Spinoza thought that the nature of the world and of human life could be logically deduced from self-evident axioms; we ought to be as resigned to events as to the fact that 2 and 2 are 4, since they are equally the outcome of logical necessity. The whole of this metaphysic is impossible to accept; it is incompatible with modern logic and with scientific method. *Facts* have to be discovered by observation, not by reasoning; when we successfully infer the future, we do so by means of principles which are not logically necessary, but are suggested by empirical data. And the concept of substance, upon which Spinoza relies, is one which neither science nor philosophy can nowadays accept. | But when we come to Spinoza's ethics, we feel – or at least I feel – that something, though not everything, can be accepted even when the metaphysical foundation has been rejected. Broadly speaking, Spinoza is concerned to show how it is possible to live nobly even when we recognize the limits of human power. ... The problem for Spinoza is easier than it is for one who has no belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe. Spinoza thinks that, if you see your misfortunes as they are in reality, as part of the concatenation of causes stretching from the beginning of time to the end, you will see that they are only misfortunes to you, not to the universe, to which they are merely passing discords heightening an ultimate harmony. I cannot accept this; I think that particular events are what they are, and do not become different by absorption into a whole. Each act of cruelty is eternally a part of the universe; nothing that happens later can make that act good rather than bad, or can confer perfection on the whole of which it is a part. | Nevertheless, when it is your lot to have to endure something that is (or seems to you) worse than the ordinary lot of mankind, Spinoza's principle of thinking about the whole, or at any rate about larger matters than your own grief, is a useful one. There are even times when it is comforting to reflect that human life, with all that it contains of evil and suffering, is an infinitesimal part of the life of the universe. Such reflections may not suffice to constitute a religion, but in a painful world they are a help towards sanity and an antidote to the paralysis of utter despair.> Irrespective of the reputed nobility of Spinoza and the occasional utility of his ethics, the fact that his <metaphysical foundation> doesn't stand up to scrutiny is quite devastating. It's like living in a house built on sand: personally, I'd rather take my chances surviving on my wits in the wilderness.

p.563: <Leibniz (1646-1716) was one of the supreme intellects of all time, but as a human being he was not admirable. He had, it is true, the virtues that one would wish to find mentioned in a testimonial to a prospective employee: he was industrious, frugal, temperate, and financially honest. But he was wholly destitute of those higher philosophic virtues that are so notable in Spinoza. His best thought was not such as would win him popularity, and he left his records of it unpublished in his desk. What he published was designed to win the approbation of princes and princesses. The consequence is that there are two systems of philosophy which may be regarded as representing Leibniz: one, which he proclaimed, was optimistic, orthodox, fantastic, and shallow; the other, which has been slowly unearthed from his manuscripts by fairly recent editors, was profound, coherent, largely Spinozistic, and amazingly logical. It was the popular Leibniz who invented the doctrine that this is the best of all possible worlds (to which F. H. Bradley added the sardonic comment 'and everything in it is a necessary evil'); it was this Leibniz whom Voltaire caricatured as Doctor Pangloss. It would be unhistorical to ignore this Leibniz, but the other is of far greater philosophical importance.> Another brilliant pen-portrait.



pp.564-565: <Like Descartes and Spinoza, Leibniz based his philosophy on the notion of substance, but he differed radically from them as regards the relation of mind and matter, and as regards the number of substances. Descartes allowed three substances, God and mind and matter; Spinoza admitted God alone. For Descartes, extension is the essence of matter; for Spinoza, both extension and thought are attributes of God. Leibniz held that extension cannot be an attribute of a substance. His reason was that extension involves plurality, and can therefore only belong to an aggregate of substances; each single substance must be unextended. He believed, consequently, in an infinite number of substances, which he called 'monads'. Each of these would have some of the properties of a physical point, but only when viewed abstractly; in fact, each monad is a soul. This follows naturally from the rejection of extension as an attribute of substance; the only remaining possible essential attribute seemed to be thought. Thus Leibniz was led to deny the reality of matter, and to substitute an infinite family of souls.> This is, of course, impossible. Enough said.

pp.566-570: <Leibniz brought into their final form the metaphysical proofs of God's existence. These had a long history; they begin with Aristotle, or even with Plato; they were formalized by the scholastics, and one of them, the ontological argument, was invented by St Anselm. This argument, though rejected by St Thomas, was revived by Descartes. Leibniz, whose logical skill was supreme, stated the arguments better than they had ever been stated before. ... Leibniz's arguments for the existence of God are four in number; they are (1) the ontological argument, (2) the cosmological argument, (3) the argument from the eternal truths, (4) the argument from the pre-established harmony, which may be generalized into the argument from design, or the physico-theological argument, as Kant calls it. We will consider these arguments successively. | The ontological argument depends upon the distinction between existence and essence. ... Kant countered this argument by maintaining that 'existence' is not a predicate. Another kind of refutation results from my theory of descriptions. The argument does not, to a modern mind, seem very convincing, but it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies. | The cosmological argument is more plausible than the ontological argument. It is a form of the First-Cause argument, which is itself derived from Aristotle's argument of the unmoved mover. The First-Cause argument is simple. It points out that everything finite has a cause, which in turn had a cause, and so on. This series of previous causes cannot, it is maintained, be infinite, and the first term in the series must itself be uncaused, since otherwise it would not be the first term. There is therefore an uncaused cause of everything, and this is obviously God. ... It is clear that Kant is right in saying that this argument depends upon the ontological argument. ... The argument from the eternal truths ... is really only another form of the cosmological argument. ... The argument from the pre-established harmony, as Leibniz states it, is only valid for those who accept his windowless monads which all mirror the universe. ... Leibniz's argument, however, can be freed from dependence on his peculiar metaphysic, and transformed into what is called the argument from design. This argument contends that, on a survey of the known world, we find things which cannot plausibly be explained as the product of blind natural forces, but are much more reasonably to be regarded as evidences of a beneficent purpose. | This argument has no formal logical defect; its premisses are empirical, and its conclusion professes to be reached in accordance with the usual canons of empirical inference. The question whether it is to be accepted or not turns, therefore, not on general metaphysical questions, but on comparatively detailed considerations. There is one important difference between this argument and the others, namely, that the God whom (if valid) it demonstrates need not have all the usual metaphysical attributes. He need not be omnipotent or omniscient; He may be only vastly wiser and more powerful than we are. The evils in the world may be due to His limited power. Some modern theologians have made use of these possibilities in forming their conception of God.> It is to Russell's credit that he makes the effort to summarise these <metaphysical proofs of God's existence> and the ways in which they are mistaken. Whilst <it is easier to feel convinced that it must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies>, he has taken the road that is less easy, but ultimately more satisfying.

pp.570-571: <One of the most characteristic features of that [Leibniz's] philosophy is the doctrine of many possible worlds. A world is 'possible' if it does not contradict the laws of logic. There are an infinite number of possible worlds, all of which God contemplated before creating the actual world. Being good, God decided to create the best of the possible worlds, and He considered that one to be the best which had the greatest excess of good over evil. He could have created a world containing no evil, but it would not have been so good as the actual world. That is because some great goods are logically bound up with certain evils. ... This argument apparently satisfied the queen of Prussia. Her serfs continued to suffer the evil, while she continued to enjoy the good, and it was comforting to be assured by a great philosopher that this was just and right. | Leibniz's solution of the problem of evil, like most of his other popular doctrines, is logically possible, but not very convincing. ... In fact, of course, the world is partly good and partly bad, and no 'problem of evil' arises unless this obvious fact is denied.> I agree.

pp.575-576: <Leibniz, in his private thinking, is the best example of a philosopher who uses logic as a key to metaphysics. This type of philosophy begins with Parmenides, and is carried further in Plato's use of the theory of ideas to prove various extra-logical propositions. Spinoza belongs to the same type, and so does Hegel. But none of these is so clear cut as Leibniz in drawing inferences from syntax to the real world. This kind of argumentation has fallen into disrepute owing to the growth of empiricism. Whether any valid inferences are possible from language to non-linguistic facts is a question as to which I do not care to dogmatize; but certainly the inferences found in Leibniz and other *a priori* philosophers are not valid, since all are due to a defective logic. The subject-predicate logic, which all such philosophers in the past assumed, either ignores relations altogether, or produces fallacious arguments to prove that relations are unreal. Leibniz is guilty of a special inconsistency in combining the subject-predicate logic with pluralism, for the proposition 'there are many monads' is not of the subject-predicate form. To be consistent, a philosopher who believes all propositions to be of this form should be a monist, like Spinoza.> Russell's critique of <subject-predicate logic>, clearly stated here but also a factor in several preceding analyses (such as those for Aristotle's metaphysics, pp.175-177, and his logic, pp.210-212), is for me a strong reason to join him in consigning much of traditional metaphysics to the dustbin of history.

p.576: <Leibniz remains a great man, and his greatness is more apparent now than it was at any earlier time. Apart from his eminence as a mathematician and as the inventor of the infinitesimal calculus, he was a pioneer in mathematical logic, of which he perceived the importance when no one else did so. And his philosophical hypotheses, though fantastic, are very clear, and capable of precise expression. Even his monads can still be useful as suggesting possible ways of viewing perception>. I agree with the first part of this assessment. But monads are wholly fantastical, and Russell is mistaken in thinking that there's anything about them which <can still be useful>.

pp.578-579: <Early liberalism was optimistic, energetic, and philosophic, because it represented growing forces which appeared likely to become victorious without great difficulty, and to bring by their victory great benefits to mankind. It was opposed to everything medieval, both in philosophy and in politics, because medieval theories had been used to sanction the powers of Church and king, to justify persecution, and to obstruct the rise of science; but it was opposed equally to the then modern fanaticisms of Calvinists and Anabaptists. It wanted an end to political and theological strife, in order to liberate energies for the exciting enterprises of commerce and science, such as the East India Company and the Bank of England, the theory of gravitation and the discovery of the circulation of the blood. Throughout the Western world bigotry was giving place to enlightenment, the fear of Spanish power was ending, all classes were increasing in prosperity, and the highest hopes appeared to be warranted by the most sober judgment. For a hundred years, nothing occurred to dim these hopes; then, at last, they themselves generated the French Revolution, which led directly to Napoleon and thence to the Holy Alliance. After these events, liberalism had to acquire its second wind before the renewed optimism of the nineteenth century became possible. |

Before embarking upon any detail, it will be well to consider the general pattern of the liberal movements from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. This pattern is at first simple, but grows gradually more and more complex. The distinctive character of the whole movement is, in a certain wide sense, individualism; but this is a vague term until further defined. The philosophers of Greece, down to and including Aristotle, were not individualists in the sense in which I wish to use the term. They thought of a man as essentially a member of a community; Plato's *Republic*, for example, is concerned to define the good community, not the good individual. With the loss of political liberty from the time of Alexander onwards, individualism developed, and was represented by the Cynics and Stoics. According to the Stoic philosophy, a man could live a good life in no matter what social circumstances. This was also the view of Christianity, especially before it acquired control of the State. But in the Middle Ages, while mystics kept alive the original individualistic trends in Christian ethics, the outlook of most men, including the majority of philosophers, was dominated by a firm synthesis of dogma, law, and custom, which caused men's theoretical beliefs and practical morality to be controlled by a social institution, namely the Catholic Church: what was true and what was good was to be ascertained, not by solitary thought, but by the collective wisdom of Councils. | The first important breach in this system was made by Protestantism, which asserted that General Councils may err. To determine the truth thus became no longer a social but an individual enterprise. Since different individuals reached different conclusions, the result was strife, and theological decisions were sought, no longer in assemblies of bishops, but on the battle-field. Since neither party was able to extirpate the other, it became evident, in the end, that a method must be found of reconciling intellectual and ethical individualism with ordered social life. This was one of the main problems which early liberalism attempted to solve. | Meanwhile individualism had penetrated into philosophy. Descartes' fundamental certainty, 'I think, therefore I am', made the basis of knowledge different for each person, since for each the starting-point was his own existence, not that of other individuals or of the community. His emphasis upon the reliability of clear and distinct ideas tended in the same direction, since it is by introspection that we think we discover whether our ideas are clear and distinct. Most philosophy since Descartes has had this intellectually individualistic aspect in a greater or less degree.> Another insightful history lesson.

p.581: <The first comprehensive statement of the liberal philosophy is to be found in Locke, the most influential though by no means the most profound of modern philosophers.>

pp.584-585: <Locke is the most fortunate of all philosophers. He completed his work in theoretical philosophy just at the moment when the government of his country fell into the hands of men who shared his political opinions. Both in practice and in theory, the views which he advocated were held, for many years to come, by the most vigorous and influential politicians and philosophers. His political doctrines, with the developments due to Montesquieu, are embedded in the American Constitution, and are to be seen at work whenever there is a dispute between President and Congress. The British Constitution was based upon his doctrines until about fifty years ago, and so was that which the French adopted in 1871.> See my notes for pp.596-616 below.

pp.589-590: <Locke may be regarded as the founder of empiricism, which is the doctrine that all our knowledge (with the possible exception of logic and mathematics) is derived from experience. Accordingly the first book of the *Essay [Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1689]* is concerned in arguing, as against Plato, Descartes, and the scholastics, that there are no innate ideas or principles. In the second book he sets to work to show, in detail, how experience gives rise to various kinds of ideas. Having rejected innate ideas, he says: | 'Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience: in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it

ultimately derives itself' (Book II, chap. i, sec. 2). | Our ideas are derived from two sources, (a) sensation, and (b) perception of the operation of our own mind, which may be called 'internal sense'. Since we can only think by means of ideas, and since all ideas come from experience, it is evident that none of our knowledge can antedate experience. | Perception, he says, is 'the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it'. This may seem, to a modern, almost a truism, since it has become part of educated common sense, at least in English-speaking countries. But in his day the mind was supposed to know all sorts of things *a priori*, and the complete dependence of knowledge upon perception, which he proclaimed, was a new and revolutionary doctrine. Plato, in the *Theaetetus*, had set to work to refute the identification of knowledge with perception, and from his time onwards almost all philosophers, down to and including Descartes and Leibniz, had taught that much of our most valuable knowledge is not derived from experience. Locke's thorough-going empiricism was therefore a bold innovation. | The third book of the *Essay* deals with words, and is concerned, in the main, to show that what metaphysicians present as knowledge about the world is purely verbal. Chapter III, 'Of General Terms', takes up an extreme nominalist position on the subject of universals. All things that exist are particulars, but we can frame general ideas, such as 'man', that are applicable to many particulars, and to these general ideas we can give names. Their generality consists solely in the fact that they are, or may be, applicable to a variety of particular things; in their own being, as ideas in our minds, they are just as particular as everything else that exists. | Chapter VI of Book III, 'Of the Names of Substances', is concerned to refute the scholastic doctrine of essence. Things *may* have a real essence, which will consist of their physical constitution, but this is in the main unknown to us, and is not the 'essence' of which scholastics speak. Essence, as we can know it, is purely verbal; it consists merely in the definition of a general term. To argue, for instance, as to whether the essence of body is only extension, or is extension plus solidity, is to argue about words: we may define the word 'body' either way, and no harm can result so long as we adhere to our definition. Distinct species are not a fact of nature, but of language; they are 'distinct complex ideas with distinct names annexed to them'. There are, it is true, differing things in nature, but the differences proceed by continuous gradations: 'the boundaries of the species, whereby men sort them, are made by men'. He proceeds to give instances of monstrosities, concerning which it was doubtful whether they were men or not. This point of view was not generally accepted until Darwin persuaded men to adopt the theory of evolution by gradual changes. Only those who have allowed themselves to be afflicted by the scholastics will realize how much metaphysical lumber it sweeps away.> I agree with Locke, which I suppose confirms me as <an extreme nominalist> (or even <an out-and-out nominalist> like Hobbes, see pp.533-536). Indeed, Locke's stance *as recounted by Russell* anticipates an important facet of Review05.pdf pp.2-3. (The italicised qualifier is included because I've never been able to understand Locke's writings, but Russell's masterful summary has made all things clear.)

pp.590-592: <Empiricism and idealism alike are faced with a problem to which, so far, philosophy has found no satisfactory solution. This is the problem of showing how we have knowledge of other things than ourself and the operations of our own mind. Locke considers this problem, but what he says is very obviously unsatisfactory. In one place [Footnote: <Op. cit., Book IV, chap. i.>] we are told: 'Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them.' And again: 'Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas.' From this it would seem to follow immediately that we cannot know of the existence of other people, or of the physical world, for these, if they exist, are not merely ideas in any mind. Each one of us, accordingly, must, so far as knowledge is concerned, be shut up in himself, and cut off from all contact with the outer world. | This, however, is a paradox, and Locke will have nothing to do with paradoxes. Accordingly, in another chapter, he sets forth a different theory, quite inconsistent with the earlier one. We have, he tells us, three kinds of knowledge of real existence. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive, our knowledge of God's existence is demonstrative, and our knowledge of things present to sense is sensitive (Book IV, chap. iii). ...

This difficulty has troubled empiricism down to the present day. Hume got rid of it by dropping the assumption that sensations have external causes, but even he retained this assumption whenever he forgot his own principles, which was very often. His fundamental maxim, ‘no idea without an antecedent impression’, which he takes over from Locke, is only plausible so long as we think of impressions as having outside causes, which the very word ‘impression’ irresistibly suggests. And at the moments when Hume achieves some degree of consistency he is wildly paradoxical. | No one has yet succeeded in inventing a philosophy at once credible and self-consistent. Locke aimed at credibility, and achieved it at the expense of consistency. Most of the great philosophers have done the opposite. A philosophy which is not self-consistent cannot be wholly true, but a philosophy which is self-consistent can very well be wholly false. The most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that very reason have been partially true. There is no reason to suppose that a self-consistent system contains more truth than one which, like Locke’s, is obviously more or less wrong.> In my view, “once an idea has been expressed *in writing* it may be comprehended in just the same way as any other percept”: and *by any number of people*, not just its author. <From this it would seem to follow immediately that> we *can* know <of the existence of other people>, and <of the physical world>. Thus our use of language effectively solves the stated paradox, as well as its other advantages as summarised in Review05.pdf pp.2-3. This argument I consider to be sufficiently potent that it inspires me to wax scriptural and compose the (undoubtedly heretical) dictum, that through ‘the word’ ideas are ‘made flesh’: which is, I suggest, a truer meaning of *logos* than has prevailed since the Gospel of John was first held to be canonical.

pp.592-595, <Locke’s ethical doctrines>: <God has laid down certain moral rules; those who follow them go to heaven, and those who break them risk going to hell. The prudent pleasure-seeker will therefore be virtuous. With the decay of the belief that sin leads to hell, it has become more difficult to make a purely self-regarding argument in favour of a virtuous life. Bentham, who was a freethinker, substituted the human lawgiver in place of God: it was the business of laws and social institutions to make a harmony between public and private interests, so that each man, in pursuing his own happiness, should be compelled to minister to the general happiness. But this is less satisfactory than the reconciliation of public and private interests effected by means of heaven and hell, both because lawgivers are not always wise or virtuous, and because human governments are not omniscient. ... Since it is only in the long run that, according to Locke, self-interest and the general interest coincide, it becomes important that men should be guided, as far as possible, by their long-run interests. That is to say, men should be prudent. Prudence is the one virtue which remains to be preached, for every lapse from virtue is a failure of prudence. Emphasis on prudence is characteristic of liberalism. It is connected with the rise of capitalism, for the prudent became rich while the imprudent became or remained poor. It is connected also with certain forms of Protestant piety: virtue with a view to heaven is psychologically very analogous to saving with a view to investment. | Belief in the harmony between private and public interests is characteristic of liberalism, and long survived the theological foundation that it had in Locke. | Locke states that liberty depends upon the necessity of pursuing true happiness and upon the government of our passions. This opinion he derives from his doctrine that private and public interests are identical in the long run, though not necessarily over short periods. It follows from this doctrine that, given a community of citizens who are all both pious and prudent, they will all act, given liberty, in a manner to promote the general good. There will be no need of human laws to restrain them, since divine laws will suffice. ... Locke’s ethical doctrines are, of course, not defensible. Apart from the fact that there is something revolting in a system which regards prudence as the only virtue, there are other, less emotional, objections to his theories. | In the first place, to say that men only desire pleasure is to put the cart before the horse. Whatever I may happen to desire, I shall feel pleasure in obtaining it; but as a rule the pleasure is due to the desire, not the desire to the pleasure. It is possible, as happens with masochists, to desire pain; in that case, there is still pleasure in the gratification of the desire, but it is mixed with its opposite. Even in Locke’s own doctrine, it is not pleasure as such that is desired, since a proximate pleasure is more desired than a remote one. If

morality is to be deduced from the psychology of desire, as Locke and his disciples attempt to do, there can be no reason for deprecating the discounting of distant pleasures, or for urging prudence as a moral duty. His argument, in a nutshell, is: 'We only desire pleasure. But, in fact, many men desire, not pleasure as such, but proximate pleasure. This contradicts our doctrine that they desire pleasure as such, and is therefore wicked.' Almost all philosophers, in their ethical systems, first lay down a false doctrine, and then argue that wickedness consists in acting in a manner that proves it false, which would be impossible if the doctrine were true. Of this pattern Locke affords an example.> Whilst I agree with Russell's criticisms of <Locke's ethical doctrines>, I think he's overlooked the worst offence, which is the inextricable co-mingling of *individual self-interest* with a *collective ethos*. To me these are two entirely separate domains, "and never the twain shall meet". Thus while I regard "the values underpinning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... as the basis of my personal moral code", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.4, I don't make it a condition of my friendship or company that others do the same. On the contrary, increasingly I find myself using the phrase, 'Each to their own', see for example Review05.pdf, *passim*.

pp.596-616, <Chapter XIV | Locke's Political Philosophy>: Fortunately for him, Locke's political views were a favourable reflection of the times in which he lived, see pp.584-585 above. He opposed the inheritance of political power, but supported the inheritance of personal property; argued that a government's legitimacy was based on a hypothetical <social contract>, which itself was derived from a particular interpretation of <the state of nature and the law of nature>; and upheld a <doctrine of checks and balances> in relation to national governance. This is a long chapter, but I consider the following quotations to provide a representative snapshot.

p.600: <It is curious that the rejection of the hereditary principle in politics has had almost no effect in the economic sphere in democratic countries. (In totalitarian states, economic power has been absorbed by political power.) We still think it natural that a man should leave his property to his children; that is to say, we accept the hereditary principle as regards economic power while rejecting it as regards political power. Political dynasties have disappeared, but economic dynasties survive. I am not at the moment arguing either for or against this different treatment of the two forms of power; I am merely pointing out that it exists, and that most men are unconscious of it.>

p.601: <What Locke has to say about the state of nature and the law of nature is, in the main, not original, but a repetition of medieval scholastic doctrines. ... Throughout the Middle Ages, the law of nature was held to condemn 'usury', i.e. lending money at interest. Church property was almost entirely in land, and landowners have always been borrowers rather than lenders. But when Protestantism arose, its support – especially the support of Calvinism – came chiefly from the rich middle class, who were lenders rather than borrowers. Accordingly first Calvin, then other Protestants, and finally the Catholic Church, sanctioned 'usury'. Thus natural law came to be differently conceived, but no one doubted there being such a thing. | Many doctrines which survived the belief in natural law owe their origin to it; for example, *laissez-faire* and the rights of man. These doctrines are connected, and both have their origins in puritanism.>

p.604: <Some parts of Locke's natural law are surprising. For example, he says that captives in a just war are slaves by the law of nature. He says also that by nature every man has a right to punish attacks on himself or his property, even by death. He makes no qualification, so that if I catch a person engaged in petty pilfering I have, apparently, by the law of nature, a right to shoot him. | Property is very prominent in Locke's political philosophy, and is, according to him, the chief reason for the institution of civil government: | 'The great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.'>

pp.606-607: <Some writers regarded the social contract as a historical fact, others as a legal fiction; the important matter, for all of them, was to find a terrestrial origin for governmental authority. In fact, they could not think of any alternative to divine right except the supposed contract. It was felt by all except rebels that some reason must be found for obeying governments, and it was not thought sufficient to say that for most people the authority of government is convenient.>

Government must, in some sense, have a right to exact obedience, and the right conferred by a contract seemed the only alternative to a divine command. Consequently the doctrine that government was instituted by a contract was popular with practically all opponents of divine right of kings.>

pp.609-610: <The social contract, in the sense required, is mythical even when, at some former period, there actually was a contract creating the government in question. The United States is a case in point. At the time when the Constitution was adopted, men had liberty of choice. Even then, many voted against it, and were therefore not parties to the contract. They could, of course, have left the country, and by remaining were deemed to have become bound by a contract to which they had not assented. But in practice it is usually difficult to leave one's country. And in the case of men born after the adoption of the Constitution their consent is even more shadowy.>

p.613: <Some of Locke's opinions are so odd that I cannot see how to make them sound sensible. ... He makes a great deal of the imperishable character of the precious metals, which, he says, are the source of money and inequality of fortune. He seems, in an abstract and academic way, to regret economic inequality, but he certainly does not think that it would be wise to take such measures as might prevent it. No doubt he was impressed, as all the men of his time were, by the gains to civilization that were due to rich men, chiefly as patrons of art and letters. The same attitude exists in modern America, where science and art are largely dependent upon the benefactions of the very rich. To some extent, civilization is furthered by social injustice. This fact is the basis of what is most respectable in conservatism.>

pp.613-614: <The doctrine that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government should be kept separate is characteristic of liberalism; it arose in England in the course of resistance to the Stuarts, and is clearly formulated by Locke, at least as regards the legislature and the executive. The legislative and executive must be separate, he says, to prevent abuse of power. It must of course be understood that when he speaks of the legislature he means Parliament, and when he speaks of the executive he means the king; at least this is what he means emotionally, whatever he may logically intend to mean. Accordingly he thinks of the legislature as virtuous, while the executive is usually wicked.>

p.616: <The country where Locke's principle of the division of powers has found its fullest application is the United States, where the President and Congress are wholly independent of each other, and the Supreme Court is independent of both. Inadvertently, the Constitution made the Supreme Court a branch of the legislature, since nothing is a law if the Supreme Court says it is not. The fact that its powers are nominally only interpretative in reality increases those powers, since it makes it difficult to criticize what are supposed to be purely legal decisions. It says a very great deal for the political sagacity of Americans that this Constitution has only once led to armed conflict.>

p.616: <Locke's political philosophy was, on the whole, adequate and useful until the industrial revolution. Since then, it has been increasingly unable to tackle the important problems. The power of property, as embodied in vast corporations, grew beyond anything imagined by Locke. The necessary functions of the State – for example, in education – increased enormously. Nationalism brought about an alliance, sometimes an amalgamation, of economic and political power, making war the principal means of competition. The single separate citizen has no longer the power and independence that he had in Locke's speculations. Our age is one of organization, and its conflicts are between organizations, not between separate individuals. The state of nature, as Locke says, still exists as between States. A new international Social Contract is necessary before we can enjoy the promised benefits of government. When once an international government has been created, much of Locke's political philosophy will again become applicable, though not the part of it that deals with private property.>

Irrespective of its intention, this last paragraph fully supports my view that <Locke's Political Philosophy> presents just another vision of Utopia; see Review05.pdf p.5 for my opinion on that.

pp.617-622, <Chapter XV | Locke's Influence>: <From the time of Locke down to the present day, there have been in Europe two main types of philosophy, and one of these owes both its doctrines and its method to Locke, while the other was derived first from Descartes and then from Kant. Kant himself thought that he had made a synthesis of the philosophy derived from Descartes and that derived from Locke; but this cannot be admitted, at least from a historical point of view, for the followers of Kant were in the Cartesian, not the Lockean, tradition. The heirs of Locke are, first Berkeley and Hume; second, those of the French *philosophes* who did not belong to the school of Rousseau; third, Bentham and the philosophical Radicals; fourth, with important accretions from Continental philosophy, Marx and his disciples. ... Kant, like Darwin, gave rise to a movement which he would have detested. Kant was a liberal, a democrat, a pacifist, but those who professed to develop his philosophy were none of these things. Or, if they still called themselves Liberals, they were Liberals of a new species. Since Rousseau and Kant, there have been two schools of liberalism, which may be distinguished as the hard-headed and the soft-hearted. The hard-headed developed, through Bentham, Ricardo, and Marx, by logical stages into Stalin; the soft-hearted, by other logical stages, through Fichte, Byron, Carlyle, and Nietzsche, into Hitler. This statement, of course, is too schematic to be quite true, but it may serve as a map and a mnemonic. ... Leaving politics on one side, let us examine the differences between the two schools of philosophy, which may be broadly distinguished as the Continental and the British respectively. | There is first of all a difference of method. ... In Locke or Hume, a comparatively modest conclusion is drawn from a broad survey of many facts, whereas in Leibniz a vast edifice of deduction is pyramided upon a pin-point of logical principle. In Leibniz, if the principle is completely true and the deductions are entirely valid, all is well; but the structure is unstable, and the slightest flaw anywhere brings it down in ruins. In Locke or Hume, on the contrary, the base of the pyramid is on the solid ground of observed fact, and the pyramid tapers upward, not downward; consequently the equilibrium is stable, and a flaw here or there can be rectified without total disaster. This difference of method survived Kant's attempt to incorporate something of the empirical philosophy: from Descartes to Hegel on the one side, and from Locke to John Stuart Mill on the other, it remains unvarying. | The difference in method is connected with various other differences. Let us take first metaphysics. | Descartes offered metaphysical proofs of the existence of God, of which the most important had been invented in the eleventh century by St Anselm, archbishop of Canterbury. Spinoza had a pantheistic God, who seemed to the orthodox to be no God at all; however that may be, Spinoza's arguments were essentially metaphysical, and are traceable (though he may not have realized this) to the doctrine that every proposition must have a subject and a predicate. Leibniz's metaphysics had the same source. | In Locke, the philosophical direction that he inaugurated is not yet fully developed; he accepts as valid Descartes' arguments as to the existence of God. Berkeley invented a wholly new argument; but Hume – in whom the new philosophy comes to completion – rejected metaphysics entirely, and held that nothing can be discovered by reasoning on the subjects with which metaphysics is concerned. This view persisted in the empirical school, while the opposite view, somewhat modified, persisted in Kant and his disciples. | In ethics, there is a similar division between the two schools. | Locke, as we saw, believed pleasure to be the good, and this was the prevalent view among empiricists throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their opponents, on the contrary, despised pleasure as ignoble, and had various systems of ethics which seemed more exalted. Hobbes valued power, and Spinoza, up to a point, agreed with Hobbes. There are in Spinoza two unreconciled views on ethics, one that of Hobbes, the other that the good consists in mystic union with God. Leibniz made no important contribution to ethics, but Kant made ethics supreme, and derived his metaphysics from ethical premisses. Kant's ethic is important, because it is anti-utilitarian, *a priori*, and what is called 'noble'. | Kant says that if you are kind to your brother because you are fond of him, you have no moral merit: an act only has moral merit when it is performed because the moral law enjoins it. ... The sort of ethic that is called 'noble' is less associated with attempts to improve the world than is the more mundane view that we should seek to make men happier. This is not surprising. Contempt for happiness is easier when the happiness is other people's than when it is our own. Usually the substitute for happiness is some



form of heroism. This affords unconscious outlets for the impulse to power, and abundant excuses for cruelty. Or, again, what is valued may be strong emotion; this was the case with the romantics. This led to a toleration of such passions as hatred and revenge; Byron's heroes are typical, and are never persons of exemplary behaviour. ... These ethical differences are associated, usually though not invariably, with differences in politics. Locke, as we saw, is tentative in his beliefs, not at all authoritarian, and willing to leave every question to be decided by free discussion. The result, both in his case and in that of his followers, was a belief in reform, but of a gradual sort. ... The great political defect of Locke and his disciples, from a modern point of view, was their worship of property. But those who criticized them on this account often did so in the interest of classes that were more harmful than the capitalists, such as monarchs, aristocrats, and militarists. ... Most of the opponents of Locke's school had an admiration for war, as being heroic and involving a contempt for comfort and ease. Those who adopted a utilitarian ethic, on the contrary, tended to regard most wars as folly. This, again, at least in the nineteenth century, brought them into alliance with the capitalists, who disliked wars because they interfered with trade. The capitalists' motive was, of course, pure self-interest, but it led to views more consonant with the general interest than those of militarists and their literary supporters. ... Enlightened self-interest is, of course, not the loftiest of motives, but those who decry it often substitute, by accident or design, motives which are much worse, such as hatred, envy, and love of power. On the whole, the school which owed its origin to Locke, and which preached enlightened self-interest, did more to increase human happiness, and less to increase human misery, than was done by the schools which despised it in the name of heroism and self-sacrifice.> Another insightful history lesson. But on the basis of my previous specific comments I'm satisfied that there's nothing in this more general survey which hasn't been taken into account, and improved upon, in MyPhilosophy03.pdf and Review05.pdf. Noting that in this passage (and, indeed, throughout) Russell describes and analyses philosophical thought using the categories {Method, Metaphysics, Ethics, Politics}, I'm tempted to include 'Science' and map them to IDEAL as follows: {Empiricist = Science; Idealist = Metaphysics; Activist = Politics; Conformist = Ethics; Theorist = Method}. As with the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14, and <The most important matters in Plato's philosophy> of pp.122-124, this latest mapping corresponds well with the Review05.pdf "five main areas of philosophical enquiry", {Ontology, Cosmology, Teleology, Deontology, Epistemology}.

p.623: <George Berkeley (1685-1753) is important in philosophy through his denial of the existence of matter – a denial which he supported by a number of ingenious arguments. He maintained that material objects only exist through being perceived. To the objection that, in that case, a tree, for instance, would cease to exist if no one was looking at it, he replied that God always perceives everything; if there were no God, what we take to be material objects would have a jerky life, suddenly leaping into being when we look at them; but as it is, owing to God's perceptions, trees and rocks and stones have an existence as continuous as common sense supposes. This is, in his opinion, a weighty argument for the existence of God.> This argument is a prime example of Cicero's observation, "Nothing so absurd can be said that some philosopher had not said it."

p.632: <Berkeley, as we have seen, thinks that there are logical reasons proving that only minds and mental events can exist. This view, on other grounds, is also held by Hegel and his followers. I believe this to be a complete mistake. Such a statement as 'there was a time before life existed on this planet', whether true or false, cannot be condemned on grounds of logic, any more than 'there are multiplication sums which no one will have ever worked out'. To be observed, or to be a percept, is merely to have effects of certain kinds, and there is no logical reason why all events should have effects of these kinds.> I agree. Well, that about wraps it up for George Berkeley.

p.633: <It remains to be asked whether any meaning can be attached to the words ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. Every one knows that ‘mind’ is what an idealist thinks there is nothing else but, and ‘matter’ is what a materialist thinks the same about. The reader knows also, I hope, that idealists are virtuous and materialists are wicked. But perhaps there may be more than this to be said. | My own definition of ‘matter’ may seem unsatisfactory; I should define it as what satisfies the equations of physics. There may be nothing satisfying these equations; in that case either physics or the concept ‘matter’ is a mistake. If we reject substance, ‘matter’ will have to be a logical construction. Whether it can be any construction composed of events – which may be partly inferred – is a difficult question, but by no means an insoluble one. | As for ‘mind’, when substance has been rejected a mind must be some group or structure of events. The grouping, must be effected by some relation which is characteristic of the sort of phenomena we wish to call ‘mental’. We may take memory as typical. We might – though this would be rather unduly simple – define a ‘mental’ event as one which remembers or is remembered. Then the ‘mind’ to which a given mental event belongs is the group of events connected with the given event by memory-chains, backwards or forwards. | It will be seen that, according to the above definitions, a mind and a piece of matter are, each of them, a group of events. There is no reason why every event should belong to a group of one kind or the other, and there is no reason why some events should not belong to both groups; therefore some events may be neither mental nor material, and other events may be both. As to this, only detailed empirical considerations can decide.> Regarding the definition of <matter>, I concur with Russell, and take the view that “If it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere well | It were done” according to <the equations of physics>. However, I’d add the important qualifier that in fact there is no single body of these <equations>, rather they’re grouped into self-consistent theories – classical mechanics, quantum mechanics, relativistic mechanics, and so on – each of which is applicable only within its own well-defined finite domain. Thus <matter>, if so defined, will be a parameter like ‘time’, “which has meaning only within a particular frame or system or application or context or model; but which when used outside its domain can lead to apparent contradictions and paradoxes; and so the toolkit approach simply forbids any such misuse”: and here I’m quoting my own comments to pp.351-353 above. As for whether <a mind and a piece of matter are, each of them, a group of events>, this depends on what is meant by <event>. From the quotation on pp.87-88 above I take an <event> to be a point in ‘spacetime’: that is, it too “has meaning only within a particular frame ...”, and it has none of the generality that one might normally expect for such a commonplace word. It follows that Russell’s proposed approach to defining <matter> and <mind> is at best ‘unsupported’, and at worst should be consigned to the same dustbin of history as much of traditional metaphysics. In any case I am confident that nothing more need be said other than my usual statement to the effect that “Everything is defined through its associations”.

p.634: <David Hume (1711-76) is one of the most important among philosophers, because he developed to its logical conclusion the empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkeley, and by making it self-consistent made it incredible. He represents, in a certain sense, a dead end: in his direction, it is impossible to go further. To refute him has been, ever since he wrote, a favourite pastime among metaphysicians. For my part, I find none of their refutations convincing; nevertheless, I cannot but hope that something less sceptical than Hume’s system may be discoverable.> Strangely, Russell makes no mention here of Hume’s other contributions to philosophy, principally, those known as ‘Hume’s fork’ and ‘Hume’s law’, see references below. The second of these is the source of the popular saying, “You can’t get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, or vice versa”, which in turn is the basis of my counter to <Bradley’s principle>, see pp.410-411 above. Another omission is any enquiry into why Hume <rejected metaphysics entirely>, while Berkeley denied <the existence of matter>. I suspect that these extreme positions resulted from their protagonists holding very different opinions about *how* they’d learnt about the world: say, Hume by *perception*, and Berkeley by *introspection*. But there are other ways of learning about the world: we can read books (*citation*); we can make ‘educated guesses’ (*estimation*); or we can just ‘do something’ (*perspiration*).

These five 'ways of learning about the world' map to IDEAL as follows: {Empiricist = Perception; Idealist = Introspection; Activist = Perspiration; Conformist = Citation; Theorist = Estimation}. This exercise might appear to be rather trivial and simplistic, but it has hidden depths. In particular, it defuses the empiricist/idealist dichotomy, by showing that there are other ways of learning about the world. Furthermore, it lays down a challenge for the reader to discover a *sixth* way of learning about the world. As I say on HMM p.165, "I bet you can't."

pp.646-647: <Hume's scepticism rests entirely upon his rejection of the principle of induction. The principle of induction, as applied to causation, says that, if A has been found very often accompanied or followed by B, and no instance is known of A not being accompanied or followed by B, then it is probable that on the next occasion on which A is observed it will be accompanied or followed by B. If the principle is to be adequate, a sufficient number of instances must make the probability not far short of certainty. If this principle, or any other from which it can be deduced, is true, then the causal inferences which Hume rejects are valid, not indeed as giving certainty, but as giving a sufficient probability for practical purposes. If this principle is not true, every attempt to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observations is fallacious, and Hume's scepticism is inescapable for an empiricist. The principle itself cannot, of course, without circularity, be inferred from observed uniformities, since it is required to justify any such inference. It must therefore be, or be deduced from, an independent principle not based upon experience. To this extent, Hume has proved that pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis for science. But if this one principle is admitted, everything else can proceed in accordance with the theory that all our knowledge is based on experience. It must be granted that this is a serious departure from pure empiricism, and that those who are not empiricists may ask why, if one departure is allowed, others are to be forbidden. These, however, are questions not directly raised by Hume's arguments. What these arguments prove – and I do not think the proof can be controverted – is that induction is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either from experience or from other logical principles, and that without this principle science is impossible.> As Hume argues, and Russell agrees, the <principle of induction> cannot be inferred inductively. And one of the most potent objections to Karl Popper's falsification criterion is that it cannot be falsified. Therefore each method fails its own test for what it means to be 'scientific'. Now consider my proposed alternative, 'iteration': it *can* be inferred iteratively; indeed, this is how it came about, see HMM pp.63-65; which is another good reason to see it as the basis of 'scientific method', see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.5.

pp.651-659: <The romantic movement was not, in its beginnings, connected with philosophy, though it came before long to have connections with it. With politics, through Rousseau, it was connected from the first. But before we can understand its political and philosophical effects we must consider it in its most essential form, which is as a revolt against received ethical and aesthetic standards. | The first great figure in the movement is Rousseau, but to some extent he only expressed already existing tendencies. Cultivated people in eighteenth-century France greatly admired what they called *la sensibilité*, which meant a proneness to emotion, and more particularly to the emotion of sympathy. To be thoroughly satisfactory, the emotion must be direct and violent and quite uninformed by thought. The man of sensibility would be moved to tears by the sight of a single destitute peasant family, but would be cold to well-thought-out schemes for ameliorating the lot of peasants as a class. The poor were supposed to possess more virtue than the rich; the sage was thought of as a man who retires from the corruption of courts to enjoy the peaceful pleasures of an unambitious rural existence. As a passing mood, this attitude is to be found in poets of almost all periods. ... The romantic movement is characterized, as a whole, by the substitution of aesthetic for utilitarian standards. The earth-worm is useful, but not beautiful; the tiger is beautiful, but not useful. Darwin (who was not a romantic) praised the earth-worm; Blake praised the tiger. The morals of the romantics have primarily aesthetic motives. ... Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, written under the inspiration of conversations with Byron in the romantic scenery of the Alps, contains what might almost be regarded as an allegorical prophetic history of the development of

romanticism. Frankenstein's monster is not, as he has become in proverbial parlance, a *mere* monster: he is, at first, a gentle being, longing for human affection, but he is driven to hatred and violence by the horror which his ugliness inspires in those whose love he attempts to gain. ... It is not the psychology of the romantics that is at fault: it is their standard of values. They admire strong passions, of no matter what kind, and whatever may be their social consequences. Romantic love, especially when unfortunate, is strong enough to win their approval, but most of the strongest passions are destructive – hate and resentment and jealousy, remorse and despair, outraged pride and the fury of the unjustly oppressed, martial ardour and contempt for slaves and cowards. Hence the type of man encouraged by romanticism, especially of the Byronic variety, is violent and anti-social, an anarchic rebel or a conquering tyrant. | This outlook makes an appeal for which the reasons lie very deep in human nature and human circumstances. By self-interest Man has become gregarious, but in instinct he has remained to a great extent solitary; hence the need of religion and morality to reinforce self-interest. But the habit of forgoing present satisfactions for the sake of future advantages is irksome, and when passions are roused the prudent restraints of social behaviour become difficult to endure. Those who, at such times, throw them off, acquire a new energy and sense of power from the cessation of inner conflict, and, though they may come to disaster in the end, enjoy meanwhile a sense of godlike exaltation which, though known to the great mystics, can never be experienced by a merely pedestrian virtue. The solitary part of their nature reasserts itself, but if the intellect survives the reassertion must clothe itself in myth. The mystic becomes one with God, and in the contemplation of the Infinite feels himself absolved from duty to his neighbour. The anarchic rebel does even better: he feels himself not one with God, but God. Truth and duty, which represent our subjection to matter and to our neighbours, exist no longer for the man who has become God; for others, truth is what *he* posits, duty what *he* commands. If we could all live solitary and without labour, we could all enjoy this ecstasy of independence; since we cannot, its delights are only available to madmen and dictators. ... The romantic movement, in its essence, aimed at liberating human personality from the fetters of social convention and social morality. In part, these fetters were a mere useless hindrance to desirable forms of activity, for every ancient community has developed rules of behaviour for which there is nothing to be said except that they are traditional. But egoistic passions, when once let loose, are not easily brought again into subjection to the needs of society. Christianity had succeeded, to some extent, in taming the Ego, but economic, political, and intellectual causes stimulated revolt against the Churches, and the romantic movement brought the revolt into the sphere of morals. By encouraging a new lawless Ego it made social cooperation impossible, and left its disciples faced with the alternative of anarchy or despotism. Egoism, at first, made men expect from others a parental tenderness; but when they discovered, with indignation, that others had their own Ego, the disappointed desire for tenderness turned to hatred and violence. Man is not a solitary animal, and so long as social life survives, self-realization cannot be the supreme principle of ethics.> I agree, because, in my view, there is no <supreme principle of ethics>, see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.4. As for the various romantic archetypes described by Russell, <The poor>, <the sage>, <poets>, <an anarchic rebel>, <a conquering tyrant>, and so on, they're instantly recognisable, and it's not difficult to map them to the IDEAL learning styles. Naturally, PI is full of this kind of thing.

p.666, Rousseau: <In theology he made an innovation which has now been accepted by the great majority of Protestant theologians. Before him, every philosopher from Plato onwards, if he believed in God, offered intellectual arguments in favour of his belief. [Footnote: <We must except Pascal. 'The heart has its reasons, of which reason is ignorant' is quite in Rousseau's style.>] The arguments may not, to us, seem very convincing, and we may feel that they would not have seemed cogent to anyone who did not already feel sure of the truth of the conclusion. But the philosopher who advanced the arguments certainly believed them to be logically valid, and such as should cause certainty of God's existence in any unprejudiced person of sufficient philosophical capacity. Modern Protestants who urge us to believe in God, for the most part, despise the old 'proofs', and base their faith upon some aspect of human nature – emotions of awe or mystery, the

sense of right and wrong, the feeling of aspiration, and so on. This way of defending religious belief was invented by Rousseau. It has become so familiar that his originality may easily not be appreciated by a modern reader, unless he will take the trouble to compare Rousseau with (say) Descartes or Leibniz.>

pp.668-669: <The rejection of reason in favour of the heart was not, to my mind, an advance. In fact, no one thought of this device so long as reason appeared to be on the side of religious belief. In Rousseau's environment, reason, as represented by Voltaire, was opposed to religion, therefore away with reason! Moreover reason was abstruse and difficult; the savage, even when he has dined, cannot understand the ontological argument, and yet the savage is the repository of all necessary wisdom. Rousseau's savage – who was not the savage known to anthropologists – was a good husband and a kind father; he was destitute of greed, and had a religion of natural kindness. He was a convenient person, but if he could follow the good Vicar's reasons for believing in God he must have had more philosophy than his innocent naïveté would lead one to expect. | Apart from the fictitious character of Rousseau's 'natural man', there are two objections to the practice of basing beliefs as to objective fact upon the emotions of the heart. One is that there is no reason whatever to suppose that such beliefs will be true; the other is, that the resulting beliefs will be private, since the heart says different things to different people. ... For my part, I prefer the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, and the rest of the old stock-in-trade, to the sentimental illogicality that has sprung from Rousseau. The old arguments at least were honest: if valid, they proved their point; if invalid, it was open to any critic to prove them so. But the new theology of the heart dispenses with argument; it cannot be refuted, because it does not profess to prove its points. At bottom, the only reason offered for its acceptance is that it allows us to indulge in pleasant dreams. This is an unworthy reason, and if I had to choose between Thomas Aquinas and Rousseau, I should unhesitatingly choose the Saint.> As for me, <if I had to choose> then "I would try to take each of the five distinct perspectives of the 'IDEAL learning styles'", see MyPhilosophy03.pdf p.4.

pp.670-674: <The Social Contract can be stated in the following words: 'Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole.' ... The will of the Sovereign, which is always right, is the 'general will'. Each citizen, *quâ* citizen, shares in the general will, but he may also, as an individual, have a particular will running counter to the general will. The Social Contract involves that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be forced to do so. 'This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free.' | This conception of being 'forced to be free' is very metaphysical. The general will in the time of Galileo was certainly anti-Copernican; was Galileo 'forced to be free' when the Inquisition compelled him to recant? Is even a malefactor 'forced to be free' when he is put in prison? Think of Byron's Corsair: | *O'er the glad waters of the deep blue sea, | Our thoughts as boundless and our hearts as free.* | Would this man be more 'free' in a dungeon? The odd thing is that Byron's noble pirates are a direct outcome of Rousseau, and yet, in the above passage, Rousseau forgets his romanticism and speaks like a sophisticated policeman. ... *The Social Contract* became the Bible of most of the leaders in the French Revolution, but no doubt, as is the fate of Bibles, it was not carefully read and was still less understood by many of its disciples. It reintroduced the habit of metaphysical abstractions among the theorists of democracy, and by its doctrine of the general will it made possible the mystic identification of a leader with his people, which has no need of confirmation by so mundane an apparatus as the ballot-box. Much of its philosophy could be appropriated by Hegel in his defence of the Prussian autocracy. Its first-fruits in practice was the reign of Robespierre; the dictatorships of Russia and Germany (especially the latter) are in part an outcome of Rousseau's teaching. What further triumphs the future has to offer to his ghost I do not venture to predict.> I wouldn't describe Rousseau's <conception of being 'forced to be free'> as <very metaphysical>: I'd describe it as utterly self-contradictory; from which anything follows, good or bad; just like for every other Utopian fantasy. Well, that about wraps it up for <*The Social Contract*>.

p.677: <Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is generally considered the greatest of modern philosophers. I cannot myself agree with this estimate, but it would be foolish not to recognize his great importance.> In my view <the greatest of modern philosophers> is not Immanuel Kant but Bertrand Russell, who in writing this book has shown a breadth and depth of vision and understanding far surpassing all others in the field.

pp.679-680: <Kant's most important book is *The Critique of Pure Reason* (first edition, 1781; second edition, 1787). The purpose of this work is to prove that, although none of our knowledge can transcend experience, it is nevertheless in part *a priori* and not inferred inductively from experience. ... An 'analytic' proposition is one in which the predicate is part of the subject; for instance, 'a tall man is a man', or 'an equilateral triangle is a triangle'. Such propositions follow from the law of contradiction; to maintain that a tall man is not a man would be self-contradictory. A 'synthetic' proposition is one that is not analytic. All the propositions that we know only through experience are synthetic. ... An 'empirical' proposition is one which we cannot know except by the help of sense-perception, either our own or that of some one else whose testimony we accept. The facts of history and geography are of this sort; so are the laws of science, whenever our knowledge of their truth depends on observational data. An '*a priori*' proposition, on the other hand, is one which, though it may be elicited by experience, is seen, when known, to have a basis other than experience. A child learning arithmetic may be helped by experiencing two marbles and two other marbles, and observing that altogether he is experiencing four marbles. But when he has grasped the general proposition 'two and two are four' he no longer requires confirmation by instances; the proposition has a certainty which induction can never give to a general law. All the propositions of pure mathematics are in this sense *a priori*. | Hume had proved that the law of causality is not analytic, and had inferred that we could not be certain of its truth. Kant accepted the view that it is synthetic, but nevertheless maintained that it is known *a priori*. He maintained that arithmetic and geometry are synthetic, but are likewise *a priori*. He was thus led to formulate his problem in these terms: | How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? | The answer to this question, with its consequences, constitutes the main theme of *The Critique of Pure Reason*.> Russell's early attempt to address this question, in *The Problems of Philosophy*, is valiant and sincere. This book was my introduction to philosophy, in 1982. I can't remember what I thought then about Russell's 1912 solution to Kant's problem, but when I re-read it in 2017 I was less-than-impressed. Indeed, it was this subsequent reading, documented in MyPhilNotes.pdf, which spurred me to express my own perspective, resulting in MyPhilosophy03.pdf. As for 'Kant's problem', in my view there are five ways of learning about the world, not all of which may be expressed using propositions defined as <empirical> or <*a priori*>, see p.634 above.

pp.682-684: <Kant's ethical system, as set forth in his *Metaphysic of Morals* (1785), has considerable historical importance. This book contains the 'categorical imperative', which, at least as a phrase, is familiar outside the circle of professional philosophers. As might be expected, Kant will have nothing to do with utilitarianism, or with any doctrine which gives to morality a purpose outside itself. He wants, he says, 'a completely isolated metaphysic of morals, which is not mixed with any theology or physics or hyperphysics'. All moral concepts, he continues, have their seat and origin wholly *a priori* in the reason. Moral worth exists only when a man acts from a sense of duty; it is not enough that the act should be such as duty *might* have prescribed. The tradesman who is honest from self-interest, or the man who is kind from benevolent impulse, is not virtuous. The essence of morality is to be derived from the concept of law; for, though everything in nature acts according to laws, only a rational being has the power of acting according to the idea of a law, i.e. by Will. The idea of an objective principle, in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of the reason, and the formula of the command is called an *imperative*. | There are two sorts of imperative: the *hypothetical* imperative, which says 'You must do so-and-so if you wish to achieve such-and-such an end'; and the *categorical* imperative, which says that a certain kind of

action is objectively necessary, without regard to any end. The categorical imperative is synthetic and *a priori*. Its character is deduced by Kant from the concept of Law: | ‘If I think of a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains, besides the Law, only the necessity of the maxim to be in accordance with this law, but the Law contains no condition by which it is limited, nothing remains over but the generality of a law in general, to which the maxim of the actions is to be conformable, and which conforming alone presents the imperative as necessary. Therefore the categorical imperative is a single one, and in fact this: *Act only according to a maxim by which you can at the same time will that it shall become a general law.*’ ... Kant maintains, although his principle does not seem to entail this consequence, that we ought so to act as to treat every man as an end in himself. This may be regarded as an abstract form of the doctrine of the rights of man, and it is open to the same objections. If taken seriously, it would make it impossible to reach a decision whenever two people’s interests conflict. The difficulties are particularly obvious in political philosophy, which requires some principle, such as preference for the majority, by which the interests of some can, when necessary, be sacrificed to those of others. If there is to be any ethic of government, the end of government must be one, and the only single end compatible with justice is the good of the community.> For many years I’ve struggled to understand the <categorical imperative>, but now at last I feel able to come off the fence and admit that, try as I might, I simply can’t think of any <maxim> that I would ever <will that it shall become a general law>. To me this sounds like the motivation of the sanctimonious do-gooder who always wants to lead the way through their holier-than-thou perfect example. I can’t stand it. Far better that I choose my own moral code and leave others to theirs, see pp.592-595 above.

pp.684-689: <The most important part of *The Critique of Pure Reason* is the doctrine of space and time. ... To prove that space and time are *a priori* forms, Kant has two classes of arguments, one metaphysical, the other epistemological, or, as he calls it, transcendental. ... Let us now try to consider the questions raised by Kant as regards space in a more general way. If we adopt the view, which is taken for granted in physics, that our percepts have external causes which are (in some sense) material, we are led to the conclusion that all the actual qualities in percepts are different from those in their unperceived causes, but that there is a certain structural similarity between the system of percepts and the system of their causes. There is, for example, a correlation between colours (as perceived) and wavelengths (as inferred by physicists). Similarly there must be a correlation between space as an ingredient in percepts and space as an ingredient in the system of unperceived causes of percepts. ... There is no reason whatever for regarding our knowledge of space as in any way different from our knowledge of colour and sound and smell. | With regard to time, the matter is different, since, if we adhere to the belief in unperceived causes of percepts, the objective time must be identical with the subjective time. If not, we get into the difficulties already considered in connection with lightning and thunder. ... While, therefore, there is an important sense in which perceptual space is subjective, there is no sense in which perceptual time is subjective. | The above arguments assume, as Kant does, that percepts are caused by ‘things in themselves’, or, as we should say, by events in the world of physics. This assumption, however, is by no means logically necessary. If it is abandoned, percepts cease to be in any important sense ‘subjective’, since there is nothing with which to contrast them. | The ‘thing-in-itself’ was an awkward element in Kant’s philosophy, and was abandoned by his immediate successors, who accordingly fell into something very like solipsism. Kant’s inconsistencies were such as to make it inevitable that philosophers who were influenced by him should develop rapidly either in the empirical or in the absolutist direction; it was, in fact, in the latter direction that German philosophy moved until after the death of Hegel.> In my view <space and time> are not <a priori forms>, rather, each of them is a parameter which “has meaning only within a particular frame ...”; see pp.351-353 and p.633 above. As for Kant’s <thing-in-itself>, while agreeing with Russell that it is <by no means logically necessary>, I don’t see why abandoning it would inevitably trigger a descent <into something very like solipsism>. But maybe that’s because I don’t accept the assumed dichotomy between empiricism and idealism, see my comments to p.634 above.

pp.691-700, <Chapter XXI | Currents of Thought in the Nineteenth Century>: Another insightful history lesson. Russell's pen-portraits of Helvetius and Condorcet are entertaining, his description of the philosophical impact of Darwin's theory of evolution is intriguing, and his concluding rhetoric is as inspirational as ever: <To frame a philosophy capable of coping with men intoxicated with the prospect of almost unlimited power and also with the apathy of the powerless is the most pressing task of our time. ... To formulate any satisfactory modern ethic of human relationships it will be essential to recognize the necessary limitations of men's power over the non-human environment, and the desirable limitations of their power over each other.> My response to Russell's p.482 'stirring call to arms' applies here also.

p.701: <Hegel (1770-1831) was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant; although he often criticized Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant's had not existed. His influence, though now diminishing, has been very great, not only or chiefly in Germany. At the end of the nineteenth century, the leading academic philosophers, both in America and in Great Britain, were largely Hegelians. Outside of pure philosophy, many Protestant theologians adopted his doctrines, and his philosophy of history profoundly affected political theory. Marx, as everyone knows, was a disciple of Hegel in his youth, and retained in his own finished system some important Hegelian features. Even if (as I myself believe) almost all Hegel's doctrines are false, he still retains an importance which is not merely historical, as the best representative of a certain kind of philosophy which, in others, is less coherent and less comprehensive.> Nevertheless for me this chapter is a tedious crawl through an incomprehensible rats-maze. Instead I much prefer to remind myself of "Popper's devastating attack on Hegelian dialectic [which] remains unsurpassed as a refutation of woolly thinking", see PI pp.84-86.

pp.716-721, <Chapter XXIII | Byron>: Another insightful history lesson, but one which is included merely as a bridge from Rousseau to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

p.722: <Schopenhauer (1788-1860) is in many ways peculiar among philosophers. He is a pessimist, whereas almost all the others are in some sense optimists. He is not fully academic, like Kant and Hegel, nor yet completely outside the academic tradition. He dislikes Christianity, preferring the religions of India, both Hinduism and Buddhism. He is a man of wide culture, quite as much interested in art as in ethics. He is unusually free from nationalism, and as much at home with English and French writers as with those of his own country. His appeal has always been less to professional philosophers than to artistic and literary people in search of a philosophy that they could believe. He began the emphasis on Will which is characteristic of much nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy; but for him Will, though metaphysically fundamental, is ethically evil – an opposition only possible for a pessimist. He acknowledges three sources of his philosophy, Kant, Plato, and the Upanishads, but I do not think he owes as much to Plato as he thinks he does. His outlook has a certain temperamental affinity with that of the Hellenistic age; it is tired and valetudinarian, valuing peace more than victory, and quietism more than attempts at reform, which he regards as inevitably futile.> Another brilliant pen-portrait.

pp.725-727: <Schopenhauer is led to complete agreement, at least as regards practice, with ascetic mysticism. ... The good man will practise complete chastity, voluntary poverty, fasting, and self-torture. In all things he will aim at breaking down his individual will. But he does not do this, as do the Western mystics, to achieve harmony with God; no such positive good is sought. The good that is sought is wholly and entirely negative: | 'We must banish the dark impression of that nothingness which we discern behind all virtue and holiness as their final goal, and which we fear as children fear the dark; we must not even evade it like the Indians, through myths and meaningless words, such as reabsorption in Brahma or the Nirvana of the Buddhists. Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly



nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky ways – is nothing.’ ... Schopenhauer’s gospel of resignation is not very consistent and not very sincere. The mystics to whom he appeals believed in contemplation; in the Beatific Vision the most profound kind of knowledge was to be achieved, and this kind of knowledge was the supreme good. Ever since Parmenides, the delusive knowledge of appearance was contrasted with another kind of knowledge, not with something of a wholly different kind. Christianity teaches that in *knowledge* of God standeth our eternal life. But Schopenhauer will have none of this. He agrees that what commonly passes for knowledge belongs to the realm of Maya, but when we pierce the veil, we behold not God, but Satan, the wicked omnipotent will, perpetually busied in weaving a web of suffering for the torture of its creatures. ... Nor is the doctrine sincere, if we may judge by Schopenhauer’s life. He habitually dined well, at a good restaurant; he had many trivial love-affairs, which were sensual but not passionate; he was exceedingly quarrelsome and unusually avaricious. On one occasion he was annoyed by an elderly seamstress who was talking to a friend outside the door of his apartment. He threw her downstairs, causing her permanent injury. ... It is hard to find in his life evidences of any virtue except kindness to animals, which he carried to the point of objecting to vivisection in the interests of science. In all other respects he was completely selfish. It is difficult to believe that a man who was profoundly convinced of the virtue of asceticism and resignation would never have made any attempt to embody his convictions in his practice.> Hypocrite.

p.727: <Historically, two things are important about Schopenhauer: his pessimism, and his doctrine that will is superior to knowledge. His pessimism made it possible for men to take to philosophy without having to persuade themselves that all evil can be explained away, and in this way, as an antidote, it was useful. From a scientific point of view, optimism and pessimism are alike objectionable: optimism assumes, or attempts to prove, that the universe exists to please us, and pessimism that it exists to displease us. Scientifically, there is no evidence that it is concerned with us either one way or the other. ... More important than pessimism was the doctrine of the primacy of the will. It is obvious that this doctrine has no necessary logical connection with pessimism, and those who held it after Schopenhauer frequently found in it a basis for optimism. In one form or another, the doctrine that will is paramount has been held by many modern philosophers, notably Nietzsche, Bergson, James, and Dewey. It has, moreover, acquired a vogue outside the circles of professional philosophers. And in proportion as will has gone up in the scale, knowledge has gone down. This is, I think, the most notable change that has come over the temper of philosophy in our age. It was prepared by Rousseau and Kant, but was first proclaimed in its purity by Schopenhauer. For this reason, in spite of inconsistency and a certain shallowness, his philosophy has considerable importance as a stage in historical development.> But it has absolutely no importance when it comes to the ‘search for truth’. In my opinion.

pp.729-731: <Nietzsche’s criticism of religions and philosophies is dominated entirely by ethical motives. He admires certain qualities which he believes (perhaps rightly) to be only possible for an aristocratic minority; the majority, in his opinion, should be only means to the excellence of the few, and should not be regarded as having any independent claim to happiness or well-being. He alludes habitually to ordinary human beings as the ‘bungled and botched’, and sees no objection to their suffering if it is necessary for the production of a great man. Thus the whole importance of the period from 1789 to 1815 is summed up in Napoleon: ‘The Revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. We ought to desire the anarchical collapse of the whole of our civilization if such a reward were to be its result. Napoleon made nationalism possible: that is the latter’s excuse.’ Almost all of the higher hopes of this century, he says, are due to Napoleon. ... Nietzsche’s ethic is not one of self-indulgence in any ordinary sense; he believes in Spartan discipline and the capacity to endure as well as inflict pain for important ends. He admires strength of will above all things. ‘I test the *power of a will*,’ he says, ‘according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its own advantage; I do not point

to the evil and pain of existence with the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one day become more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.' He regards compassion as a weakness to be combated. 'The object is to attain that enormous *energy of greatness* which can model the man of the future by means of discipline and also by means of the annihilation of millions of the bungled and botched, and which can yet avoid *going to ruin* at the sight of the suffering created thereby, the like of which has never been seen before.' He prophesied with a certain glee an era of great wars; one wonders whether he would have been happy if he had lived to see the fulfilment of his prophecy. | He is not, however, a worshipper of the State; far from it. He is a passionate individualist, a believer in the hero. The misery of a whole nation, he says, is of less importance than the suffering of a great individual: 'The misfortunes of all these small folk do not together constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of *mighty men*.'> What a repellent set of ideas.

p.739: <I dislike Nietzsche because he likes the contemplation of pain, because he erects conceit into a duty, because the men whom he most admires are conquerors, whose glory is cleverness in causing men to die. But I think the ultimate argument against his philosophy, as against any unpleasant but internally self-consistent ethic, lies not in an appeal to facts, but in an appeal to the emotions. Nietzsche despises universal love; I feel it the motive power to all that I desire as regards the world.> I agree with Russell.

p.740: <Jeremy Bentham ... bases his whole philosophy on two principles, the 'association principle', and the 'greatest happiness principle'. The association principle had been emphasised by Hartley in 1749; before him, though association of ideas was recognized as occurring, it was regarded, for instance by Locke, only as a source of trivial errors. Bentham, following Hartley, made it the basic principle of psychology. He recognizes association of ideas and language, and also association of ideas and ideas. By means of this principle he aims at a deterministic account of mental occurrences.> Does <the 'association principle'> have anything to do with my usual statement, "Everything is defined through its associations"? (Or am I being misled by subconscious System 1 word association?) According to the online reference below, "Associationism is often concerned with middle-level to higher-level mental processes such as learning", which is encouraging. Furthermore, this web page mentions Hume's "three principles for ideas to be connected to each other", namely, "resemblance, continuity in time or place, and cause or effect": which, by splitting the latter, and adding 'convention', I've contrived to map to the five IDEAL learning styles, see PI pp.93-94. I remain sceptical, however. My attitude is best summed up in these lines from HMM p.144: "scouring ancient texts for yet more confirming instances of a preconceived idea is no more meaningful than seeing the face of Christ in a slice of toast, or finding a brilliant jewel at the bottom of a rock pool on a warm summer's day. Given enough raw material and enough imagination you can see whatever you want to see."

p.742: <Civil law, he [Bentham] says, should have four aims: subsistence, abundance, security, and equality. It will be observed that he does not mention liberty. In fact, he cared little for liberty.> Oh go on then: {Empiricist = Subsistence; Idealist = Equality; Activist = Abundance; Conformist = Security; Theorist = Liberty}. These five may (or may not) relate to Maslow's hierarchy of needs, see PI p.204.

pp.744-746: Here Russell analyses <the 'greatest happiness principle'>. Whilst endorsing his (quite devastating) points I'll take this opportunity to repeat my observation that "one can be happy; but as an *aim in life* this is quite meaningless", see Review05.pdf p.6.

p.748: <Karl Marx is usually thought of as the man who claimed to have made Socialism scientific, and who did more than any one else to create the powerful movement which, by attraction and repulsion, has dominated the recent history of Europe. It does not come within the scope of the present work to consider his economics, or his politics except in certain general aspects; it is only as a philosopher, and an influence on the philosophy of others, that I propose to deal with him. In this respect he is difficult to classify. In one aspect, he is an outcome, like Hodgskin, of the Philosophical Radicals, continuing their rationalism and their opposition to the romantics. In another aspect he is a revivifier of materialism, giving it a new interpretation and a new connection with human history. In yet another aspect he is the last of the great system-builders, the successor of Hegel, a believer, like him, in a rational formula summing up the evolution of mankind. Emphasis upon any one of these aspects at the expense of the others gives a false and distorted view of his philosophy.> Well, until now I never thought of Marx as a philosopher ...

p.749: <He called himself a materialist, but not of the eighteenth-century sort. His sort, which, under Hegelian influence, he called 'dialectical', differed in an important way from traditional materialism, and was more akin to what is now called instrumentalism. The older materialism, he said, mistakenly regarded sensation as passive, and thus attributed activity primarily to the object. In Marx's view, all sensation or perception is an interaction between subject and object; the bare object, apart from the activity of the percipient, is a mere raw material, which is transformed in the process of becoming known. ... I think we may interpret Marx as meaning that the process which philosophers have called the pursuit of knowledge is not, as has been thought, one in which the object is constant while all the adaptation is on the part of the knower. On the contrary, both subject and object, both the knower and the thing known, are in a continual process of mutual adaptation. He calls the process 'dialectical' because it is never fully completed.> It seems to me that Marx's <dialectical> is what I call 'iterative', and <instrumentalism> is what I call the 'toolkit approach'. (See link below, but with the proviso that its definition of 'Instrumentalism' may be quite different from Russell's.) I'd prefer not to be labelled as an 'instrumentalist', however.

pp.750-753: <The politics, religion, philosophy, and art of any epoch in human history are, according to Marx, an outcome of its methods of production, and, to a lesser extent, of distribution. I think he would not maintain that this applies to all the niceties of culture, but only to its broad outlines. The doctrine is called the 'materialist conception of history'. This is a very important thesis; in particular, it concerns the historian of philosophy. I do not myself accept the thesis as it stands, but I think that it contains very important elements of truth, and I am aware that it has influenced my own views of philosophical development as set forth in the present work. Let us, to begin with, consider the history of philosophy in relation to Marx's doctrine. | Subjectively, every philosopher appears to himself to be engaged in the pursuit of something which may be called 'truth'. Philosophers may differ as to the definition of 'truth', but at any rate it is something objective, something which, in some sense, everybody ought to accept. No man would engage in the pursuit of philosophy if he thought that *all* philosophy is *merely* an expression of irrational bias. But every philosopher will agree that many other philosophers have been actuated by bias, and have had extra-rational reasons, of which they were usually unconscious, for many of their opinions. Marx, like the rest, believes in the truth of his own doctrines; he does not regard them as nothing but an expression of the feelings natural to a rebellious middle-class German Jew in the middle of the nineteenth century. What can be said about this conflict between the subjective and objective views of a philosophy? ... The truth of the matter is really fairly simple. What is conventionally called 'philosophy' consists of two very different elements. On the one hand, there are questions which are scientific or logical; these are amenable to methods as to which there is general agreement. On the other hand, there are questions of passionate interest to large numbers of people, as to which there is no solid evidence either way. Among the latter are practical questions, as to which it is impossible to remain aloof. When there is a war, I must support my own country or come into painful conflict both with friends and with the authorities. At many times there has been

no middle course between supporting and opposing the official religion. For one reason or another, we all find it impossible to maintain an attitude of sceptical detachment on many issues as to which pure reason is silent. A 'philosophy', in a very usual sense of the word, is an organic whole of such extra-rational decisions. It is in regard to 'philosophy' in this sense that Marx's contention is largely true. But even in this sense a philosophy is determined by other social causes as well as by those that are economic. War, especially, has its share in historical causation; and victory in war does not always go to the side with the greatest economic resources.> In this passage, as well as analysing Marx's <materialist conception of history>, Russell sets out his own definition of <philosophy>, which <consists of two very different elements>: the analysis of <questions which are scientific or logical> by means of <methods as to which there is general agreement>; and the declaration of a personal <philosophy> which comprises <an organic whole of ... extra-rational decisions>. Guided by this definition it becomes clear that in writing this book Russell has largely confined himself to the former mode of critical analysis, and hasn't exploited the opportunity to set out his own philosophy. Thus all we get from Russell 'himself' is an occasional opinion or polemic, but there's nothing to show that these have been derived from <an organic whole of ... extra-rational decisions>. On the one hand, this shows admirable rigour and restraint; but, on the other hand, it's not much help when it comes to answering the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14. As may be apparent from my exasperation in relation to pp.550-551 above, my own approach is quite different. In 1983 I commenced a postgraduate course in Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics, during which I found that "I disliked and agitated against the tradition of Western philosophy of only criticizing established ideas and not proposing better alternatives", see HMM p.25. Of course, to begin with "my own dogged attempts at 'proposing better alternatives' were childishly simplistic and not obviously any better than the ideas that they were supposed to replace", but after forty years' iteration they've improved beyond measure. Indeed they are the basis of MyPhilosophy03.pdf and Review05.pdf, which are the primary references for my comments throughout this review. As for whether *my* philosophy answers the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14: I'll suspend judgment on that until the end.

pp.754-755: <Modern Europe and America have thus been divided, politically and ideologically, into three camps. There are Liberals, who still, as far as may be, follow Locke or Bentham, but with varying degrees of adaptation to the needs of industrial organization. There are Marxists, who control the government in Russia, and are likely to become increasingly influential in various other countries. These two sections of opinion are philosophically not very widely separated; both are rationalistic, and both, in intention, are scientific and empirical. But from the point of view of practical politics the division is sharp. It appears already in the letter of James Mill quoted in the preceding chapter, saying 'their notions of property look ugly'. | It must, however, be admitted that there are certain respects in which the rationalism of Marx is subject to limitations. Although he holds that his interpretation of the trend of development is true, and will be borne out by events, he believes that the argument will only appeal (apart from rare exceptions) to those whose class interest is in agreement with it. He hopes little from persuasion, everything from the class war. He is thus committed in practice to power politics, and to the doctrine of a master class, though not of a master race. It is true that, as a result of the social revolution, the division of classes is expected ultimately to disappear, giving place to complete political and economic harmony. But this is a distant ideal, like the Second Coming; in the meantime, there is war and dictatorship, and insistence upon ideological orthodoxy. | The third section of modern opinion, represented politically by Nazis and Fascists, differs philosophically from the other two far more profoundly than they differ from each other. It is anti-rational and anti-scientific. Its philosophical progenitors are Rousseau, Fichte, and Nietzsche. It emphasizes will, especially will to power; this it believes to be mainly concentrated in certain races and individuals, who therefore have a right to rule. | Until Rousseau, the philosophical world had a certain unity. This has disappeared for the time being, but perhaps not for long. It can be recovered by a rationalistic reconquest of men's minds, but not in any other way, since claims to mastery can only breed strife.> Another insightful history lesson.

pp.756-765, <Chapter XXVIII | Bergson>: <Henri Bergson was the leading French philosopher of the present century. He influenced William James and Whitehead, and had a considerable effect upon French thought. Sorel, who was a vehement advocate of syndicalism and the author of a book called *Reflections on Violence*, used Bergsonian irrationalism to justify a revolutionary labour movement having no definite goal. In the end, however, Sorel abandoned syndicalism and became a royalist. The main effect of Bergson's philosophy was conservative, and it harmonized easily with the movement which culminated in Vichy. ... a large part of Bergson's philosophy, probably the part to which most of its popularity is due, does not depend upon argument, and cannot be upset by argument. His imaginative picture of the world, regarded as a poetic effort, is in the main not capable of either proof or disproof. Shakespeare says life's but a walking shadow, Shelley says it is like a dome of many-coloured glass, Bergson says it is a shell which bursts into parts that are again shells. If you like Bergson's image better, it is just as legitimate. | The good which Bergson hopes to see realized in the world is action for the sake of action. ... Those to whom activity without purpose seems a sufficient good will find in Bergson's books a pleasing picture of the universe. But those to whom action, if it is to be of any value, must be inspired by some vision, by some imaginative foreshadowing of a world less painful, less unjust, less full of strife than the world of our everyday life, those, in a word, whose action is built on contemplation, will find in this philosophy nothing of what they seek, and will not regret that there is no reason to think it true.> Well, that about wraps it up for <the leading French philosopher of the present century>.

pp.766-773, <Chapter XXIX | William James>: <William James (1842-1910) was primarily a psychologist, but was important in philosophy on two accounts: he invented the doctrine which he called 'radical empiricism', and he was one of the three protagonists of the theory called 'pragmatism' or 'instrumentalism'. In later life he was, as he deserved to be, the recognized leader of American philosophy. He was led by the study of medicine to the consideration of psychology; his great book on the subject, published in 1890, had the highest possible excellence. I shall not, however, deal with it, since it was a contribution to science rather than to philosophy. ... James's doctrine of radical empiricism was first published in 1904, in an essay called 'Does "Consciousness" Exist?' The main purpose of this essay was to deny that the subject-object relation is fundamental. It had, until then, been taken for granted by philosophers that there is a kind of occurrence called 'knowing', in which one entity, the knower or subject, is aware of another, the thing known or the object. The knower was regarded as a mind or soul; the object known might be a material object, an eternal essence, another mind, or, in self-consciousness, identical with the knower. Almost everything in accepted philosophy was bound up with the dualism of subject and object. The distinction of mind and matter, the contemplative ideal, and the traditional notion of 'truth', all need to be radically reconsidered if the distinction of subject and object is not accepted as fundamental. | For my part, I am convinced that James was right on this matter, and would, on this ground alone, deserve a high place among philosophers. ... It is otherwise with his pragmatism and 'will to believe'. The latter, especially, seems to me to be designed to afford a specious but sophisticated defence of certain religious dogmas – a defence, moreover, which no whole-hearted believer could accept. ... James's doctrine is an attempt to build a superstructure of belief upon a foundation of scepticism, and like all such attempts it is dependent on fallacies. In his case the fallacies spring from an attempt to ignore all extra-human facts. Berkeleian idealism combined with scepticism causes him to substitute belief in God for God, and to pretend that this will do just as well. But this is only a form of the subjectivistic madness which is characteristic of most modern philosophy.> Well, that about wraps it up for <the recognized leader of American philosophy>.

pp.774-782, <Chapter XXX | John Dewey>: <John Dewey, who was born in 1859, is generally admitted to be the leading living philosopher of America. In this estimate I entirely concur. He has had a profound influence, not only among philosophers, but on students of education, aesthetics, and political theory. He is a man of the highest character, liberal in outlook, generous and kind in personal relations, indefatigable in work. With most of his opinions I am in almost complete agreement. Owing to my respect and admiration for him, as well as to personal experience of his kindness, I should wish to agree completely, but to my regret I am compelled to dissent from his most distinctive philosophical doctrine, namely the substitution of ‘inquiry’ for ‘truth’ as the fundamental concept of logic and theory of knowledge. ... Dr. Dewey’s world, it seems to me, is one in which human beings occupy the imagination; the cosmos of astronomy, though of course acknowledged to exist, is at most times ignored. His philosophy is a power philosophy, though not, like Nietzsche’s, a philosophy of individual power; it is the power of the community that is felt to be valuable. It is this element of social power that seems to me to make the philosophy of instrumentalism attractive to those who are more impressed by our new control over natural forces than by the limitations to which that control is still subject. ... In all this I feel a grave danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety. The concept of ‘truth’ as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness – the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte, and to which modern men, whether philosophers or not, are prone. I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster.>  
Well, that about wraps it up for <the leading living philosopher of America>.

pp.788-789: <Modern analytical empiricism, of which I have been giving an outline, differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, as compared with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble. | There remains, however, a vast field, traditionally included in philosophy, where scientific methods are inadequate. This field includes ultimate questions of value; science alone, for example, cannot prove that it is bad to enjoy the infliction of cruelty. Whatever can be known, can be known by means of science; but things which are legitimately matters of feeling lie outside its province. | Philosophy, throughout its history, has consisted of two parts inharmoniously blended: on the one hand a theory as to the nature of the world, on the other an ethical or political doctrine as to the best way of living. The failure to separate these two with sufficient clarity has been a source of much confused thinking. Philosophers, from Plato to William James, have allowed their opinions as to the constitution of the universe to be influenced by the desire for edification: knowing, as they supposed, what beliefs would make men virtuous, they have invented arguments, often very sophisticated, to prove that these beliefs are true. For my part I reprobate this kind of bias, both on moral and on intellectual grounds. Morally, a philosopher who uses his professional competence for anything except a disinterested search for truth is guilty of a kind of treachery. And when he assumes, in advance of inquiry, that certain beliefs, whether true or false, are such as to promote good behaviour, he is so limiting the scope of philosophical speculation as to make philosophy trivial; the true philosopher is prepared to examine all preconceptions. When any limits are placed, consciously or unconsciously, upon the pursuit of truth, philosophy becomes paralysed by fear, and the ground is prepared for a government censorship punishing those who utter ‘dangerous thoughts’ – in fact, the philosopher has already placed such a censorship over his own investigations. | Intellectually, the effect of mistaken moral

considerations upon philosophy has been to impede progress to an extraordinary extent. I do not myself believe that philosophy can either prove or disprove the truth of religious dogmas, but ever since Plato most philosophers have considered it part of their business to produce ‘proofs’ of immortality and the existence of God. They have found fault with the proofs of their predecessors – St Thomas rejected St Anselm’s proofs, and Kant rejected Descartes’ – but they have supplied new ones of their own. In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have had to falsify logic, to make mathematics mystical, and to pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions. | All this is rejected by the philosophers who make logical analysis the main business of philosophy. They confess frankly that the human intellect is unable to find conclusive answers to many questions of profound importance to mankind, but they refuse to believe that there is some ‘higher’ way of knowing, by which we can discover truths hidden from science and the intellect. For this renunciation they have been rewarded by the discovery that many questions, formerly obscured by the fog of metaphysics, can be answered with precision, and by objective methods which introduce nothing of the philosopher’s temperament except the desire to understand. Take such questions as: What is number? What are space and time? What is mind, and what is matter? I do not say that we can here and now give definitive answers to all these ancient questions, but I do say that a method has been discovered by which, as in science, we can make successive approximations to the truth, in which each new stage results from an improvement, not a rejection, of what has gone before. | In the welter of conflicting fanaticisms, one of the few unifying forces is scientific truthfulness, by which I mean the habit of basing our beliefs upon observations and inferences as impersonal, and as much divested of local and temperamental bias, as is possible for human beings. To have insisted upon the introduction of this virtue into philosophy, and to have invented a powerful method by which it can be rendered fruitful, are the chief merits of the philosophical school of which I am a member. The habit of careful veracity acquired in the practice of this philosophical method can be extended to the whole sphere of human activity, producing, wherever it exists, a lessening of fanaticism with an increasing capacity of sympathy and mutual understanding. In abandoning a part of its dogmatic pretensions, philosophy does not cease to suggest and inspire a way of life.> Russell’s closing paragraphs, in which he makes a strong case for <Modern analytical empiricism>. Owing to his fine rhetoric this is all very impressive and persuasive; until one recalls the questions that he posed on pp.13-14, and reflects that he doesn’t even try to answer them, presumably because in his opinion <the human intellect is unable to find conclusive answers to many questions of profound importance to mankind>. So why did he list those questions in the first place? And why are they not mentioned again? Russell claims that his methods <resemble those of science>, so it’s reasonable to expect that at some point he would refer back to his opening questions, if only to report a lack of progress. After all, the first thing one learns in school science is how to write up an experiment, typically with headings { Aim, Theory, Experiment, Result, Conclusion }. But Russell has jumped straight to the answer without assessing progress against preset targets, which wouldn’t pass muster at school, let alone in <the whole sphere of human activity>. So how, precisely, is his proposed solution any different from the edicts of those who <pretend that deep-seated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions>? I’m not saying he’s wrong, necessarily; I’m simply having him “hoist with his own petard”.

### Summary observations and conclusions

Bertrand Russell's *History of Western Philosophy* sets out all the evidence one needs in order to be confirmed in the belief that "You can't get an 'ought' from an 'is', or vice versa". That is, philosophy ought to be about the 'search for truth', but sadly it's been anything but. Instead, throughout history philosophers have unthinkingly followed one of the five idols:

IDEAL	Idol	Instances
Empiricist	Passion	Sexism, Racism, Romanticism, Nationalism
Idealist	Personality	Plato, Aristotle, Jesus, Marx
Activist	Power	Alexander, the Romans, Napoleon, Hitler
Conformist	Property	The Church, the Renaissance, Liberalism, Capitalism
Theorist	Procedure	Socratic doubt, 'scientific method', Hegelian dialectic, analytical empiricism

As a result, the contribution of philosophers ancient and modern to answering the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14 has been <practically *nil*>. In my imagination there's a cynical Harry Lime character remarking, 'In the West we've had 2500 years of searching after truth, and what has that produced? The devotion to doubt.'

It's not so bad. This is the best philosophy book I've ever read. Before Russell, no-one had written anything like it; after him, no-one will ever need to. For this reason I consider him to be the greatest of modern philosophers – even though I don't subscribe to his philosophy of disbelief.

As for my philosophy: my read-through comments above provide ample evidence in support of my view that there's no major philosophical problem which hasn't been addressed, with significant new understanding, in MyPhilosophy03.pdf and Review05.pdf. The easiest way to test this claim is to cross-check the 'fundamental questions' of pp.13-14 against my contributions to the Review05.pdf "five main areas of philosophical enquiry". Another test is to ask, "Roger, how is your approach any different from that of the 'five idols'?" To which I'd reply, "That's a good question, I'm glad you asked it. In my view these 'idols' are five distinct 'ways of learning about the world', and it's by following *all* of them – each in its own way, but none too much – that a person may attain the <'higher' way of knowing> in which Russell expresses such disbelief." And I'd emphasise that 'my philosophy' isn't the finished article, rather it's just the latest draft, a working hypothesis, because anything else would be a betrayal of my notion of 'scientific method'.

In conclusion: Bertrand Russell is the greatest of modern philosophers; a giant on whose shoulders I stand.



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